Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch represents a series of brief analyses, written by local and foreign experts, dedicated to the most topical subjects related to the foreign policy of Moldova, major developments in the Black Sea Region, cooperation with international organizations and peace building activities in the region. It aims to create a common platform for discussion and to bring together experts, commentators, officials and diplomats who are concerned with the perspectives of European Integration of Moldova. It is also pertaining to offer to Moldova’s diplomats and analysts a valuable tribune for debating the most interesting and controversial points of view that could help Moldova to find its path to EU.

At the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova from 28 November 2010, no one from the electoral competitors has gained the parliamentary majority necessary to form the government.

The post-electoral negotiations have highlighted two possible governmental alliances – of center-left (Communist Party-Democratic Party) and center-right (Democratic Party-Liberal Democratic Party-Liberal Party) – the balance to one of them was to be inclined by the Democratic Party. Each of this two governing alliances, alongside purely internal political aspects, have also strong geopolitical connotations: the center-left being a pro-Russian one and the center-right a pro-western one. In turn, the involved geopolitical actors, each of them having its interests in Moldova, through their visits in Chisinau have attempted to determine Moldovan parliamentary
parties to form a governing alliance in the Republic of Moldova that is convenient for them.

Between East and West

The geopolitical earthquake at the end of Cold War has led at reconfiguration of the two main geopolitical areas existing in the post-war period – euro-Atlantic and euro-Asiatic. After the Cold War, the delimitation line between these two geopolitical spaces has been moved from Central Europe to the east of the continent, getting at the frontiers of Republic of Moldova.

The determinant concept of a multi-vectorial foreign policy of a Republic of Moldova is that of permanent neutrality. The geopolitical balance established in Chisinau has constituted in the nineties of the last century the line of the external behavior of the Republic of Moldova – being easy pro-CIS during the agrarian governing, or being with pro-European nuances, in time of Sturza’s government.

Republic of Moldova has been situated and is situated in what we can call “geopolitical trap”. In the nineties, Russian Federation, besides Transnistrian conflict, did not have the necessary leverage to impose itself geopolitically in Moldova. In his turn, the West manifested disinterest towards eastern part of the European continent. Things have been changed at the beginning of the XXI century. Enlargement of NATO and EU has brought Republic of Moldova in the zone of proximity of these two western actors of main importance. The neighbourhood of Moldova with EU and NATO has provoked increasing interest from European countries towards Chisinau. Simultaneously, Russian Federation, after Putin’s arrival in power, has been strengthened as a country that has led at the diversification of its influencing levers upon neighbouring countries. If initially “geopolitical trap” in which have been caught Moldova has consisted in incapacity (Russia) and disinterest (Occident), then, later, it has been transformed in capacity (Moscow) and interest (Brussels and Washington).

The Moldovan communists, in the first stage after coming to power, wanted to break Moldova’s geopolitical balancing, trying to bring Chisinau closer to euro-Asiatic space. The Kremlin reacted at the pro-Russian policy of Moldovan communists through the elaboration of Kozak Memorandum, which would have tied Chisinau with Moscow through “transnistrisition” of Moldova.

In 2003, in the context of western geopolitical expansion to the east (including through “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine), the return of the Republic of Moldova in the geopolitical euro-Asiatic area was difficult to be realized. Moldova’s foreign policy vector change – from east to west, namely from Russia-Belarus Union to European Union – meant that Moldova came back to its policy of regional balancing, which characterized Chisinau until 2001.

The Alliance for European Integration (AEI), unlike the Communists party that mimicked the European course of Chisinau, surprising for many people made Moldova to have a remarkable behavior in the dialog with Brussels. Moldova – “the success story” of the Eastern Partnership became more visible on the background of a European recession of Ukraine. Through its actions, government of AEI has created all conditions to remove again Republic of Moldova out of regional geopolitical balance, for this time move being to the west.

Disputes of geopolitical visits
Republic of Moldova has come to be located at the confluence of two important geopolitical areas – between a stronger Russia and a West in expansion. In these conditions, the geopolitical bid in the November 28 elections has increased enormously.

The tone of Russian-Western geopolitical dispute was given by Russia through an unannounced visit to Chisinau, on December 4-5, of the Chief of the presidential Administration from Moscow, Sergei Naryshkin. Right from the airport the Russian official has operated with such notions (problematic for Republic of Moldova in opinion of Naryshkin) like statehood, sovereignty, geopolitical orientation. Further, he declared that only a functional government of the Republic of Moldova may address these issues in the context of a strategic partnership between Russia and Moldova. The functional government composition desired by Moscow in Moldova has been shown by Naryshkin when at the residence of the Russian Embassy from Chisinau, he met with leaders of Communist Party and Democratic Party, blatantly ignoring the Liberal Democrats, and the meeting with the leader of Liberal Party – the interim president Mihai Ghimpu – has been more for formal reasons.

Shortly after the geopolitical “movement” of Russia, through working visit to Chisinau on December 8, of Foreign Ministers of Poland, Radoslaw Sikorski and Sweden, Carl Bildt, followed the Western response. The two European officials, the initiators of the Eastern Partnership, declared that they came here not only on behaf of Poland and Sweden, but on behaf of the entire European Union. Their message was very encouraging for Republic of Moldova, which is urged to persevere in the Eastern Partnership and on its European course. Mentioning that the European Union wants to see a rapid formation of a government which would allow the continuation of reforms, they actually suggested that Brussels wants reiteration of AEI. Eloquent is the duration of Sikorski and Bildt meetings with component parties of the potential alliance of center-left – only 15 minutes with representatives of Communists Party (with symbolic picture at the monument of Lenin) and nearly an hour with the Democratic leaders.

Visit of Sikorski and Bildt to Chisinau was continued by those of Jerzy Buzek, President of European Parliament, and Werner Hoyer, Minister of State at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany. The message of Buzek was clear as possible for the Moldovan political class: “Republic of Moldova must remain on the European road which was choosed, this fact being of imminent importance for the EU and for citizens of Republic of Moldova.” Visit of Hoyer in Chisinau is a proof of the seriousness of Germany’s intentions on Republic of Moldova in talks with Russia on European security reconfiguration.

The importance of Moldova
After the geopolitical disaster from the ’90s of the last century, Russia investes serious efforts to regain lost positions. CIS is the first target in Russia’s geopolitical return. The “Color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine were interpreted by Russia as a geopolitical invasion of the West in its vital space of protection. Once in 2003-2005 was defeated by the West in the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia (not being able to institutionalize CIS space) has responded harsly, by extensively using the economic and energetic “weapons” against “rebel” countries of the CIS. After its actions, Moscow has succeeded to annihilate GUAM and to return geopolitically in Ukraine, but failed (despite military successes) sharply in Georgia.

For Moscow, its presence in Moldova means remaining of Russia as a real geopolitical subject in the south-eastern Europe. Kremlin’s approach towards Moldova is percived from two geopolitical scenarios: 1) if the Russian Federation wishes to remain present geopolitically in South-East of Europe, then it must do everything possible not to leave Moldova, 2) if Russia is leaving Moldova, then its place will be taken by the major Western geopolitical actors, mainly the EU and possible NATO, something that Kremlin is not willing to do. The ambiguity of Russian policy towards Moldova has been amplified by the suspicion of Moscow that Chisinau “plays” permanently on two fronts.

In its relationship with Moldova, Russia does not want verbal guaranties as it was, in general, until now. In the future, Moscow wants to conclude a large written strategic partnership in geopolitical terms (political, economic, social and cultural). In its turn, Russian Federation promises the Republic of Moldova significant economic benefits (reduced price for gas imports, free way for wine and agricultural exports).

The geopolitical transformation in the early ‘90s of the last century has caused eastward movement of both Western geopolitical subspaces – euro-Atlantic and euro-Continental. At the edge of centuries, NATO (euro-Atlantic expression) and EU (euro-Continental expression) became neighbors of the CIS, which in geopolitical terms percived by Moscow means that the West became the geopolitical neighbour of Russia.

At the moment, it seems like NATO decided to stop at the CIS borders. EU tries to act innstitutionally in the CIS, by launching a series of policies aiming to bring to Europe more stability and security on the eastern borders. The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched by Brussels at the time of enlargement in 2004, covered a wider geographical area, referring to all EU neighbors, not only to those from Europe. Later, in 2009, aiming to give a new dimension to European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership, which refers directly to the six European countries from CIS.

Both European institutional policies – European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership – were not implemented until the end. Initially, the best behavior in the Eastern Partnership has had Ukraine. After the election of Yanukovych as the head of state, the country has made “a step backwards” on its European way. On the other hand, in 2010, Chisinau has made significant progress in the dialogue with Brussels. The European achivements of Moldova have shown that the Eastern Partnership is viable. Becasue of this reason, Moldova became “cool” in Brussel, EU invested a lot in Moldova, including in the image chapter. To continue its European way, EU offeres Moldova hundreds of million of euros and promises to remove visas immediately after the meting of criteria required by Brussels.

In the European context, during 2010 we have assisted at an unprecedented dialogue between EU (through Germany) and Russia. Brussels is ready to conclude a strategic partnership (of modernization) with Russia which would also directly affect the states from the intermediary space (Eastern Partnership states) between EU and Russia. However, the EU and Russia have different views upon countries located geographically between them. In comparison with Russia which deals with European countries of CIS as a whole of its geopolitical area, Brussels perceive the six countries of the Eastern Partnership more as a security intermediary area between Russia and EU.

Conclusions
The post-election situation after 28 November in the Republic of Moldova is a conclusive proof that political polarization got strong geopolitical connotations. Visits by foreign officials in Chisinau in the post-election period suggest a few conclusions. The first is that Moldova matters on the regional level. Major actors in Moldova are ready to provide certain privileges to achieve their geopolitical goals in Moldova. The second (external conjuncture) refers to the substance of Russian-German dialogue in 2010. By Naryskin’s visit to Chisinau, Russia gave a clear signal to EU that Moldova can not move forward within Eastern Partnership without the permission of Kremlin. A third (internal) is that the visit of foreign officials, although they created some confusion among local political class, the decision to create the government alliance in Moldova was taken in Chisinau and not decided out of Moldova.