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President Igor Dodon’s Past Support for Irredentism Against Romania and Moldova’s New Government

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This opinion piece was written by Dr. Ionas Aurelian Rus, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati Blue Ash College (USA). The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.

***

A fact that is only known by those Romanian-speakers who have paid attention to this issue is the (Socialist) Moldovan’s president Igor Dodon’s territorial claims against Romania. After documenting this fact, I will analyze it, and place it in the broader context of Moldova’s recent change of government. First of all, there have been several declarations of Igor Dodon that document this, and I will make reference to the longest one. This is the taped interview of Igor Dodon for the Romanian newspaper “Adevarul” (The Truth) from December 2013.

Dodon declared in front of a map of historical Moldova (which includes not only the Republic of Moldova but also the part of Romania called Moldova and some parts of Ukraine) at the time of Stephen the Great (1457-1504) several surprising things. “There’ll be many [from Romania – author’s note] to take citizenship from Moldova. If we will join the [Eurasian] Customs Union [led by Russia – author’s note]. Then the massive creation of jobs will begin. Believe me, from here… and [we will] start releasing passports. You’ll see how many will come. And it explodes the European Union from there, The situation is…

But I don’t know,… whether to say it or not… The grant of the [Moldovan] citizenship to the Romanians, to those who were in [historical] Moldova. Look at my wall. It is Greater Moldova. Why not? And believe me, we’re going to get to that stage. Yes, take a look! This is [the map of] the Moldova of Stephen the Great. But this is one of the projects for the future. We’re going to scare those in your leadership [of Romania]. And even so, they don’t love us very much. When the Republic of Moldova or official Chisinau will say firmly that it is going in the direction of the [Eurasian] Customs Union, toward close relations with Russia,
this will be an important element, and maybe a decisive one to reintegrate the country in a federation. In the Republic of Moldova, 70-75% of the population declared itself Moldovan and declared that they speak in the Moldovan language. Despite what has happened lately and the attempts and movements that Romania makes [to promote a Romanian ethnic and linguistic identity] here in the Republic of Moldova, and this will be maintained from now on.”

Dodon’s statistics are problematic. Obviously, the Moldovan language is Romanian, and the distinction between ethnic Moldovans and ethnic Romanians is one of the identities; they share the same language and “objective” elements of ethnicity. To be sure, according to the Moldovan census of 2014 without the Transnistrian secessionist region, 73.7% of the people identified themselves as “Moldovans” (though only 64% if one includes the predominantly Russian-speaking Transnistrian secessionist region), and 6.9% as “Romanians”. Yet, in terms of spoken language, 53% (and declining) declared that they spoke “Moldovan” and 23.3% (and growing) “Romanian”. By now, perhaps less than 50% of the people of Moldova without Transnistria would declare that their colloquial language is “Moldovan”.

Dodon is obviously not the only Socialist who wants a Greater Moldova. What is noteworthy is that Western embassies have not paid any attention to this phenomenon. It is also noteworthy that the principality of Moldova united with the principality of Wallachia in 1859 to form Romania. The territory of the present-day Republic of Moldova was almost entirely a part of the Russian Empire at that time. The Republic of Moldova is not the successor of the medieval and modern principality of Moldova.

In other articles, I have discussed Dodon’s territorial claims against Ukraine (see Igor Dodon’s Past Support for Irredentism Against Ukraine), and his declared desire to be a dictator (see Moldovan President Igor Dodon’s Hopes of Becoming a Dictator and His Party’s Authoritarian Program).  And even though my article is obsolete in terms of details that have changed over time, Dodon has also pushed for Moldova’s federalization (see The Socialist Federalization Plan Is Just as Bad for Moldova as the Kozak Plan).

One is surprised when various analysts show their displeasure at the lack of enthusiasm in Romania for the alliance, created on June 7, 2019, between the pro-Russian Socialists and the pro-Western ACUM bloc, and for the fact that the Romanian government has not exactly made concrete promises of financial help to the Republic of Moldova after the change in government, after providing a great deal of support previously. What they either forget or they wish to forget is the content discussed previously in this article, including Dodon’s irredentism against Romania, and that the Romanian taxpayer can not reward such utterances. The Romanian government does prefer an alliance between ACUM and the more mildly pro-Western Democratic Party, just as the Ukrainian government does. The argument that the former leader of the Democratic Party (the dominant party in the previous ruling coalition), Vladimir Plahotniuc, was a highly corrupt oligarch and that Moldova’s democracy, already illiberal, became even more illiberal when he was the most powerful man in the country, is not a good enough argument to maintain the current ruling coalition. Moreover, when the Communists were in power in 2001-2009, and a large majority of the current Socialists were Communists, the state of democracy in Moldova according to Freedom House was even worse. This is not to deny that organized corruption has declined after the fall of Plahotniuc. The author of this article did prefer an ACUM-Socialist government as the lesser of two evils over a Socialist-Democratic alliance, though very ambivalently, and has been underwhelmed by the outcome. Nevertheless, what is needed for Moldova, and desired by the Romanian and Ukrainian governments, is an ACUM-Democratic coalition. This is the probable outcome at some point in 2020 unless it will be blocked by pressures from East and West.

To advocate for an ACUM-Socialist government in the name of regional stability while forgetting Dodon’s irredentism, dictatorial tendencies, and push for Moldova’s pro-Russian federalization is unwise. We should keep in mind, without denying their tactical pragmatism and wiser current tactics, how pro-Russian the Socialists are. You could observe Dodon’s discourse as a sample without forgetting that the Socialist speaker of the parliament Zinaida Greceanai is even more pro-Russian. Moreover, one should not ignore the fact that, in the case of Plahotniuc after he lost power, Vlad the Impaler has become Vlad the Fugitive or Vlad the Impaled, and that he has resigned as the leader of the Democratic Party, and lost his influence in it. And the beneficiaries and practitioners of nepotism, cronyism and those linked to oligarchs in the past (including Plahotniuc) or present, those who can not justify all of their income or property, or who have benefited from the “theft of the billion” by Ilan Shor should not dare cast the first stone against an alliance with the Democrats. And,  perhaps, as one of the graduate students mentored by me might note, the former colonial powers from the East and West should not forget how historically the fight against corruption was used as an excuse for the expansion of colonial empires and spheres of influence. (By contrast, my ancestors who lived on the territory of the present-day Republic of Moldova were neither colonialists nor colonizers.) I also have serious doubts if the current bipolar governing coalition would have been possible if the president of the United States would have been the winner of the popular vote in 2016, Hillary Clinton, or will remain in power with, for example, Democratic Joe Biden in the White House.

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Opinion

Russia And Ukraine At The Beginning of 2022

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This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.

***

The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!

In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.

Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.

During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.

The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.

For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!

Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.

For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…

Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The  present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.

A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.

Nicholas Dima, January 1,  2022

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FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

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A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.

International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.

Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.

Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.

Is it Moldova?

First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.

At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”

What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.

“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.

Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.

Is it a victory?

In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.

Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.

“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”

Is it only about football?

FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.

The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.

Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.

Photo: unknown

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Miscellaneous

Study// What is the reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations?

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“People expect logical consequences when they see cases of undeclared assets, conflicts of interest, protectionism or proof of certain acts of corruption in the press. Appropriate reaction of authorities is expected even more when the country has commitments in the field of promoting integrity and fighting corruption. The Republic of Moldova has made such commitments. Still, real and effective actions to ensure the proper functioning of most public institutions as a result of eliminating corrupt elements are not very visible,” it is mentioned in the study “Reaction of authorities to journalistic investigations into cases of integrity issues and corruption” launched  during an online event organized by the Association of Independent Press and Transparency International Moldova on May 5.

The current study is the third published study after those conducted in 2017 and 2019. All of them aimed to observe the way authorities take into account, verify and sanction the facts described in various journalistic investigations. Another purpose was to monitor persons mentioned in the investigations, in order to see if integrity issues reported by journalists were taken into account when they were promoted or moved to another position.

The 2021 study includes 19 monitored investigations, published between August 2019 and December 2020 by media institutions specialized in conducting investigations in the field of integrity, corruption and organised crime (RISE Moldova, Investigative Journalism Center of Moldova, Ziarul de Garda, MoldovaCurata.md), as well as contains a retrospective of the authorities’ reactions as a consequence of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years.

Study insights

First of all, the investigations monitored in the study were followed by a reaction from either National Integrity Authority (NIA) – as most of the facts described in the monitored investigations concerned assets and conflicts of interest, which fall within the NIA scope of
competence – or other state institutions. The study showed that state authorities were lastly more keen to react to investigations and initiate controls, as compared to 2017 and 2019. In 2017, when 32 investigations were monitored, the percentage of cases with lack of reaction from state institutions was 26%. In 2019, out of the 26 monitored investigations the percentage of non-response cases was 42.3%. In the present study, which includes 19 monitored investigations, the percentage of cases with no reaction was 0%.

The results of introduced controls have been not fruitful yet. Of the 19 controls, 10 are still ongoing, 2 – rejected, 3 confirmed the facts stated in the investigations and 1 resulted in an ongoing criminal case.

Only 3 persons targeted in the monitored investigations became subjects of criminal cases. One person out of 3 was prosecuted directly for the facts described in the investigation, following a complaint filed by a third party. Moreover, “the results continue to indicate a certain degree of tolerance of institutions whose employees are targeted in journalistic investigations as having integrity issues,” is mentioned in the study. As compared to previous studies, no cases of promotion of persons with integrity problems were recorded (8 cases in 2017 and 2 cases in 2019). Still, out of 19 documented investigations, there was only one resignation for the reasons described in the investigation. That happened only after state institutions put pressure on the concerned institution. Also, there were 2 cases when the mentioned people resigned for other reasons than the accusations stated in the investigations.

When looking at the reaction of authorities in the case of 10 investigations published in the last 5 years, it can be observed that the facts described in the investigations had a greater impact on public opinion, but didn’t generate adequate and timely responses from the responsible institutions. Authorities reacted depending on the conjuncture and political reality, sometimes long after the publication of investigation. “With regard to investigations involving mismanagement of public money or alienation of public assets, it is extremely rare for those responsible to be brought to justice and for the material damage caused to be recovered.” Criminal cases were filed only after the change of government (politicians) or when officials become hostile to people in power (judges, prosecutors), as one of the study authors, Victor Mosneag, noticed.

“There is a perception that journalists conduct good investigations and nothing happens after that,” Viorica Zaharia, the second author, said. According to the author, the lack of authorities’ reaction discredit the institutions in charge of control and penalty, as well as media institutions that publish investigations. “We hope that through these studies, more pressure will be put on the authorities to pay more attention to journalistic investigations into conflict of interests, public procurement, assets that exceed the declared income, and so on,” mentioned Viorica Zaharia at the presentation event.

The study can be read here.

Photo: Volodymyr Hryshchenko| Unsplash

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