Politics
Moscow Increasingly Using Non-Diplomats as Ambassadors
Reading Time: 4 minutesMoscow’s appointment of former Russian health minister Mikhail Zurabov in place of former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as ambassador to Ukraine has called attention to the Kremlin’s increasing use of non-diplomats as its representatives abroad and raised questions in Moscow as to how adequate such people are in such roles.
By Paul Goble
Moscow’s appointment of former Russian health minister Mikhail Zurabov in place of former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as ambassador to Ukraine has called attention to the Kremlin’s increasing use of non-diplomats as its representatives abroad and raised questions in Moscow as to how adequate such people are in such roles.
In a lengthy article in the current issue of “Versiya,” Igor Dmitriyev that in this regard, Russia is behaving in a way that resembles the United States, although up to now Moscow has not often followed the American practice of appointing to ambassadorial posts those who have given to a presidential campaign (www.versia.ru/articles/2009/jun/29/naznachenie_zurabova).
One reason for that, Dmitriyev points out, is that the pay and benefits of Russian ambassadors are far from attractive, with the highest salaries being less than 3,000 US dollars a month — most are lower — and housing often anything but luxurious, again relative to what those who may have supported a Russian presidential campaign are used to.
Dmitriyev further notes that despite the prestige of the title, ambassadors are far less free agents than many Russians assume. Instead, they are strictly directed by Moscow which gives them their assignments and expects them to inform the Russian government about what is going on in the countries to which they are assigned.
Consequently, he suggests, the appointment of non-professionals to ambassadorial posts may not cause problems for Moscow, especially if the ambassador is supported by a professional staff, and may, depending on the individual involved, even work to Russia’s advantage by highlighting the “special” nature of relations in this or that case.
Dmitriyev then turns to the various kinds of “non-professionals” the Russian government has appointed as ambassadors. The most frequent are retired politicians, such as former atomic energy minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev, who has been Russia’s ambassador in Finland since 2006.
Other “non-professional” ambassadors consist of those who have fallen out of favor in Moscow. Thus, Boris Yeltsin exiled his press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov as ambassador to the Vatican, but the latter stayed there only briefly because his memoirs enraged the Russian president and Kostikov had to return to journalism.
In addition, Dmitriyev says, there have been cases when Moscow has named someone ambassador as a holding “stage” before his return to power. For example, Nikolay Bordyuzha, who had served as secretary of Russia’s Security Council, was sent to Denmark, but he then returned to become secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Bordyuzha was replaced in Copenhagen by another “non-professional,” Dmitry Ryurikov a presidential assistant for foreign affairs. It is “curious,” Dmitriyev says, that Moscow used Denmark the same way in Soviet times, having sent Moscow CPSU Secretary Nikolay Yegorychev there in the 1970s and Komsomol head Boris Pastukhov there in the late 1980s.
Unlike some such “exiles,” Pastukhov was able to return thanks to power thanks to elections to the Duma where he headed the CIS Committee. Then he became minister for CIS affairs and now “occupies the honorable position of senior vice president of the Trade Industrial Chamber of Russia.”
Except for Mongolia to which Khrushchev famously exiled Vyacheslav Molotov and to which the Russian government has sent Irkutsk Governor Boris Govorin, in almost all African and Asian countries, the Russian ambassador is a professional diplomat. The major exception was Doku Zavgayev, former CPSU head in Checheno-Ingushetia, who was sent to Tanzania.
But his posting, an apparent punishment for failing to prevent the coming to power of Jokhar Dudayev, did not end his career but simply sent it off in a different direction: After serving in Dar es-Salaam, Zavgayev became deputy minister of foreign affairs and then general director of the foreign ministry.
An even more successful “return to the power structures” was made by Valentina Matvienko, the current governor of St. Petersburg. After serving as a Komsomol official, she was named ambassador to Malta in 1991. Six years later she was posted to Greece and then returned to be deputy prime minister.
Another “unusual case,” Dmitriyev says, is provided by Leonid Drachevsky. Having been first deputy chairman of the USSR Sports Committee, he was named Russian ambassador to Poland in 1996. Two years later, he became minister for CIS affairs and then the presidential plenipotentiary in the Siberian Federal District.
In such cases, the pattern with regard to Russian ambassadors since 1991 has been very different than that of Soviet ambassadors prior to that time. Very few of the latter ever returned from what most quite rightly assumed was diplomatic exile. But there is one way in which the Russian Federation has continued Soviet practice.
In Soviet times, most of Moscow’s ambassadors in bloc countries were party officials rather than diplomats. And now, in many cases, Dmitriyev notes, many Russian ambassadors to the 11 other former Soviet republics and three Baltic countries are former officials of one kind or another.
Dmitriyev concludes his survey by pointing to two other kinds of “unprofessional” Russian ambassadors: those who are taken from the political opposition like Rodina’s Dmitry Rogozin who now serves as Russia’s outspoken and controversial permanent representative to NATO, and those from the intelligence services.
The latter source is especially “untraditional,” Dmitriyev says, but Moscow has appointed SVR officials as its ambassadors to Lithuania, Moldova, and India. That represents a break not only with the Soviet past but also with the practice of most other countries because, as Dmitriyev himself notes, “as is well-known, there are no former intelligence officers.
By way of conclusion, Dmitriyev points out that there have been cases in recent years of something that was “unheard of in Soviet times:” professional diplomats making successful careers elsewhere. Among these are Sergey Yastrzhembsky who became presidential press secretary after serving as ambassador in Bratislava, and Aleksandr Avdeyev, the minister of culture, who earlier served as Russian ambassador to various European countries.
Featured
FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
Politics
Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita meets high-ranking EU officials in Brussels

Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Natalia Gavrilita, together with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu, pay an official visit to Brussels, between September 27-28, being invited by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles.
Today, Prime Minister had a meeting with Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The Moldovan PM thanked the senior European official for the support of the institution in strengthening democratic processes, reforming the judiciary and state institutions, economic recovery and job creation, as well as increasing citizens’ welfare. Natalia Gavrilita expressed her confidence that the current visit laid the foundations for boosting relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, so that, in the next period, it would be possible to advance high-level dialogues on security, justice and energy. Officials also exchanged views on priorities for the Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in December.
“The EU is open to continue to support the Republic of Moldova and the ambitious reform agenda it proposes. Moldova is an important and priority partner for us,” said Charles Michel.
Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also met with Paolo Gentiloni, European Commissioner for Economy, expressing her gratitude for the support received through the OMNIBUS macro-financial assistance program. The two officials discussed the need to advance the recovery of money from bank fraud, to strengthen sustainable mechanisms for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in Moldova, and to standardize the customs and taxes as one of the main conditions for deepening cooperation with the EU in this field.
Additionally, Prime Minister spoke about the importance of the Eastern Partnership and the Deep Free Trade Agreement, noting that the Government’s policies are aimed at developing an economic model aligned with the European economic model, focused on digitalization, energy efficiency and the green economy.
A common press release of the Moldovan Prime Minister with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell Fontelles, took place today, where the agenda of Moldova’s reforms and the main priorities to focus on in the coming months were presented: judiciary reform; fighting COVID-19 pandemic; promoting economic recovery and conditions for growth and job creation; strengthening state institutions and resilience of the country.
“I am here to relaunch the dialogue between my country and the European Union. Our partnership is strong, but I believe there is room for even deeper cooperation and stronger political, economic and sectoral ties. I am convinced that this partnership is the key to the prosperity of our country and I hope that we will continue to strengthen cooperation.”
The Moldovan delegation met Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice. Tomorrow, there are scheduled common meetings with Oliver Varhelyi, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Adina Valean, European Commissioner for Transport and Kadri Simson, European Commissioner for Energy.
Prime Minister will also attend a public event, along with Katarina Mathernova, Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
Photo: gov.md
Politics
Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria

The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, pays an official visit to New York, USA, between September 21-22. There, she participates in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a press release of the President’s Office, the official will deliver a speech at the tribune of the United Nations.
In this context, the Promo-LEX Association suggested the president to request the appointment of a special rapporteur in order to monitor the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. According to Promo-LEX, the responsibility for human rights violations in the Transnistrian region arises as a result of the Russian Federation’s military, economic and political control over the Tiraspol regime.
“We consider it imperative to insist on the observance of the international commitments assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces and ammunition from the territory of the country,” the representatives of Promo-LEX stated. They consider the speech before the UN an opportunity “to demand the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Russian Federation with reference to this territory which is in its full control.”
“It is important to remember about the numerous cases of murder, torture, ill-treatment, forced enlistment in illegal military structures, the application of pseudo-justice in the Transnistrian region, all carried out under the tacit agreement of the Russian Federation. These findings stem from dozens of rulings and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that Russia is responsible for human rights violations in the region.”
The association representatives expressed their hope that the president of the country would give priority to issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region and would call on relevant international actors to contribute to guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms throughout Moldova.
They asked Maia Sandu to insist on the observance of the obligation to evacuate the ammunition and the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to publicly support the need for the Russian Federation to implement the ECtHR rulings on human rights violations in the Transnistrian region, and to request the appointment of an UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
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The Promo-LEX Association concluded that 14 out of 25 actions planned within the National Action Plan for the years 2018–2022 concerning respecting human rights in Transnistria were not carried out by the responsible authorities.
The association expressed its concern and mentioned that there are a large number of delays in the planned results. “There is a lack of communication and coordination between the designated institutions, which do not yet have a common vision of interaction for the implementation of the plan.”
Promo-LEX requested the Government of the Republic of Moldova to re-assess the reported activities and to take urgent measures, “which would exclude superficial implementation of future activities and increase the level of accountability of the authorities.”
Photo: peacekeeping.un.org