Opinion
Memorandum Against Making the Russian Language Official in Moldova
The letter to the OSCE Mission in Moldova, written on January 17, 2002, was authored by Dr. Ionas Aurelian Rus, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Cincinnati Blue Ash, at that time a graduate student (Ph.D. candidate) at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA.
The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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My name is Ionas Aurelian Rus. I am a graduate student (ABD) in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers, New Brunswick. I am also the President of the European Studies Graduate Student Association (ESGSA). This is apparently the only organization of its kind in the country whose citizens both of us are, the United States.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my concern and disapproval concerning the recent attempts by the Communist-controlled government and the Communist-dominated legislature to change the policy on the public use of languages in the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, there is a need to intervene in order to minimize the danger of gross violations of the freedom of assembly and association in Moldova. I shall elaborate on all of these issues below.
According to the mission statement of the OSCE mission in Moldova, it is the responsibility of your mission to “investigate specific incidents and assess their political implications … provide advice and expertise on human and minority rights, democratic transformation”, etc. I believe that the OSCE Mission in Moldova has the right, and indeed the duty, to express its concerns to the Moldovan government and to recommend a return to status quo ante.
I am sure that you are aware that a recent decision of the Minister of Education of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Ilie Vancea, has been hotly contested. The minister had decided to make the study of the Russian language mandatory (between the second and the tenth grade) in schools where the main language of instruction is not Russian. This provision applies overwhelmingly to Romanian language schools. This decision is unconstitutional, and it violates the Law of Education of 1995.
Another hotly contested measure is the submission to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova by the Communist members of the legislature, under the leadership of Victor Stepaniuc (Stepaniuk) of the text of a proposed amendment to the constitution of the Republic of Moldova. According to this proposed amendment, Russian would become the second official language of the Republic of Moldova.
Both of these positions are unpopular in the country as a whole. According to an opinion poll conducted in November 2001, both of these measures are disapproved by 58% of the population. The former is supported by only 35%, and the latter by 33%. According to another opinion poll conducted earlier in the year, the percentage of individuals who were in favor of an official status for the Russian language was 38%. This number includes 26.3% among ethnic Moldovans/Romanians, as opposed to 19% in November.
This apparent decrease in Moldovan/Romanian support for the policy might be a sign of increasing ethnic polarization on this issue and in general. An even better example is the increase in the proportion of the members of the ethnic minorities, and particularly of the Russian-speaking inhabitants, whose views are moving in the other direction. The proportion of inhabitants who believe that Russian should become a second official language has increased from 52.7% to 71% among ethnic Russians.
The increasing polarization on the linguistic issue over time (which is further documented below) has been caused by the propaganda of left-wing political forces. In 1994, this was done primarily by the Socialist Party and “Unitate-Edinstvo” Movement Bloc, which obtained 22% of the votes in the national elections. Between 1995 and 2002, the group that has been mainly responsible for this has been the Party of Communists in the Republic of Moldova. The electoral performance of this political group has improved from 15.74% of the vote in the local elections of 1995 to 50.07% of the vote in the national elections in 2001, that is, 33.40% of the individuals with the right to vote). These groups, as well as a few parties that obtained very few votes, have promised to give Russian the status of an official language. Yet this topic has moved increasingly toward the back of the Communist programmes, and has been de-emphasized, as the Communists have increasingly obtained support from individuals who do not favor this position.
Moreover, the support for the new proposed Communist linguistic policies has been in some ways “soft”. The proportion of the Romanian population that has been against mandatory education in Russian for Moldovans has not changed substantially (74% in 1992 and 69% in November 2001). By contrast, the proportion of the members of the Ukrainian minority that favor this has increased dramatically. Whereas only 19.5% of the ethnic Ukrainians believed that everyone should be taught Russian in 1992, the proportion in 2001 was 53% (the questions were not fully identical). Among ethnic Russians, the percentage has increased from 20.1% to 65%.
Of course, when different, but related, questions were asked in 1992, the proportions were different, which indicates the existence of certain complexities and ambiguities. The affirmative response to the question “Romanian Language should be required for minorities” was 80% among Moldovans, 43.2% among Ukrainians and 50.3% among Russians. In the case of the question, “Each group should be required to learn only its own language”, the proportions were 13.1% among Moldovans, 37.4% among Ukrainians and 27.2% among Russians. It would be false to claim that a majority of the members of the national minorities disapproved of the linguistic policies of the Moldovan government in 1992.
The bottom line is that the uncompromising attitude of the non-Romanian population has not been a constant since 1989-1991. Instead, it has increased because it has been fostered by the various political forces that have been mentioned above for both ideological and electoral reasons. I do not believe that this kind of politics should be rewarded through by overruling a clear majority that approves the status quo rather than the plans of the Communists.
For the results of the very informative and methodologically sound 1992 survey conducted by Professor William Crowther of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, whose data I have used above, one should consult his various published scholarly articles and manuscripts. The data presented above is from William Crowther, “Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova”, in Donald L. Dyer (ed.), STUDIES IN MOLDOVAN: THE HISTORY, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE OF MOLDOVA, (East European Monographs, Boulder, 1996).
What explains the relative softness and lack of consistency of the opinions of the members of the national minorities. First of all, Russian is a quasi-official language according to the constitution and various statutes, a language of interethnic communication, a kind of associate official language. Moreover, until now, Russian has been mandatory in the predominantly non-Russian language schools between the grades five and nine, for five years. This is the same number of years in which the English-speaking inhabitants of Anglophone Ontario, a province of officially bilingual Canada, study French.
Among ethnic Moldovans/Romanians, who represent more than 70% of the population in the areas controlled by the Chisinau government, the support for the status quo has been constant in surveys (see above), and has manifested itself through massive protests. At any rate, the supporters of the efforts to make and keep Romanian as the sole official language have included a large number of committed individuals. An estimated one million individuals assembled in Chisinau participated in a rally in late August 1989 in favor of making Romanian the official language in the republic. Thousands of individuals have participated in street demonstrations and rallies since January 9, 2002 against the changes pushed by the Communists.
By Thursday, January 17, 1:47 AM EST, over 26,000 plus 5,517 individuals have signed the text of two petitions, a regular and an inline one, against these policies. The former has been sponsored primarily by the Christian Democratic People’s Party. The latter has been organized by the Civic Attitude Group. The author of these lines has signed the latter.
The complete lack of street demonstrations in favor of making Russian a second official language since 1990 is interesting. It is another indication of the fact that the supporters of this position are less likely to be committed to it than the supporters of the Romanian language. Of course, this is not to minimize the fact that an overwhelming majority of these individuals have voted for the Communists since 1998. They have done so due to their nostalgia for Soviet times, including, but not primarily focusing on, an affinity for the status of Russian as the dominant official language during the period before the emergence of Moldovan/Romanian as the official language in 1989.
Of course, this has been the pattern outside of the secessionist areas of the country. I am referring to Transnistria, the self-styled Dniester Moldovan Republic, the secessionist area in the eastern part of the country, and, during the early 1990’s, to Gagauz-Yeri. One of the factors that has led to the secessionist movements was the change in the primary/dominant official language from Russian to Romanian, but this was not the main factor.
In both 1989 and 2002, the opponents of the Romanophone demonstrators have not been counter-demonstrators but rather the state apparatus. During the past few days, two of those who were spreading leaflets for the rally in Chisinau were arrested. Another one of them, a parliamentary deputy from the opposition Christian Democratic People’s Party was threatened with a gun by a policeman. The demonstrators have been threatened with punishment for violations on technicalities such as demonstrating outside the area for which they had obtained the permit to rally. Even more ominously, Justice Minister Ion Morei has threatened on January 15 to outlaw (suspend) the Christian Democratic People’s Party because its deputies have engaged in these kinds of violations.
The use of these techniques in favor of these goals do not augur well for democracy in Moldova, or for interethnic relations in the country. It needs to be pointed out that whereas 35-38% of the population favors the use of Russian as a second language, and 24.3% of the population supports the status quo. There are also the others, a group equal in number to those holding the first position. They who do not believe in any kind of a special status for the Russian language. A
swing in one direction right now may very well be followed by a swing, past the mid-point, in the opposite direction.
It should be noted that the leadership of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, including the current president of the country, Vladimir Voronin, had promised earlier in the year that the issue would be determined through a referendum. It has subsequently gone back on its promise.
Ideally, the OSCE Mission, the Council of Europe, and various foreign governments and organizations should intercede with the Moldovan government to change its plans on the linguistic issue. The above-mentioned order of the Minister of Education should be cancelled. These third parties should also demand or request that the issue of whether Russian should become a second official language should be decided through a referendum. Moreover, the maintenance of Moldovan democracy, including the freedom of assembly and the freedom of association, including the right of the Christian Democratic People’s Party to function, should be upheld. All of us have the right and the duty to push for all of these.
This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.
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The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!
In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.
During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.
The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.
For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!
Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.
For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…
Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.
A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.
Nicholas Dima, January 1, 2022
A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
“People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or proof of certain acts of corruption in the press. Appropriate reaction of authorities is expected even more when the country has commitments in the field of promoting integrity and fighting corruption. The Republic of Moldova has made such commitments. Still, real and effective actions to ensure the proper functioning of most public institutions as a result of eliminating corrupt elements are not very visible,” it is mentioned in the study “Reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations into cases of integrity issues and corruption” launched during an online event organized by the Association of Independent Press and Transparency International Moldova on May 5.
The current study is the third published study after those conducted in 2017 and 2019. All of them aimed to observe the way authorities take into account, verify and sanction the facts described in various journalistic investigations. Another purpose was to monitor persons mentioned in the investigations, in order to see if integrity issues reported by journalists were taken into account when they were promoted or moved to another position.
The 2021 study includes 19 monitored investigations, published between August 2019 and December 2020 by media institutions specialized in conducting investigations in the field of integrity, corruption and organised crime (RISE Moldova, Investigative Journalism Center of Moldova, Ziarul de Garda, MoldovaCurata.md), as well as contains a retrospective of the authorities’ reactions as a consequence of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years.
Study insights
First of all, the investigations monitored in the study were followed by a reaction from either National Integrity Authority (NIA) – as most of the facts described in the monitored investigations concerned assets and conflicts of interest, which fall within the NIA scope of
competence – or other state institutions. The study showed that state authorities were lastly more keen to react to investigations and initiate controls, as compared to 2017 and 2019. In 2017, when 32 investigations were monitored, the percentage of cases with lack of reaction from state institutions was 26%. In 2019, out of the 26 monitored investigations the percentage of non-response cases was 42.3%. In the present study, which includes 19 monitored investigations, the percentage of cases with no reaction was 0%.
The results of introduced controls have been not fruitful yet. Of the 19 controls, 10 are still ongoing, 2 – rejected, 3 confirmed the facts stated in the investigations and 1 resulted in an ongoing criminal case.
Only 3 persons targeted in the monitored investigations became subjects of criminal cases. One person out of 3 was prosecuted directly for the facts described in the investigation, following a complaint filed by a third party. Moreover, “the results continue to indicate a certain degree of tolerance of institutions whose employees are targeted in journalistic investigations as having integrity issues,” is mentioned in the study. As compared to previous studies, no cases of promotion of persons with integrity problems were recorded (8 cases in 2017 and 2 cases in 2019). Still, out of 19 documented investigations, there was only one resignation for the reasons described in the investigation. That happened only after state institutions put pressure on the concerned institution. Also, there were 2 cases when the mentioned people resigned for other reasons than the accusations stated in the investigations.
When looking at the reaction of authorities in the case of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years, it can be observed that the facts described in the investigations had a greater impact on public opinion, but didn’t generate adequate and timely responses from the responsible institutions. Authorities reacted depending on the conjuncture and political reality, sometimes long after the publication of investigation. “With regard to investigations involving mismanagement of public money or alienation of public assets, it is extremely rare for those responsible to be brought to justice and for the material damage caused to be recovered.” Criminal cases were filed only after the change of government (politicians) or when officials become hostile to people in power (judges, prosecutors), as one of the study authors, Victor Mosneag, noticed.
“There is a perception that journalists conduct good investigations and nothing happens after that,” Viorica Zaharia, the second author, said. According to the author, the lack of authorities’ reaction discredit the institutions in charge of control and penalty, as well as media institutions that publish investigations. “We hope that through these studies, more pressure will be put on the authorities to pay more attention to journalistic investigations into conflict of interests, public procurement, assets that exceed the declared income, and so on,” mentioned Viorica Zaharia at the presentation event.
The study can be read here.
Photo: Volodymyr Hryshchenko| Unsplash
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