Opinion
Nicu Popescu: In 2014, Moldova dropped the anchor on the European path
Nicu Popescu, expert at the European Institute for Security Studies in Paris, said that currently, the situation in the region is very fluid and difficult to predict. However, in 2014 Moldova managed to drop several anchors designed to maintain it in future on the European path, says Nicu Popescu.
Nicu Popescu: The situation is very fluid. You know it that some months ago Russia believed it obtained a kind of victory in the case of Ukraine: Crimea has been annexed, the Ukraine was practically ruined …And all of a sudden, the Russian economy deteriorated, the price of oil dropped … So we cannot be certain with regard to such countries as Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. And this is a big disadvantage. Obviously, from a strategic perspective, the situation in Romania, Lithuania and Poland is more predictable and more irreversible than that of Moldova and Ukraine.
On the other hand, Moldova has made firm steps dropping strong anchors in the European space. This is about the visa liberalization and in the long-term future, if the Chisinau government doesn’t make big mistakes in the foreign and domestic policy, the Moldovan citizens will be able to travel without visas in the EU countries. And this is very important.
Another very strong anchor is the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. The Association Agreement and the Free Trade Area with the EU is a great opportunity. We have already observed the first positive effects as a result of the increase in the agricultural exports to the EU. But I assure you that no major Western investor will come to Moldova just because of the Association Agreement. There should be substantial improvements in the business environment, fighting against corruption and the judiciary reform.
Another effect of the Association Agreement is that it will make it more difficult for Moldova, including for any left-wing government, for a period of more than 3, 5 or 10 years, and practically impossible, to reorient towards the Eurasian Union in the conditions when more than half of the Moldovan trade is with the EU, but also because Ukraine will not join the Eurasian Union in the foreseeable future due to its de facto war with Russia. All these circumstances make it almost impossible for Moldova to reorient towards Asia. Any government will have to take into account these economic and political anchors that Moldova and the pro-European government has dropped in the EU in recent years.
Lina Grâu: You are speaking of anchors, but there are also threats for Moldova on its European way. What are the main things that could, in the worst scenario, compromise this way?
N.P.: I think the main threats are of internal nature as the Moldovan state, the state institutions are largely decayed. Some institutions have improved their functionality in recent years, but the cases of successful institutional reforms are still very few. Moldova continues to be a rotten state because of corruption, the political class of both right and left-wing which discredited itself in the eyes of the population, the justice system, the inefficient system of tax collection, and the business climate which puts excessive pressure on the businesses and which failed to create good working conditions.
So, in all these respects, the state remains rotten, creating opportunities for complications of internal nature – the disappointment of the population increases, the popularity of the Eurasian illusion is on the rise as well as the wish of a large part of the population to have strong leaders such as Putin and Lukashenko…
All these internal problems create opportunities for external factors. Firstly, let’s put it straight that the Russian Federation is investing in the building of its Eurasian dream project of post-Soviet reintegration. Obviously, in this process Russia is taking advantage of the internal weaknesses of the post-Soviet states. We have seen what Russian has done in Ukraine in the last year: infiltration into Donbass and annexation of Crimea as well as the connections based on corruption with the Yanukovych regime. All these things were possible because Ukraine was a rotten and corrupt state having offered to Russia ample opportunities of exploiting its weaknesses…
Things are very different in the Baltic States that have a much greater institutional resistance to Russia. This is true even in Georgia, thanks to the efforts of Saakashvili who reformed the police and special services, including the counter-intelligence and the military. Russia’s ability to infiltrate and influence from inside the situation in a country like Georgia and Lithuania is much lower than Russia’s ability to influence the internal situation and politics of countries like Ukraine or Moldova. In this sense, the external factors resort to manipulation whenever it is allowed by the corrupt political class and unreformed state institutions, which provide the external actors with possibilities for geopolitical manipulation.
L.G.: What you are saying is that for Moldova, even against the background of a rather slack Russia due to the economic problems, the threat of destabilization of the situation and manipulation of the political sphere, including in the perspective of local elections from next summer, will persist also in 2015?
N.P.: Yes, it will. Well, in 2014 Russia’s attention was directed toward Ukraine at all levels –at the political level, the level of foreign policy resources, special services and the army. Obviously, this meant that Russia did not deal with other post-Soviet states with the same determination as in the case of Ukraine. And this gave the Republic of Moldova and other states a little more time to pursue their internal and external policies, as they had been determined by the domestic political consensus.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that Russia will invade Moldova openly, but it can use instead more subtle and cheaper mechanisms and fewer resources than it used in the case of the intervention in Ukraine. This was partly observed in the election campaign: pressure, media interventions, propaganda on the Russian channels, open support to certain political forces, partnerships with political parties in Moldova, not necessarily open ones… So, Russia has applied in Moldova all these influence methods in the last 20 years and will continue to do so.
And in this sense, the true answer to the security and stability in Moldova is not so much the hope that Russia will cease to do this type of foreign policy interventions that Moldova’s increased immunity to these “geopolitical viruses”. However, this immunity refers to the police reform, the reform of the army, the transparency of the parties’ financing, the strength of the banking system … The main question Moldova should ask itself is to what extent the elites can deal with self-cleaning and self-strengthening?
L.G.: The Parliamentary elections that took place at the end of November have been much commented, including in the sense that the vote cast by Moldovans was not so supportive of the winning parties but of the European course. The fact that the parties were not able to form a coalition by the end of the year and that there have been discussions about attracting the Communist Party into the coalition, what do these facts speak about the Moldovan political class and to what extent can things change in the country with the present political class?
N.P.: The fact that the negotiations over the new coalition have taken a few weeks since the elections is not a new thing for Moldova and neither for the region. The very speed with which this is done is not so much of a concern for me, though, obviously, in particular in the conditions of Moldova, a quicker agreement would have been beneficial.
Ultimately, what matters is to see if the political class understood the lesson of Ukraine on the one hand, and on the other hand, the lesson of the parliamentary elections in Moldova.
The lesson of Ukraine is that a rotten, dysfunctional and corrupt state is offering opportunities to external and internal forces, and can ultimately question the existence of the state. I personally have not seen a significant change in the domestic policy trajectory of Moldova between March, when the annexation of Crimea took place, and November. I have not seen any intensification of the fight against corruption or new reform efforts given the election campaign, either. Instead of focusing on analyses and improvement of the domestic policies, all the political forces have relied on the rather simplistic geopolitical factor: East or West. This seems to be what they have learned from the Ukrainian experience.
The second lesson which remains to be seen if the new centre-right government will learn – which eventually provides the Communist Party with a degree of participation in power – is that the popularity of the European integration idea in the Republic Moldova cannot be regarded as irreversible at the level of the public opinion and that the government failures, including the failure to combat corruption, can lead to the discrediting of the European integration policies, creating structural problems in future.
Ultimately, I think that all centre-right parties – PD, PLDM and LP – need a very serious internal reset. We have seen that many of the representatives of these parties had lost their energy and desire to continue the reforms.
In 2009, the people wanted a change and the change was embodied then by the centre-right parties. And now again the Moldovan population wants a change because in the recent years the government has not responded to several crucial questions such as corruption, for example. So the Moldovan population has not stopped waiting for change and this time the change seemed to have come from Dodon and Usatîi, which is very dangerous.
If in the next one to two years the centre-right parties do not offer a real change to the Moldovan citizens, there is a serious risk that “the Eurasian change” will create systemic risks for Moldova in the next election cycles.
L.G.: In the context of the governance change, look at the example of Ukraine, where European and American citizens were invited to serve as ministers. Do you think such a development is possible also in the Republic of Moldova?
N.P.: I think this would be technically possible in Moldova and it would be even easier to realize than in Ukraine. Ukraine does not recognize dual citizenship and these new ministers have renounced their previous citizenship – Lithuanian, American and Georgian – in order to take the citizenship of Ukraine. In Moldova such a problem wouldn’t exist as Moldova allows dual citizenship.
Frankly speaking, my impression is that the political class in Chisinau is not ready and does not want a re-start and acceleration of reforms which could come including with such possible appointments. And there is another aspect: after all, if you really want serious reforms, this cannot be necessarily done with foreigners. You can do it by means of attracting more Moldovans from outside, those who have vision and experience in business, large international banks and other areas. There are thousands and thousands of experienced Moldovans working for the biggest companies in the world.
But my impression is that the current political class doesn’t want real changes in the government methods. There were some exceptions though, such as for example, the Minister of Education, Maia Sandu. But, ultimately, I do not see how the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party can provide the government with new faces, potentially more competent and less corrupt people than we have seen in recent years.
And then, it is not necessary to focus only on ministries. For example, why cannot the management method of the four key state institutions such as the Tax and Customs Inspectorate on one hand, and the General Prosecutor’s Office and the National Anti-Corruption Center on the other hand, be reformed? Removing the political influence over these four institutions and appointment in the management structures of people with credibility, regardless of whether or not they are citizens of the Republic of Moldova, could seriously change the way Moldova is governed. And we have seen it clearly at the last elections that the current governance methods do not inspire much confidence among the citizens.
Lina Grâu: One of the important things that will happen in 2015 will be the Riga Summit where Moldova will submit its application for the EU membership. Is this objective feasible and what should be the priorities of the Moldovan government in order to insure the European course?
Nicu Popescu: The Brussels’s decision on this membership application will not be made based on the symbolism or timing of the application but rather on what Moldova has done in order to get closer to the European standards and implement the Association Agreement.
A lot of things happening in Moldova raise big question marks in the European Union: the situation around the concession of the airport and around the Savings Bank, the money laundering through the Moldovan banks in amount of $ 17 billion and many other things that shouldn’t have happened in a functional state. Nobody wants a dysfunctional state in the European Union.
And in this sense, yes, Moldova can submit the membership application, but the European Union will be able to give a real answer only in a few years, after it analyses if Moldova improved its governance, has less corruption, if the European investors confront with fewer problems in relation to the state institutions of the Republic of Moldova.
The interview was done by Lina Grâu, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova.
This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
***
The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!
In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.
During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.
The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.
For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!
Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.
For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…
Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.
A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.
Nicholas Dima, January 1, 2022
A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
“People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or proof of certain acts of corruption in the press. Appropriate reaction of authorities is expected even more when the country has commitments in the field of promoting integrity and fighting corruption. The Republic of Moldova has made such commitments. Still, real and effective actions to ensure the proper functioning of most public institutions as a result of eliminating corrupt elements are not very visible,” it is mentioned in the study “Reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations into cases of integrity issues and corruption” launched during an online event organized by the Association of Independent Press and Transparency International Moldova on May 5.
The current study is the third published study after those conducted in 2017 and 2019. All of them aimed to observe the way authorities take into account, verify and sanction the facts described in various journalistic investigations. Another purpose was to monitor persons mentioned in the investigations, in order to see if integrity issues reported by journalists were taken into account when they were promoted or moved to another position.
The 2021 study includes 19 monitored investigations, published between August 2019 and December 2020 by media institutions specialized in conducting investigations in the field of integrity, corruption and organised crime (RISE Moldova, Investigative Journalism Center of Moldova, Ziarul de Garda, MoldovaCurata.md), as well as contains a retrospective of the authorities’ reactions as a consequence of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years.
Study insights
First of all, the investigations monitored in the study were followed by a reaction from either National Integrity Authority (NIA) – as most of the facts described in the monitored investigations concerned assets and conflicts of interest, which fall within the NIA scope of
competence – or other state institutions. The study showed that state authorities were lastly more keen to react to investigations and initiate controls, as compared to 2017 and 2019. In 2017, when 32 investigations were monitored, the percentage of cases with lack of reaction from state institutions was 26%. In 2019, out of the 26 monitored investigations the percentage of non-response cases was 42.3%. In the present study, which includes 19 monitored investigations, the percentage of cases with no reaction was 0%.
The results of introduced controls have been not fruitful yet. Of the 19 controls, 10 are still ongoing, 2 – rejected, 3 confirmed the facts stated in the investigations and 1 resulted in an ongoing criminal case.
Only 3 persons targeted in the monitored investigations became subjects of criminal cases. One person out of 3 was prosecuted directly for the facts described in the investigation, following a complaint filed by a third party. Moreover, “the results continue to indicate a certain degree of tolerance of institutions whose employees are targeted in journalistic investigations as having integrity issues,” is mentioned in the study. As compared to previous studies, no cases of promotion of persons with integrity problems were recorded (8 cases in 2017 and 2 cases in 2019). Still, out of 19 documented investigations, there was only one resignation for the reasons described in the investigation. That happened only after state institutions put pressure on the concerned institution. Also, there were 2 cases when the mentioned people resigned for other reasons than the accusations stated in the investigations.
When looking at the reaction of authorities in the case of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years, it can be observed that the facts described in the investigations had a greater impact on public opinion, but didn’t generate adequate and timely responses from the responsible institutions. Authorities reacted depending on the conjuncture and political reality, sometimes long after the publication of investigation. “With regard to investigations involving mismanagement of public money or alienation of public assets, it is extremely rare for those responsible to be brought to justice and for the material damage caused to be recovered.” Criminal cases were filed only after the change of government (politicians) or when officials become hostile to people in power (judges, prosecutors), as one of the study authors, Victor Mosneag, noticed.
“There is a perception that journalists conduct good investigations and nothing happens after that,” Viorica Zaharia, the second author, said. According to the author, the lack of authorities’ reaction discredit the institutions in charge of control and penalty, as well as media institutions that publish investigations. “We hope that through these studies, more pressure will be put on the authorities to pay more attention to journalistic investigations into conflict of interests, public procurement, assets that exceed the declared income, and so on,” mentioned Viorica Zaharia at the presentation event.
The study can be read here.
Photo: Volodymyr Hryshchenko| Unsplash
“They are not needy, but they need help”. How Moldovan volunteers try to create a safe environment for the Ukrainian refugees
Reading Time: 3 minutes At the Government’s ground floor, the phones ring constantly, the laptop screens never reach standby. In...
#WorldForUkraine – a map that shows the magnitude of the world’s actions against Russian aggression
Reading Time: 2 minutes The international community and volunteers from all over te world have launched #WorldForUkraine as a platform...
How is Moldova managing the big influx of Ukrainian refugees? The authorities’ plan, explained
Reading Time: 3 minutes From 24th to 28th of February, 71 359 Ukrainian citizens entered the territory of Republic of...
Russia And Ukraine At The Beginning of 2022
Reading Time: 4 minutes This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography...
The man raising children on Nistru river
Reading Time: 7 minutes On the Nistru, near the village of Varnița, a few colored pens with blue dots in...
The village of the first astronomer in the Republic of Moldova
Reading Time: 5 minutes From eight in the morning till noon, every Thursday and Sunday, people lay their merchandise on...
The prodigal son returns and turns his grandparents’ home in a tourist attraction on Nistru river
Reading Time: 7 minutes On the road towards the school, a well-maintained rural house catches your eye, yellow stags painted...
FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?
Reading Time: 4 minutes A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and...
Study// What is the reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations?
Reading Time: 3 minutes “People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or...
Secretary General of CoE called on Moldova’s state institutions to avoid constitutional crisis. Politicians took it the way they wanted.
Reading Time: 3 minutes At the beginning of this month, Speaker of Parliament, Zinaida Greceanii, sent a letter to Secretary...