Politics

Moldovenism: the State Ideology of the Republic of Moldova

Reading Time: 10 minutes In order to avoid the mistakes of the totalitarian past, the Constitution of the RM (Article 5, paragraph # 2) contains a clause that “No ideology may be pronounced as official ideology of the State.”

Published

17 years ago

December 6, 2006

Autor invitat

Reading Time: 10 minutes

Moldovenism: the State Ideology of the Republic of Moldova

By Dr. Argentina GRIBINCEA

In order to avoid the mistakes of the totalitarian past, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (RM) (Article 5, paragraph # 2) contains a clause that "No ideology may be pronounced as official ideology of the State." However, the RM, like the former USSR, has had an official state ideology, which, in spite of its origin in the very text of the Constitution (Article 13 on the State Language), obviously violates this Constitution. It is about the so-called theory of Moldovenism, the roots of which go back to the Stalinist period. However, to date this theory has been reshaped in a “modernised” manner by the present government, the essence of which is to repudiate the Romanian identity of the RM’s majority population, and to contest or sometimes to interdict the name of this population. The Moldovenist rhetoric is easy to identify because it is aggressively promoted by the administration as well as by the official or pro-communist press. Beyond lumber affirmations, lame justifications and reasons, which often change in accordance with certain circumstances, there are three major ideas which form the basis of the Moldovenist ideology: 1) Two different people – Romanians and “Moldovans” – exist in the Republic of Moldova and Romania, and speak two different languages – Romanian and the “Moldovan language”, respectively; 2) In the RM, the Romanians are an ethnic minority; 3) The Republic of Moldova represents a “political-judicial continuation (legacy) of the century-old processes with a view to affirming the statehood of the Moldovan people.” In other words, the State of the Republic of Moldova is seen as a successor to the Moldovan Feudal State founded in the 14^th century. The Romanophobic nature and, in general, xenophobia of the Moldovenist ideology represent another peculiarity, which is easily observed in speeches of the RM’s politicians as well as in pro–communist publications.

After its decisive victory in the 2001 elections[1], the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (CPRM) that came to power abolished the vast majority of economic and social reforms pursued by previous governments, and also carried out series of actions that aimed at re-orientating Moldova towards its Soviet past: it reinstalled the previous pattern of territorial administration, restored 7 November as a holiday commemorating the October Bolshevik Revolution, introduced measures to make Russian an official second language, proposed regulations requiring mandatory Russian-language teaching in schools, etc. Moreover, it imposed the doctrine of “Moldovenism” as a State Ideology of the country. Such developments, on occasion, gave rise to vehement protests from the opposition and the Moldovan intelligentsia. The first half of 2002 was marked by protest demonstrations, involving often 80,000 – 100,000 people. The intervention was needed from the Council of Europe to calm the political situation.

In the opinion of some historians and sociologists, the doctrine of “Moldovenism” was a continuation of the Soviet policy of Russification of the Romanian population of the ex-USSR.[2] This population, to a great extent, was initially incorporated in the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in 1924-1940, a republic within the borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and later within the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (1940-1991).[3] Prior to the World War II, the Soviet authorities desperately needed this doctrine to justify their claims regarding Bessarabia, which joined Romania in 1918.

Despite the efforts of the Soviet propaganda to qualify the creation of the Moldovan ASSR on 12 October 1924 as a great achievement of the Soviet policy and nation-building, the legitimacy of its establishment was still dubious, if judged based on the following factors: The Romanians/Moldovans constituted only 31.5 per cent of the total population of the MASSR; until 1924 there were no Romanian/Moldovan schools on the territory of the MASSR and no Romanian/Moldovan newspapers either; moreover, the language of administration and of church was either Russian or Ukrainian; the number of Romanians/Moldovans in public service, the party and Komsomol of the MASSR was meagre. Some urgent measures were necessary “to rectify” the situation. The solution to the problem – the "Moldovenism" – was in perfect harmony with the patterns of the totalitarian regime, and in agreement with the policy of autochtonization/"korenizatsiya" (which aimed at increasing the number of none-Russians in the party and state institutions from union and autonomous republics) in the course of its “implementation” in the USSR. The policy of Moldovenization in the MASSR, as well as the idea of creating the MASSR was inspired by the Soviet party and the USSR leadership, as well as by the Communist International. The latter, for instance, called on the Communist parties worldwide in April 1925 to support “by all means possible the national aspirations of Moldovans, who considered themselves distinct people in comparison with Romanians and recognise their language as independent versus the Romanian.”[4]

The declared goals of Moldovenization were as follows: transfer of the official documentation of the state machinery into the “Moldovan language”; increase the number of the Moldovans in the administrative and state machinery; promote the Moldovans to the Bolshevik party, Komsomol and trade unions; establish necessary conditions for the Moldovan population to study in their native language in schools and higher education institutions; develop the “Moldovan culture and language”, etc. However, the true aim of these actions was to promote the theory concerning the existence of a nation in the MASSR and Bessarabia different from the Romanian nation, speaking a language different from the Romanian, obtaining the required ideological support and ensuring the “headway of legitimacy” after the creation of the MASSR.

After WW II the Moldovenism was used by the Soviet authorities to justify the occupation of Bessarabia by the USSR on 28 June 1940 in accordance with the provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

Following the Declaration of the Republic of Moldova’s Independence, the doctrine of Moldovenism was abandoned for about two years. However, since the end of 1992, and with the motivation that identification of Moldova as ethnically and linguistically Romanian would undermine the statehood of the republic and prevent the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the doctrine was revived, initially through the interdiction of the term “Romanian” for the majority ethnic group and the identification in the Constitution of the state language as “the Moldovan language” instead of Romanian. The slogan launched by the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur was “Neither with the Russians, nor with the Romanians.” In practical terms, it involved the desire of the Moldova’s new leadership to remain within Russia’s sphere of influence. This policy was generated, to a greater extent, by the old Soviet and party nomenklatura that returned to the power after the 1994 parliamentary election.

The argument that “Moldovenism” served to consolidate the statehood of Moldova was used as never before by the Communist ruling party of these days. The main "ideological pillars" of this "doctrine" under Communist government were stipulated in “The Concept on National Policy of the Republic of Moldova”, a document adopted by the Moldova Parliament on 19 December 2003[5]. Mr. Reşetnikov, an Adviser to the Moldovan President, while presenting the “Concept” in the Parliament declared that the document, among other things, served the following purposes: “ensuring civic reconciliation; development of all ethnic and linguistic communities and proper interethnic relations; elimination of the consequences of civil strife from the 80’s and the beginning of 90’s; neutralization of attempts for “demoldovanization”; prevention of attempts to deny the existence of the Moldovan nation and statehood, to discredit the history of Moldova, to ignore the “Moldovan” ethno-name and the notion of the “Moldovan language”; etc.

The "Concept" was taken positively by the pro-communist press; however it was strongly contested by the opposition media, by human rights non-governmental organizations as well as various unions. The opposition and many NGOs in Moldova characterized it as a “profoundly anti-European” document “envisioning the positioning of the Republic of Moldova in Russia’s geo-political sphere”[6]. The critics to the "Concept" also stressed its "anti-constitutional character"; its aim to perpetuate the Soviet doctrine of Moldovenism; the attempts of the "Concept" to categorise the Romanians as a national minority in the Republic of Moldova (while they represent the majority of the population); the provocative spirit of the Concept, infringing upon human and minority rights and its potential to bring about conflicts with unpredictable outcomes. Political publicist and commentator Vitalie Ciobanu labelled this document as the “conscience’s strait jacket” and emphasised that “it proposed setting up of a uniform state ideology in Bessarabia compulsory for everybody like in the past, namely, anti-Romanian and anti-Occidental Moldovenism, which implied the return back to the policy of Russification of majority Romanian population in the Republic of Moldova."[7]

It is worthwhile to note that none of the opposition political parties supported the adoption of the National Policy Concept. The deputies of Christian Democratic Popular Party (CDPP), for instance, expressed their total disapproval of the concept and their majority even left the parliamentary hall when the document was put to the vote by a Communist MP.[8]

In practice, the effect of the implementation of the Moldovenist ideology was different from its declared purposes. It fuelled political tensions within the society and eventually led to the weakening of Moldova’s sovereignty. Eventually, the Moldovan society became considerably polarized than it was in late 1980s. A greater part of the population, especially the intellectual elite, did not accept the so-called “doctrine of Moldovenism”[9].Therefore, there were contradictions between the ruling party and some professional strata of the population. These contradictions had the tendency of degeneration into genuine conflicts. The Moldovenism tended to be a totalitarian doctrine, as it bred the hatred and the notion of superiority of the “Moldovans” over the Romanians. The official mass media supported Moldovenist ideology (in particular, Moldova Suverana [Sovereign Moldova] and Nezavisimaya Moldova [Independent Moldova]) and published denigrating articles against Romanians in general and Romania as a neighbouring country, as well as disseminated libellous statements about those members of the Moldovan society who identified themselves as Romanians[10].

It is worth mention, that there was a deliberate confusion in terms “Rrom” (Roma) and “Romanian” in a number of articles, especially those signed by Vasile Stati, one of the ideologists of the Moldovenism, which is a regrettable confusion. Those xenophobic campaigns led to the fact that not only the Romanians but also the Roma minority were considered as “inferior nations”. Moldovenism thus represented a local type of nationalism, and xenophobia and, by virtue of intolerance towards the Roma minority it also implied racism

The doctrine of Moldovenism also aggravated interethnic relations within the RM and, in particular, between the majority and minority population. The authorities tried to present the Moldovenism to express the Government’s concern for national minorities of Moldova. In fact, in some experts’ opinion, the implementation of the Moldovenism led to Russification of both the majority and minority population. This didn’t imply anything new, but rather served as a continuation of the former USSR’s policy.

Owing to the fact that the Communist authorities treated the opponents to Moldovenism doctrine as opponents to the RM state (“statehood”), the situation became even more aggravated. In the Concept on National Policy, the authorities proposed to neutralise the attempts of Demoldovanization, in particular the denial of the ethno-name “Moldovan” and the notion of the “Moldovan language”. Although it was not clear, as to what was understood by “neutralisation” of those who did not accept the Moldovenism doctrine, all anti-democratic practices of the Communist Government, and declarations by Communist leaders’ (like: “there were too many Romanians in this country” by Victor Stepaniuk, the leader of the Communist Party in the Parliament) caused apprehension[11]. This led to a conclusion that the authorities would never refrain from violent acts against their opponents.

The promotion of the Moldovenism could have deplorable consequences for the future of the RM’s state. Further imposition of the Moldovenism could give birth to a new national liberation movement in the RM. And, just because the Communists were perceived as defenders of the Russian interests in Moldova, which made the majority group feel discriminated, it was expected that a new national liberation movement would acquire a more pronounced ethnic dimension than that of the late 1980s. Politicians took the liberty of disagreeing with linguists, e.g. by insisting on calling Romanian as the “Moldovan language” (as one communist leader put it, “the language is identical with Romanian, but we call them differently”). This generated ambiguity and fear in the society, including among minorities, as they could no longer expect much from the administration which forcefully imposed a false identity of the majority ethnic group. All this would definitely bring about a psychosocial crisis which, in turn, would lead to other forms of crisis, like political, social, cultural, etc. These trends had already manifested themselves in disputes over the identity as well as endless protests against the actions of the government insisting on imposing its point of view by methods which, in most cases, were far from being democratic.

At first glance, there is seemingly nothing wrong about emphasising the Moldovan identity. Nor was there anything wrong with the "Moldovan identity", as in reality, "Moldovans" lived in the Republic of Moldova just as they lived in Romania, particularly in view of the fact, that the greater part of Moldova’s historic province was a part of the Romanian state and used to be the initiator of the union of Romanian principalities at certain period in history. The Moldovans from Romania and, namely, the greater part of the Moldovans from the world considere themselves an inalienable element of the Romanian nation. There is no fundamental difference between those who consider themselves as Romanians and those who consider themselves as Moldovans. One could say that there were differences because of the isolation of today’s RM territory from the rest of Romania in the course of the Russian and Soviet occupation. However, these differences have a superficial character and were not manifested at the level of intellectual élite. On the contrary, the works by some writers who originate from the former MSSR (Mihai Cimpoi, Grigore Vieru, Ion Druţă etc.) are taught at schools in Romania as a part of the Romanian literature course, and viceversa.

From the political viewpoint, all RM citizens (weather Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Jews, Armenians or Poles etc.), irrespective of their ethnic origin, are Moldovans, namely, the Moldovan citizens.

The problem is that today’s state policy in the RM proposed the Moldovenism ideology as a way for building an identity. This was done not on the basis of political criteria (the existence of the RM state), but rather through attempts aimed at destroying the Romanian ethnic identity of the majority of the Republic of Moldova. This happens not only because there is a perceptible dose of Romanophobia in the Moldovenist rhetoric of the Chisinau politicians, but olso because the renouncement of the Romanian identity by the Moldovans in the RM would mean the loss of common cultural heritage which they shared with the rest of the Romanians. Therefore, the majority of the Moldovan intellectuals use to identify themselves as Romanians. They used to write and continue to write in the Romanian language.

In other words, the Moldovenism has these days a pronounced destructive component. Unfortunately, the facts and the situation in the RM discourage from any positive appreciation of the Moldovenism. It rather represents a reminiscence of the totalitarianism and expression of identity crisis in the RM. In our opinion, Moldova does not need any state ideology to justify its existence. Above all, Moldova needs democracy, prosperity and social harmony, however, nothing could be attained unless efforts are made towards de-ideologisation and liberalisation in the real sense of these words.

[1] During the 2001 election the CPRM took 50.7 per cent of the vote and 71 of the 101 seats in the Moldovan Parliament. In the 6 March 2005 election the CPRM won 45, 98 per cent (and received 56 mandates of parliamentarians). See http://www.elections2005.md/info/

[2] See, e.g., Chifu, I. (ed.), Republic of Moldova: Antidemocratic Sliding of a Noisy Government: Country Report: 2003, Bucharest, SNSPA-Politeia, 2004, pp. 11-52; Argentina Gribincea, Mihai Gribincea, Ion Şişcanu, Politica de Moldovenizare în R.A.S.S. Moldovenească: Culegere de documente şi materiale [The Policy of Moldovanization in Moldavian ASSR.: Collection of Documents and Materials], Chisinau: Civitas, 2004; Oazu Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement Proposed by Ukraine-pros and cons, 8 June 2005 http://www.ipp.md/comentarii1.php?l=en&id=38 ; see also: http://www1.azi.md/print/25780/En

[3] Republic of Moldova: antidemocratic sliding of a noisy government. Country Report: 2003,, Co-ordinator Iulian Chifu, Bucharest, SNSPA-Politeia, 2004, pp. 11-52; Argentina Gribincea, Mihai Gribincea, Ion Şişcanu, The Policy of Moldovanization in Moldavian ASSR…

[4] Dinamizm kulturnogo stroitelistva v Sovetskoi Moldavii, Kishinev , 1984, p. 67

[5] Newspaper "Moldova Suverană" (Sovereign Moldova), 25 July 2003.

[6] Resolution of the Conference of Intelligentsia Representatives of the Republic of Moldova on the Draft Concept of National State Policy of RM, Limba Română [Romanian Language], No. 6-10, p. 103

[7] Ciobanu, V., "Accente"("Abutmentt"), no. No. 7-8 (105-106), July-August 2003

[8] BASA-Press news agency (in Romanian); Moldpress news agency, no. 17516t,19 December 2003.

[9] See, for example, Memorandum of the PEN Club of the Republic of Moldova, Contrafort, No. 1-2 (111-112), January-February 2004, http://www.contrafort.md/2004/111-112/661.html [accessed October 2004] or, Resolution of the Conference of Intelligentsia Representatives…, p. 103

[10] See, for example, Open letter to Mr. Mihai Cimpoi, President of Writers’ Union of Moldova, and Representatives of “pan-Romanianist” sect of I. Roşca, Sovereign Moldova, 11 March 2004; Andrushchiak, V., Opposition: Election Masks of Political Pharisees, Sovereign Moldova, 12 February 2004

[11] See: Interview with Victor Stepaniuk , Comunistul [The Communist], No.36, 2003, http://comunist.pcrm.md/2003archives/36_2003/142206 [accessed October 2004]

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FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

Published

3 years ago

September 29, 2021

Maria Dulgher

Reading Time: 4 minutes

A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.

International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.

Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.

Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.

Is it Moldova?

First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.

At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”

What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.

“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.

Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.

Is it a victory?

In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.

Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.

“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”

Is it only about football?

FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.

The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.

Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.

Photo: unknown

Politics

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita meets high-ranking EU officials in Brussels

Published

3 years ago

September 27, 2021

Maria Dulgher

Reading Time: 2 minutes

Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Natalia Gavrilita, together with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu, pay an official visit to Brussels, between September 27-28, being invited by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles.

Today, Prime Minister had a meeting with Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The Moldovan PM thanked the senior European official for the support of the institution in strengthening democratic processes, reforming the judiciary and state institutions, economic recovery and job creation, as well as increasing citizens’ welfare. Natalia Gavrilita expressed her confidence that the current visit laid the foundations for boosting relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, so that, in the next period, it would be possible to advance high-level dialogues on security, justice and energy. Officials also exchanged views on priorities for the Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in December.

“The EU is open to continue to support the Republic of Moldova and the ambitious reform agenda it proposes. Moldova is an important and priority partner for us,” said Charles Michel.

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also met with Paolo Gentiloni, European Commissioner for Economy, expressing her gratitude for the support received through the OMNIBUS macro-financial assistance program. The two officials discussed the need to advance the recovery of money from bank fraud, to strengthen sustainable mechanisms for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in Moldova, and to standardize the customs and taxes as one of the main conditions for deepening cooperation with the EU in this field.

Additionally, Prime Minister spoke about the importance of the Eastern Partnership and the Deep Free Trade Agreement, noting that the Government’s policies are aimed at developing an economic model aligned with the European economic model, focused on digitalization, energy efficiency and the green economy.

A common press release of the Moldovan Prime Minister with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell Fontelles, took place today, where the agenda of Moldova’s reforms and the main priorities to focus on in the coming months were presented: judiciary reform; fighting COVID-19 pandemic; promoting economic recovery and conditions for growth and job creation; strengthening state institutions and resilience of the country.

“I am here to relaunch the dialogue between my country and the European Union. Our partnership is strong, but I believe there is room for even deeper cooperation and stronger political, economic and sectoral ties. I am convinced that this partnership is the key to the prosperity of our country and I hope that we will continue to strengthen cooperation.”

The Moldovan delegation met Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice. Tomorrow, there are scheduled common meetings with Oliver Varhelyi, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Adina Valean, European Commissioner for Transport and Kadri Simson, European Commissioner for Energy.

Prime Minister will also attend a public event, along with Katarina Mathernova, Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.

Photo: gov.md

Politics

Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria

Published

3 years ago

September 21, 2021

Maria Dulgher

Reading Time: 2 minutes

The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, pays an official visit to New York, USA, between September 21-22. There, she participates in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a press release of the President’s Office, the official will deliver a speech at the tribune of the United Nations.

In this context, the Promo-LEX Association suggested the president to request the appointment of a special rapporteur in order to monitor the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. According to Promo-LEX, the responsibility for human rights violations in the Transnistrian region arises as a result of the Russian Federation’s military, economic and political control over the Tiraspol regime.

“We consider it imperative to insist on the observance of the international commitments assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces and ammunition from the territory of the country,” the representatives of Promo-LEX stated. They consider the speech before the UN an opportunity “to demand the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Russian Federation with reference to this territory which is in its full control.”

“It is important to remember about the numerous cases of murder, torture, ill-treatment, forced enlistment in illegal military structures, the application of pseudo-justice in the Transnistrian region, all carried out under the tacit agreement of the Russian Federation. These findings stem from dozens of rulings and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that Russia is responsible for human rights violations in the region.”

The association representatives expressed their hope that the president of the country would give priority to issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region and would call on relevant international actors to contribute to guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms throughout Moldova.

They asked Maia Sandu to insist on the observance of the obligation to evacuate the ammunition and the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to publicly support the need for the Russian Federation to implement the ECtHR rulings on human rights violations in the Transnistrian region, and to request the appointment of an UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

The Promo-LEX Association concluded that 14 out of 25 actions planned within the National Action Plan for the years 2018–2022 concerning respecting human rights in Transnistria were not carried out by the responsible authorities.

The association expressed its concern and mentioned that there are a large number of delays in the planned results. “There is a lack of communication and coordination between the designated institutions, which do not yet have a common vision of interaction for the implementation of the plan.”

Promo-LEX requested the Government of the Republic of Moldova to re-assess the reported activities and to take urgent measures, “which would exclude superficial implementation of future activities and increase the level of accountability of the authorities.”

Photo: peacekeeping.un.org

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Moldovenism: the State Ideology of the Republic of Moldova

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FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

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Is it a victory?

Is it only about football?

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Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita meets high-ranking EU officials in Brussels

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Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria

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