Opinion
Mark Tkaciuk and the negotiations on the Transnistrian issue
This opinion piece was written by Dr. Aurelia Felea and Dr. Ionas Aurelian Rus. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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Authors: Dr. Aurelia FELEA (Chisinau), Dr. Ionas Aurelian RUS, Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati Blue Ash (USA)
People following the evolution of the Transnistrian negotiations have had the opportunity to note that at most of these meetings, together with the Foreign Minister, the President of Moldova or other dignitaries, involve almost every time Vladimir Voronin’s former adviser on domestic policy issues, current political adviser Mark Tkaciuk. As the involvement of this official in foreign policy seemed to go beyond his formal duties, it is natural to ask what role Tkaciuk plays in the negotiations with Moscow and in what sense he can influence them. The effort is all the more justified as the speeches of the president and the councilor show remarkable ideational confluences.
Phoenix, counterweight to the movement initiated by Romanian historians
Mark Tkaciuk was born on September 26, 1966 in the city of Soroca. He comes from a mixed family, his mother being Armenian and his father Ukrainian. In the late 1980s, while studying at the Faculty of History of the State University of the capital of Soviet Moldova, Tkaciuk was part of a group of young people concerned with the history of his homeland. The group was called Fenix and operated under the auspices of the Komsomol organization in Chisinau. In the years 1988-1989, at the above-mentioned educational institution, there was the Bogdan-Petriceicu Hasdeu circle, created by the students of the History faculty, who refused to accept the official Soviet historiography and pleaded for an unadulterated, national history. Examined in retrospect, the work of the Fenix organization, almost unknown to the general public, may be seen as a counterweight to the vigorous and popular movement for the liberalization of historical thinking initiated by the Romanian ethnic historians.
In 1991, Tkaciuk studied in London, where, according to a source connected to a Western secret service, he came into contact with the British intelligence service MI-6. Tkaciuk received his doctorate in 1995, in St. Petersburg, with a topic on the Getae, the connections with the political and academic world of the former empire being, by all accounts, extremely important for his intellectual formation.
Organizer of the PCRM election campaign
Mark Tkaciuk appears among the supporters of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) on the eve of the 2001 elections. editor of the Communist newspaper, the press body of the PCRM.
Entering parliament on the party’s lists, Tkaciuk resigned as deputy in May 2002, saying he was returning to his scientific concerns. Shortly afterwards, he would become an adviser to the President of Moldova. He promptly, publicly and explicitly stated that he appreciated Vladimir Voronin, calling him “our beloved president.” The latter named Tkaciuk’s friend Alexei Tulbure as Moldova’s representative to the Council of Europe.
According to a Russian-language publication, in September of the same year, Tkaciuk met in Moscow with Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin’s deputy head of administration and one of the most influential politicians in Vladimir Putin’s entourage. At the time, the Russian presidency was working to create a subdivision, which would develop and promote new strategies for unrecognized states and enclaves in the post-Soviet space. At the heart of that discussion was the issue of privatization in Transnistria. Earlier, in August 2002, the Russian leadership had discussed with Abkhazian leaders the need to privatize state property in the republic so that at least some of the buyers would be Russian entrepreneurs.
The idol Che Guevara
The ideological preferences of the counselor may be said to be heterogeneous, with an emphasis on authoritarianism. The ideal of the young Tkaciuk was Ernesto Che Guevara, a revolutionary whom he still worships. In the 1990s, Tkaciuk leaned toward “anarchism as an anti-politics and as an ethic of daily assertion of freedom” and extolled the emancipatory mission of exceptional personalities. Although he describes in gloomy colors the situation in the USSR (“cumbersome state capitalism”, “venal partocracy”, etc.), he seems to nurture the conviction that, after 1990, the Soviet regime had to follow a different path than the one we know, but avoids identifying the alternative. In Tkaciuk’s treatment, the communist system did not collapse, but merged with the capitalist one, and the ideal of social equity has survived the socialist states and “continues its triumphant march on the planet.” Tkaciuk argues that it is not right for the words communism and democracy to be associated with the “monsters and rejects”, who periodically try to monopolize them. The historian ignores the reality accessible to common sense, but also important works of political philosophy, which highlight the immorality intrinsic to communist doctrine.
Tkaciuk disapproves in terms that leave no room for nuanced assessments of the state construction carried out for ten years after the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova. In his opinion, until 2001, Moldova was a “ghost state”, whose citizenship was only a “residence visa”, “a punctuation mark easy to face in southern European geopolitics”, a country where the abyss between citizens and officials is greater than anywhere else in the world and that people are constantly leaving. Tkaciuk suggests that at the root of the evil lies the national movement of the 1990s and that the “Romanian past” could in no way generate a “promising Moldovan present.”
The enemy of the Romanian past
In the understanding of Tkaciuk and the people in his circle, the Republic of Moldova is a point of contact between cultures and peoples, which must take advantage of its advantageous positioning to play the role of connector of civilizations. The same ideas are promoted by the archeology journal Stratum plus, which appears in Russian, under the auspices of the Higher Anthropological School in Chisinau, an institution founded and led by Tkaciuk. In the pages of the magazine appear from time to time articles dedicated to issues of medieval and modern history, which justifiy the occupation of Bessarabia by Russia in 1812, mock the modernization of Romania, appreciated as superficial, ridiculously mimetic in relation to Western European civilization (modernization that Bessarabia did not need to follow, because it had another, superior, model, Russia) and the post-Soviet Moldovan reality is treated with contempt.
According to Tkaciuk, the cultural elite in Moldova is horribly primitive. Regarding the opposition, the president’s adviser has repeatedly suggested that it is an evil comparable to fascism. In an interview with Nezavisimaja Moldova on May 14, 2004, he described most opposition forces as totalitarian sects, emerging from the former Soviet nomenclature, intellectually exhausted, and concerned exclusively with their own interests. The president’s adviser said they were subordinated to foreign political technologies, particularly from the United States, and would soon reach the end of a dramatic process of self-destruction. It is worth noting, among other things, the fact that in his essays and articles, Tkaciuk expressed his distrust of the values of Western civilization and ridiculed the scientists and political actors in the Republic of Moldova, who receive support from the West. Voronin also said that what happened after the proclamation of independence was a disaster and that the main enemy of the communists in power was the post-Soviet “nomenclature”, which he also called “feudal bureaucracy”. Following this line of thinking, one can only conclude that the only healthy political force in the Republic of Moldova is the Party of Communists and that the country must persist in its pro-Eastern orientation.
Extrapolates his own identity crisis
Although it refers to Western sources and currents of thought, the group of intellectuals to which Mark Tkaciuk adheres is mainly informed by works published in Russian. The aforementioned Stratum plus magazine pays homage almost exclusively to Soviet researchers in the Russian Federation.
Ultimately, the people in this category do not belong to the Bessarabian culture, of Romanian essence, nor to the Russian one. Moreover, they are resentful in relation to the eastern metropolis, insinuating that it does not give them enough consideration. From here probably come major internal tensions and an acute identity crisis, which he extrapolates to the majority population of the Republic of Moldova. This segment of the political elite questions the sincerity of the Bessarabians who identify with Romanianism, qualifying such manifestations as opportunistic. Moldovans are treated not with hatred or disrespect, but with a kind of condescending tolerance, which quickly metamorphoses into hostility if they try to define themselves as Romanians.
The ideologue of federalization
The position occupied by the presidency in settling the Transnistrian dispute is decrypted, to some extent, following the analysis of the opinions expressed on this issue, in various situations, by Tkaciuk. Coming to power in 2001 and relying on the fact that its ideological foundation, especially views on identity, the Soviet past, etc., are not fundamentally different from those shared by the Tiraspol leaders, the Communist Party leadership imagined that it would be able to resolve the Transnistrian conflict in the near future. In 2002, we find the president’s adviser, together with Alexei Tulbure, actively promoting the federalization plan of the Republic of Moldova, developed by the OSCE.
After the failure of the Kozak Plan, Tkaciuk was given a particularly delicate task – to explain the president’s sudden refusal to sign the document, after the “parties” had apparently reached a consensus at key moments. Dmitry Kozak is known to have commented on Voronin’s conduct in the fall of 2003 in an interview with Moscow’s Kommersant. Kozak claimed that Voronin had self-flagellated with the worst words, that he had deeply regretted the fact that he had disappointed Putin, etc. The Russian diplomat hinted that the “unpredictable” president of Moldova did not deserve respect: “Neither in everyday life, he concluded, nor in politics do you fall in such a state.”
Representatives of a part of the Russian elite
The president’s adviser offered his own version – unnaturally emotional for his situation – of the negotiations on the Memorandum. Tkaciuk’s answer was hosted by the same publication that interviewed Kozak. Tkaciuk claimed, among other things, that Chisinau officials were disturbed by the inclusion, at Kozak’s unexpected request, of the point about the Russian military presence, extended until 2020. Kozak said that such a stipulation was absolutely necessary to gain Tiraspol’s good will, but promised that the Russian armies would not stay for more than three years. The Russian diplomat, says Tkaciuk, assured Voronin that the most important actors on the world political scene – the OSCE, the USA, and the EU – had been informed of the content of the plan and that they had approved it; but when the Moldovan side began contacting European bodies, stating their position, it was learned that Russian officials had not arranged anything with anyone and were simply lying. Consequently, says Tkaciuk, the Chisinau leadership became aware of its own naivety, of the big game, but also of the fact that, in reality, “there is no independent Transnistrian party, only Transnistrian representatives of the interests of a certain part of the elite of the Russian Federation ”.
Simulation of the negotiation process
At first glance, the statements may pass as an indictment directed toward Moscow, if behind the guilt of “a certain part of the elite of the Russian Federation” there would be no tendency to save the attractive image of Russia as a whole and its top leadership. Recent developments, including the meetings of the Chisinau leaders with President Putin, seem to validate this interpretation. Note also that Tkaciuk claims the helplessness of small countries in the face of pressure from large states, the powerful Western states not being different in this respect from those in the East. The statement tends, in our opinion, to induce in society a feeling of powerlessness and communes, in a way, with the idea, circulated by the government, according to which any attempt to remedy the situation in Bessarabia – in the economic, political or cultural realm – is compromised from the start compromisă, as long as the Transnistrian conflict is not settled.
In 2006, Mark Tkaciuk and Vasile Sova visited Moscow, where they were supposed to discuss the prospect of a Moldova loyal to Russia, if the latter would help solve the Transnistrian problem. It should be noted that, although he vehemently criticized the alienation of Transnistrian companies operated by the separatist regime in Tiraspol, Voronin was also pleased that most of the new owners came from Russia. The Chisinau leadership continues to define Moldova’s relations with the Russian Federation as a “strategic partnership” after repeatedly declaring since 2004 that Russia maintains occupation forces in Moldova.
Mentally connected to the eastern space
The great drama of the Moldovan communists is their inability to understand – or openly admit – even after the Kremlin clearly undermined their 2005 election campaign, that Russia’s treatment of Moldova does not depend at all on “noble sentiments” nurtured by the leadership in Chisinau towards Moscow. The long-term maintenance of a party in power in Moldova, regardless of its ideological orientation, implies the stabilization of the situation and it can be argued that it is likely to generate favorable conditions for the reunification of the country. However, the international situation created after the fall of the USSR did not in any way allow the settlement of the dispute in the direction desired by Russia and the restoration of its control over the entire Moldova. That is why the power in the east has been interested over the years – and still is, for now – to simulate a process of negotiations, to procrastinate the conflict resolution and to periodically imbalance the political life from Chisinău.
As the political biography of the influential presidential adviser Mark Tkaciuk once again sees, the communist leaders continue to be mentally connected to the Eastern space and have not for a moment given up in their inner forum the authoritarian traditions of governance. They will continue to be tempted to settle the Transnistrian conflict in a voluntarist manner, mimicking the consultation of the people, but always keeping an eye on the reaction of the Kremlin leader.
First published in Jurnal de Chișinău
This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!
In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.
During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.
The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.
For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!
Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.
For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…
Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.
A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.
Nicholas Dima, January 1, 2022
A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
“People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or proof of certain acts of corruption in the press. Appropriate reaction of authorities is expected even more when the country has commitments in the field of promoting integrity and fighting corruption. The Republic of Moldova has made such commitments. Still, real and effective actions to ensure the proper functioning of most public institutions as a result of eliminating corrupt elements are not very visible,” it is mentioned in the study “Reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations into cases of integrity issues and corruption” launched during an online event organized by the Association of Independent Press and Transparency International Moldova on May 5.
The current study is the third published study after those conducted in 2017 and 2019. All of them aimed to observe the way authorities take into account, verify and sanction the facts described in various journalistic investigations. Another purpose was to monitor persons mentioned in the investigations, in order to see if integrity issues reported by journalists were taken into account when they were promoted or moved to another position.
The 2021 study includes 19 monitored investigations, published between August 2019 and December 2020 by media institutions specialized in conducting investigations in the field of integrity, corruption and organised crime (RISE Moldova, Investigative Journalism Center of Moldova, Ziarul de Garda, MoldovaCurata.md), as well as contains a retrospective of the authorities’ reactions as a consequence of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years.
Study insights
First of all, the investigations monitored in the study were followed by a reaction from either National Integrity Authority (NIA) – as most of the facts described in the monitored investigations concerned assets and conflicts of interest, which fall within the NIA scope of
competence – or other state institutions. The study showed that state authorities were lastly more keen to react to investigations and initiate controls, as compared to 2017 and 2019. In 2017, when 32 investigations were monitored, the percentage of cases with lack of reaction from state institutions was 26%. In 2019, out of the 26 monitored investigations the percentage of non-response cases was 42.3%. In the present study, which includes 19 monitored investigations, the percentage of cases with no reaction was 0%.
The results of introduced controls have been not fruitful yet. Of the 19 controls, 10 are still ongoing, 2 – rejected, 3 confirmed the facts stated in the investigations and 1 resulted in an ongoing criminal case.
Only 3 persons targeted in the monitored investigations became subjects of criminal cases. One person out of 3 was prosecuted directly for the facts described in the investigation, following a complaint filed by a third party. Moreover, “the results continue to indicate a certain degree of tolerance of institutions whose employees are targeted in journalistic investigations as having integrity issues,” is mentioned in the study. As compared to previous studies, no cases of promotion of persons with integrity problems were recorded (8 cases in 2017 and 2 cases in 2019). Still, out of 19 documented investigations, there was only one resignation for the reasons described in the investigation. That happened only after state institutions put pressure on the concerned institution. Also, there were 2 cases when the mentioned people resigned for other reasons than the accusations stated in the investigations.
When looking at the reaction of authorities in the case of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years, it can be observed that the facts described in the investigations had a greater impact on public opinion, but didn’t generate adequate and timely responses from the responsible institutions. Authorities reacted depending on the conjuncture and political reality, sometimes long after the publication of investigation. “With regard to investigations involving mismanagement of public money or alienation of public assets, it is extremely rare for those responsible to be brought to justice and for the material damage caused to be recovered.” Criminal cases were filed only after the change of government (politicians) or when officials become hostile to people in power (judges, prosecutors), as one of the study authors, Victor Mosneag, noticed.
“There is a perception that journalists conduct good investigations and nothing happens after that,” Viorica Zaharia, the second author, said. According to the author, the lack of authorities’ reaction discredit the institutions in charge of control and penalty, as well as media institutions that publish investigations. “We hope that through these studies, more pressure will be put on the authorities to pay more attention to journalistic investigations into conflict of interests, public procurement, assets that exceed the declared income, and so on,” mentioned Viorica Zaharia at the presentation event.
The study can be read here.
Photo: Volodymyr Hryshchenko| Unsplash
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