Opinion
Memorandum Against the Planned Federalization of the Republic of Moldova
This memorandum against the federalization of the Republic of Moldova was written in the summer of 2002 by Ionas Aurelian Rus, at that time a graduate student in Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, currently Dr. Ionas Aurelian Rus, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati Blue Ash, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA. The other signatures were collected soon thereafter.
The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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We, the signers of this declaration, would like to express our disapproval toward the idea of the federalization of the Republic of Moldova. Some of our main arguments are related to public opinion and electoral results. A majority of the population of the areas under the control of the government of the Republic of Moldova would prefer a more centralized form of government than the proposed federation. In addition, federalization is against the program of the ruling Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, whose leader, President Vladimir Voronin, has recently endorsed the idea of federalization. Moreover, federalization would be unconstitutional. On issues such as the one discussed in this declaration, the constitution may only be revised through a referendum in which a majority of the registered voters of the Republic of Moldova would participate. Finally, we believe that the attempt to push through the federalization plan in the current context is likely to destabilize the situation, possibly to a level unprecedented in the history of post-Soviet Moldova.
The first argument against the federalization of the Republic of Moldova is the opposition of public opinion. The evidence that a large majority of the population of Moldova has been opposed to the transformation of Transnistria into a federal unit of Moldova since the Transnistrian conflict of 1992 comes from a large number of opinion polls. The first such poll was conducted in June and July 1992 within the part of the Republic of Moldova that was not under the control of the Transnistrian secessionist authorities by Professor William Crowther of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the author of the country study on Moldova in the prestigious series of country studies of the largest and most prestigious library in the world, the Library of Congress [Helen Fedor, Belarus and Moldova : Country Studies , (Washington, D.C. : Library of Congress, c1995)]. The survey was funded by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, with the support of the Duke University Center for East West Trade, Communication and Investment. (For more details, see Professor Crowther’s unpublished manuscript, “The Construction of Moldovan National Consciousness”.) The survey was administered by the personnel of the Institutes of Ethnography and Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova and by the National Institute of Sociology of Moldova. The results may be found in various published scholarly articles and manuscripts.
The data presented below comes from William Crowther, “Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova”, in Donald L. Dyer (ed.), STUDIES IN MOLDOVAN: THE HISTORY, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE OF MOLDOVA, (East European Monographs, Boulder, 1996). About 81.6% of all the ethnic Moldovans/Romanians (who represented 70.3% of the polling sample) desired the area to remain a part of the Republic of Moldova in comparison to 6.8% who desired the federalization of the country and 4.2% who favored Transnistrian independence. Among ethnic Ukrainians (12.2%), the figures were 46.0%, 27.9% and 10.6%, while among ethnic Russians (10.8%), the numbers were 45.6%, 30.8% and 8.3%. See Crowther, “Nationalism and Political Transformation”, p. 40, 46 (table), 49 as well as William Crowther, “Ethnic Politics and the Post-Communist Transition in Moldova”, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, no. 1, March 1998, p. 161. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants desired arrangements in which the Moldovan state would be more centralized than a federal state.
A very similar picture is provided by a more recent poll, conducted in late April 2000 by Vladimir Kolosov and Dmitriy Zayats with the collaboration of Luminita Drumea of Chisinau as well as N. G. Babilunga of Tiraspol. Only 7% of the population of the area controlled by the Moldovan authorities believed that Moldova and Transnistria should be joined together in a confederation and 11.9% desired that Moldova should become a federation of equal members. By contrast, 30.8% of the population believed that Transnistria should get a great deal of autonomy within Moldova, whereas 18.3%, including almost one-third of the ethnic Moldovans/Romanians, thought that Transnistria should form a number of regular counties within Moldova which should not benefit from any autonomy. The rest did not believe that the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict would be possible in the near future. Their lack of faith in the prospects for peace might be based on their realization that union on their terms (apparently almost always a preference for a unitary Republic of Moldova) would not be accepted by the other parties involved in the negotiations.
This latter scenario is suggested by another opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Social Technologies between 10 and 12 November 2001 in the city of Chisinau, the capital of the Republic of Moldova. Even though the Moldovans represented only 55.07% of the population of the city, 48.25% of its inhabitants believed that Transnistria should be an administrative territorial unit within the Republic of Moldova, while 18.47% of the population believed that Transnistria should be an autonomous unit within the Republic of Moldova. By contrast, 17.80% of the population believed that Moldova and the Dniester Moldovan Republic/Transnistria should be “equal subjects of a unitary state (federation)” and only 2.83% of the population believed that the two entities should be sovereign, independent states. The other inhabitants thought that it would be difficult to provide an answer, did not know or did not respond.
President Voronin has recently endorsed the idea of the federalization of the Republic of Moldova, and has praised the preliminary federalization plan proposed by the OSCE Mission in Chisinau. It is not legitimate to argue that the electoral victory of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova in February 2001 in some sense justifies the federalization of the Republic of Moldova. With this program, the party obtained 50.07% of the valid votes during the above-mentioned elections, states that “The party supports sovereign, independent, one and indivisible State” (sic). [A better translation would have been “The party pleads for a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state”.]
The federalization of the country is not allowed by the constitution. Article 1, section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova states, “The Republic of Moldova is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state.” Furthermore, article 10, section 1, states “The national unity of the Republic of Moldova constitutes the foundation of the State. The Republic of Moldova is the common and indivisible motherland of all her citizens.”
Any federalization plan may be implemented only after a revision of the constitution of the Republic of Moldova. Due to the importance of the issue, the federalization of the country may be achieved only through a referendum in which a majority of the registered voters participate. Article 142 states, “The provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the State may be revised only by referendum based on a majority vote of registered voting citizens.” Keeping in mind the state of public opinion, a majority of the voters in the country would most probably reject the federalization of the Republic of Moldova.
Another argument against federalization is the fact that it would negatively impact stability in the country, including by increasing political conflict and by causing massive rallies against the plan. A number of political parties in the Republic of Moldova have indicated their opposition against the federalization plan. These include the parliamentary Christian Democratic People’s Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party of Moldova. These parties and their predecessors (the Liberal Party has been created through the merger of a number of parties) have obtained 22.50% of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 2001. The preparations for the anti-federalization street protests have already started.
It is quite possible that, eventually, the protests against federalization would be the largest since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova. We should not forget the massive demonstrations earlier this year provoked by other issues. At that time, the positions of the demonstrators were supported by a somewhat smaller proportion of the population and by a combination of political parties that had obtained a slightly lower number of votes in the same elections. Moreover, the opposition against federalization is more evenly spread throughout the population, in the sense that there is much more center-left and ethnic minority support for the demands of the potential protesters. Even more importantly, the level of support for the Communists has decreased according to opinion polls to 32.4% of the total population. This figure is arguably lower than at any time since 2000, including than during the elections of 2001, when 33.4% of the registered voters cast their ballots for the party. Therefore, the pushing through of the federalization plan in the current context is likely to destabilize the situation, possibly to a level unprecedented in the history of post-Soviet Moldova.
While we disagree with his position, we fully agree with President Voronin’s statements in the above-mentioned declaration that this plan is unprecedented and that there is a significant level of criticism directed against the federalization of the Republic of Moldova. We also note that nothing in his declaration, or of anybody else’s statement in favor of the proposal, in any way contradicts the facts documented in our declaration.
Therefore, if the constitution of the Republic of Moldova and its democratic procedures would be followed, the federalization of the country should not take place in the foreseeable future due to a number of reasons, including the ones listed above. We are aware of an official OSCE proposal for the federalization of the Republic of Moldova, which has recently appeared in the governmental newspaper “Moldova Suverana” on July 9, 2002. We are also not certain about the extent to which the final version would diverge from this text. Therefore, our criticism against the proposed federalization of the Republic of Moldova would also apply to amended versions of the same plan that do not change its basic nature.
Therefore, we, the signers of this letter, would like to express our opposition against the idea of the federalization of the Republic of Moldova. Some of our main arguments are related to public opinion and electoral politics. A majority of the population of the areas under the control of the Republic of Moldova would prefer a more centralized form of government. Moreover, federalization is against the program of the ruling Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, regardless of the recent endorsement of the idea by its leader, President Vladimir Voronin. Other arguments deal with constitutional issues. Federalization would be unconstitutional. Moreover, the constitution may only be revised through a referendum in which a majority of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova would participate. Finally, we believe that the attempt to push through the federalization plan in the current context is likely to destabilize the situation, possibly to a level unprecedented in the history of post-Soviet Moldova.
Sincerely,
1. Ionas Aurelian Rus, New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America, 08901-1411, President of the European Studies Graduate Student Association
2. Oleg Brega, Chisinau, R.Moldova
3. Burdujan Radu, Briceni, R.Moldova
4. Septimiu Nechifor, Brasov, Romania
5. Jardan Cristian, mun.Ungheni, R. Moldova, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
6. Ioan Nicolescu, Canada
7. Liviu Cananau, Kitchener, Canada
8. Filip Antonio, London, UK
9. Vitalie Braniste, Chisinau
10. Anatol Caslaru
11. Liviu Bîrcã. Chisinau, Rep. Moldova
12. Iulian Stefan, München, Germany
13. Tatiana Basarab, MA student in International Relations, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
14. Marin Eladi, Societatea de Tineret pentru Drepturile Omului si Integrare Europeana “Nicolae Titulescu”, U.S.A.
15. Cosmin Pacuraru – journalist
16. Nicu Jechiu, Chisinau
17. Rodica Vermeiuc, Chisinau
18. Lia A. Ciocan, Cluj/Chisinau
19. E. Ionita, Bucuresti/Chisinau
20. A. Gribincea, Bucuresti
21. D. Maties, Chisinau
22. L. Badiceanu, Chisinau
23. T. Dascaliuc, Cluj
24. A. Jechiu, Cluj
25. E. Gregorian, Chisinau
26. Nicu Popescu
27. Emilia Rus, South Orange, New Jersey, U.S.A.
28. Ioan Rus, South Orange, New Jersey, U.S.A.
29. Smaranda CAZAN LIVESCU, English Language Professor, Founding President of the first Romanian-American Cultural Center, “Athenaeum” of Atlanta, Georgia, General Secretary of the World Romanian Counci/CMR, Director in the Board of Directors of the International Women’s Association, Director in the Board of Directors of the Dekalb International Cultures Center
30. Lucian I. Livescu, Founding President of the First American-Romanian Trade and Business Chamber of Georgia and the South East, President of the American Romanian Sister Cities Commission, Editor in Chief of “Romanian Times” – publication of the Romanian Cultural Center since 1990
31. Paul Diaconu, Doctor in Economics
32. C G Matasa
33. Dr. Carmen Sabau
34. Professor Doctor Mircea Sabau
35. Dacian Valentin, Pitesti, Romania
36. Ion Ditoiu, Hazleton, PA, USA
37. George Petrineanau, Linköping, Suedia
38. Andrei Doicin, Geneva, Elvetia
This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!
In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.
During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.
The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.
For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!
Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.
For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…
Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.
A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.
Nicholas Dima, January 1, 2022
A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
“People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or proof of certain acts of corruption in the press. Appropriate reaction of authorities is expected even more when the country has commitments in the field of promoting integrity and fighting corruption. The Republic of Moldova has made such commitments. Still, real and effective actions to ensure the proper functioning of most public institutions as a result of eliminating corrupt elements are not very visible,” it is mentioned in the study “Reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations into cases of integrity issues and corruption” launched during an online event organized by the Association of Independent Press and Transparency International Moldova on May 5.
The current study is the third published study after those conducted in 2017 and 2019. All of them aimed to observe the way authorities take into account, verify and sanction the facts described in various journalistic investigations. Another purpose was to monitor persons mentioned in the investigations, in order to see if integrity issues reported by journalists were taken into account when they were promoted or moved to another position.
The 2021 study includes 19 monitored investigations, published between August 2019 and December 2020 by media institutions specialized in conducting investigations in the field of integrity, corruption and organised crime (RISE Moldova, Investigative Journalism Center of Moldova, Ziarul de Garda, MoldovaCurata.md), as well as contains a retrospective of the authorities’ reactions as a consequence of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years.
Study insights
First of all, the investigations monitored in the study were followed by a reaction from either National Integrity Authority (NIA) – as most of the facts described in the monitored investigations concerned assets and conflicts of interest, which fall within the NIA scope of
competence – or other state institutions. The study showed that state authorities were lastly more keen to react to investigations and initiate controls, as compared to 2017 and 2019. In 2017, when 32 investigations were monitored, the percentage of cases with lack of reaction from state institutions was 26%. In 2019, out of the 26 monitored investigations the percentage of non-response cases was 42.3%. In the present study, which includes 19 monitored investigations, the percentage of cases with no reaction was 0%.
The results of introduced controls have been not fruitful yet. Of the 19 controls, 10 are still ongoing, 2 – rejected, 3 confirmed the facts stated in the investigations and 1 resulted in an ongoing criminal case.
Only 3 persons targeted in the monitored investigations became subjects of criminal cases. One person out of 3 was prosecuted directly for the facts described in the investigation, following a complaint filed by a third party. Moreover, “the results continue to indicate a certain degree of tolerance of institutions whose employees are targeted in journalistic investigations as having integrity issues,” is mentioned in the study. As compared to previous studies, no cases of promotion of persons with integrity problems were recorded (8 cases in 2017 and 2 cases in 2019). Still, out of 19 documented investigations, there was only one resignation for the reasons described in the investigation. That happened only after state institutions put pressure on the concerned institution. Also, there were 2 cases when the mentioned people resigned for other reasons than the accusations stated in the investigations.
When looking at the reaction of authorities in the case of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years, it can be observed that the facts described in the investigations had a greater impact on public opinion, but didn’t generate adequate and timely responses from the responsible institutions. Authorities reacted depending on the conjuncture and political reality, sometimes long after the publication of investigation. “With regard to investigations involving mismanagement of public money or alienation of public assets, it is extremely rare for those responsible to be brought to justice and for the material damage caused to be recovered.” Criminal cases were filed only after the change of government (politicians) or when officials become hostile to people in power (judges, prosecutors), as one of the study authors, Victor Mosneag, noticed.
“There is a perception that journalists conduct good investigations and nothing happens after that,” Viorica Zaharia, the second author, said. According to the author, the lack of authorities’ reaction discredit the institutions in charge of control and penalty, as well as media institutions that publish investigations. “We hope that through these studies, more pressure will be put on the authorities to pay more attention to journalistic investigations into conflict of interests, public procurement, assets that exceed the declared income, and so on,” mentioned Viorica Zaharia at the presentation event.
The study can be read here.
Photo: Volodymyr Hryshchenko| Unsplash
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