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Moldova’s “White Collar” Crimes: National Context and Recent Legal Developments

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The term “white collar” crimes was first coined by sociologist Edwin Sutherland. It denotes the full range of crimes committed by people who enjoy a high social standing over the course of their professional life. This term was later imported into the legal terminology.

There’s no single opinion with regard to the typology of crimes that meet the definition of “white collar.” Despite the diversity of offenses that could fall into the category, the following common features seem to stand out. First, the crimes are committed by people with a high social standing (e.g., civil servants, decision-makers, presidents and senior managers of companies, and other high-ranking officials). Second, the crimes are committed in the process of carrying out job-related responsibilities and to the detriment of the employing company. Third, the motives for committing the crimes by the “white collar” offender is the pursuit of material gains.

In the Republic of Moldova, the “white collar” phenomenon is characterized by a high degree of invisibility. The reasons are twofold: first, “white collar” crimes are perpetrated through convoluted schemes, over a long period of time. Second, “white collar” criminals, due to their high social standing and network of contacts, are capable of inspiring trust and credibility through their behavior.

“White collar” criminality is closely linked with corruption-related offenses and work-related crimes. “White collar” criminality is often associated with and takes the shape of economic crimes.

As such, there are two main groups of offenses: 1) justice-related crimes and corruption in the public and private sectors; and 2) economic crimes.

The first category covers the following offenses: interference with justice and criminal prosecution, issuing a court sentence, decision or judgment in violation of the law, forgery of evidence, passive corruption, active corruption, influence peddling, misuse of authority or abuse of power, etc.

The second category of “white collar” crimes includes: acquiring credit by fraud, violation of crediting rules, bad or fraudulent management of a bank, obstructing banking supervision, improper use of proceeds from domestic and foreign loans guaranteed by the state, illegal practice of entrepreneurial activity, money laundering, corporate tax fraud, individual tax fraud, limiting free competition, non-loyal competition, smuggling, intentional insolvency, fictitious insolvency, etc.

Taking into account the distinct nature of “white collar” criminality, criminal legislation stipulates clear penalties. In addition to fines and imprisonment, in such cases when offenses meet the criteria of “white collar” crimes, applicable sentences include depriving the offender of the right to hold certain offices or undertake certain activities. These punishments aim to remove the convicted person from his/her office, through which the execution of the crime was facilitated. The penalties applied in relation to those found guilty of “white collar” crimes are normally more severe compared to those found guilty of different offenses. The maximum size of applicable fines can reach MDL 200,000 (around EUR 10,000), compared to MDL 20,000 (around EUR 1,000) in the case of ordinary offenders, if the latter don’t have special status or didn’t act with the intent to accumulate material wealth. The same principles apply in cases when the offender is deprived of the right to hold certain offices and/or exercise certain activities. In such cases, the penalties for offenders meeting the “white collar” criteria are more severe than for ordinary criminals. The severity of punishment extends up to 15 years, compared to a general ban of 5 years for ordinary offenders.

In addition to the above punishments, other measures can be applied, including confiscation of assets and extended confiscation of assets.

In comparison to special confiscation, extended confiscation is intended primarily for people who fit the category of “white collar” criminals. It represents the confiscation of certain assets if their value substantially exceeds the value of legally acquired goods by the offender. Such decisions are taken by courts, based on evidence put forward by the prosecution. The Criminal code of Moldova clarifies the nature of such illegal activities. In the case of extended confiscation, the confiscation can also cover goods originating from illegal activities that do not directly relate to the crimes for which the offender is sentenced – in other words, where a direct link between the crime that leads to sentencing and the confiscated goods is not established.

The introduction of such a measure in the criminal legislation of Moldova is the result of recent reform efforts and the implementation of the National Justice Sector Reform Strategy. This development represents a necessary and long-awaited change in national legislation. It puts in place a modern concept for combating the illegal acquisition of property. We hope that this legal measure will be an efficient tool and will prove successful in combating general criminality, and in particular “white collar” offenses, whilst increasing social support for addressing these challenges.

By Daniel Martin, Litigation Partner, and Stanislav Copetchi, Lawyer, ACI Partners for CEE Legal Matters

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Opinion

Russia And Ukraine At The Beginning of 2022

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This opinion piece was written by Dr. Nicholas Dima. Dr. Dima was formerly a Professor of Geography and Geopolitics at Djibouti University, St. Mary’s University College and James Madison University. From 1975 to 1985 and from 1989 to 2001, Dr. Dima was a Writer and Field Reporter at Voice of America. The opinion does not necessarily represent the opinion of the editorial staff of Moldova.org.

***

The 21st Century Russian Federation is a rebirth of the 19-th Century Tsarist Empire; a huge territory inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups held together by an authoritarian government. Having acquired a diversity of lands and peoples that would not freely want to be together, Moscow has to be on guard. It has to keep an eye on those who are inside the federation and to make sure that no outsiders threaten its territory. Otherwise, in a nutshell, Ukraine is Russia’s biggest dilemma and Russia is Ukraine’s biggest nightmare!

In 1991 Moscow agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the former USSR. Ukraine became independent and consented to give up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for territorial guaranties. Russia did not keep its engagement. It violated the Minsk protocol and in 2014, after a hybrid war, annexed Crimea. At the same time, pro-Russian forces took over two important eastern Ukrainian regions, Lugansk and Donetsk, where the population is ethnically mixed and somehow pro-Russian.

Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in the peninsula and in the Black and Azov Seas. Furthermore, it built a strategic bridge that connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Then, Russia began to reject NATO activities in East Europe and to denounce the presence of the US Navy in the Black Sea as provocations. In order to counter NATO, Russia also brought some of its warships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don Canal.

During recent years, Ukraine approached the United States and NATO and asked for assistance and, eventually, for membership in the EU and possibly NATO. For Moscow, however, Ukraine is an essential buffer zone against the West. With President Vladimir Putin lamenting the dismemberment of the USSR and embracing the traditional Russian expansionist mentality, the perspective of Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an existential threat.

The current situation at the Russo-Ukrainian border is tense and the stakes are high. Neither country is satisfied with the status quo, but the choices are very risky. The important Donbas region of East Ukraine, controlled by pro-Russian forces, is in a limbo. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is losing support among the people and must defend his country’s integrity. Currently, Putin has the upper hand and military superiority on his side, but using brute force in the conflict could trigger further Western economic sanctions and even military hostility.

For now it seems that Moscow is mainly posturing, but the true Russian intentions are not clear. Thus, a miscalculation could trigger a catastrophe of international proportions. No one knows how the events will play out, but the danger is obvious. Moscow is playing with fire. Apparently, it does not want a full war, neither the current stalemate, nor a retreat. What does it want? It seems that Moscow knows what it wants, but not necessarily what it can!

Regionally, the situation between Europe and Russia is complex and internationally the world is confronted with threatening new realignments. With the help of Russia, Belarus has encouraged thousand of Middle East migrants to assail the Polish border and the European Union. Poland has mobilized its forces and NATO and EU are on alert. The three Baltic countries also feel threatened. And the recent Russo-Chinese economic cooperation and military rapprochement reinforce the international apprehension.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia went through several uneasy stages. During the first years of transition toward a new political system Russia experienced economic decline and popular unrest. Then, Putin took over and managed to stabilize the country. Russia opted for security and stability instead of political democracy and economic prosperity. At the same time, Kremlin focused its resource on the military and strengthened Russia’s war capacity.

For the time being, Russia may want to perpetuate the current situation and to keep Ukraine under its thumb. However, things are not static and sometimes they move unpredictably. What if Ukraine does become a NATO member? Then, it will be impossible for Russia to challenge Kyiv without triggering a devastating war. On the other hand, waiting is not in Russia’s advantage. Demographically, ethnic Russians are declining and the non-Russians, mostly Muslims, are fast increasing. The continuous emigration to the West of many Russians is not helping the population balance either. This trend will almost certainly renew old conflicts especially in the unsettled Caucasus region…

Attacking Ukraine now, overtly or through a hybrid war, would be risky for Russia and would not bring a lasting solution to the dispute. The war could destabilize Kyiv and even dismember Ukraine, but it would also destabilize the Russian Federation. The  present tension will probably be diffused, but the next time around, in about 10 to 20 years, Putin will be gone, Moscow itself will be in disarray, Caucasian Muslims will be asking openly for independence and Ukraine will be ready and capable to fight Russia.

A Russo-Ukrainian war, now or later, will immediately have regional effects engaging Belarus and most likely Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, Romania and implicitly NATO. Romania, for example, will follow its western allies, but it could not ignore the fact that certain formerly Romanian lands are now part of Ukraine. As for Moldova, beyond the facts that Moldovans are Romanians, its Transnistrian (Transdnestr) area is entirely under Russian control and in an eventual war will be used by Moscow against Ukraine.

Nicholas Dima, January 1,  2022

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Featured

FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

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A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.

International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.

Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.

Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.

Is it Moldova?

First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.

At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”

What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.

“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.

Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.

Is it a victory?

In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.

Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.

“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”

Is it only about football?

FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.

The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.

Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.

Photo: unknown

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Justice

Changing the judiciary or replacing the Prosecutor General – what starts a successful judicial reform?

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The newly elected government decided to take action regarding one of its main priorities, which was previously announced – the judicial reform. Namely, an amendment to the existing Law on the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) was voted through the first reading on August 13. The bill provides for introduction of a mechanism for evaluating the performance of the Prosecutor General, as well as his dismissal following a proposal submitted by the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP) in case he fails in his duties.

The performance of the Prosecutor General would be evaluated once per year by a 5 members commission formed by the SCP. One member would be proposed by the President of the Republic of Moldova, the second by the Ministry of Justice, the third by the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM), the forth by the Superior Council of Prosecutors and the last one by the Prosecutor General (PG). In case at least 3 members of the SCP, the Performance Evaluation Commission or the President of the Republic of Moldova take the initiative, disciplinary proceedings may be brought against the Prosecutor General. If a criminal investigation is initiated, an interim PG is appointed by the SCP.

The authors of the bill (MPs of the Party of Action and Solidarity) claimed that the proposed changes would not affect the independence and autonomy of the OPG and that of the Prosecutor General, as the Superior Council of Prosecutors has the decisive role in making the decision. “The introduction of regulations on the evaluation of the Prosecutor General’s performance, as well as regulations on the application of disciplinary liability to the Prosecutor General comes to ensure accountability of the institution, and establishes a balance of power and control between the Prosecutor General and the Superior Council of Prosecutors,” the authors of the bill said.

During the same plenary session, MPs supported through the first reading the amendment to the normative acts providing for the election and appointment of members in the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. The candidates of both councils are required to hold office for at least 3 years and not to be penalised in the last 3 years. Six members of the SCM would be elected by the General Assembly of Judges, next to three ex officio members and three law professors appointed by Parliament.

At the same time, the proposed amendments seek to reduce the number of the SCP members from 15 to 12, by excluding the Prosecutor General, the Chief Prosecutor of the ATU (Autonomous Territorial Unit) Gagauzia Prosecutor’s Office and the President of the Lawyers Union.

The Parliamentary Committee in charge of Legal Affairs, Appointments and Immunities invited all interested parties to public consultations, on 18 August, regarding the previously mentioned bills, after civil society organizations have made a public request to organize “genuine and inclusive public consultations, in strict compliance with the legislation on transparency in decision-making.”

A smart move or a hasty reform?

The modifications to the Law on the Office of the Prosecutor General approved in Parliament were criticised by some experts, despite the fact that Sergiu Litvinenco, the main promoter and the one who initiated the bill, argued that “the changes contain sufficient guarantees to ensure correct procedures both in the case of performance evaluation and in the case of disciplinary procedure.”

The president of the Center for Legal Resources of Moldova, Vladislav Gribincea, declared that amending the Law on the Office of the Prosecutor General every time the government does not like the prosecutor general “creates dangerous circumstances and puts the Prosecutor General at the mercy of politicians.”

” No matter how well-intentioned politicians may be, a politically dependent prosecutor could be more dangerous than one with modest performance.”

The expert also said  that the modifications make no sense, as long as the dismissal of the Prosecutor General can be initiated only by the Superior Council of Prosecutors – a representative and self-administered body of prosecutors. “The SCP has not made proposals for dismissal, not even for disciplinary sanctions on much more critical situations committed by prosecutors. I do not see how this mechanism will lead to the de facto dismissal of Mr. Stoianoglo. I rather see this as a legislative pirouette, in order to further intensify the pressure on the General Prosecutor, causing him to leave.”

Former President of the Constitutional Court, Alexandru Tanase, stated that “although it contains high standards in the organization of the Office of the Prosecutor General, changing the rules of the game without changing people, does not generate any results.”

“The Venice Commission needs to be consulted, and the EU needs to make sure that the government does not make mistakes with this hasty reform,” claimed the expert Dionis Cenusa.

The OPG response was transcendent, still superficial: “The level of understanding by the current government of the principles of the rule of law is unexpectedly weak and, at the moment, we do not see the point of commenting on anything. The OPG response to any attack on its institutional and procedural independence will be proportionate to the seriousness of such attacks.” Regarding that, Vladislav Gribincea commented that there could not have been “a more inappropriate reaction of the OPG. The only tool of the institution is to file criminal cases against politicians. I think that is the last thing the Office of the Prosecutor General needs now.”

According to WatchDog expert Valeriu Pasa, the new law proposes to remove the SCP from the control of prosecutor, but that does not mean handing it over to politicians. “Civil society, academic environment, the ombudsman will participate in the process. Still, the largest number of members (5 out of 12) will be prosecutors. No one would have full control, as it is now. That would mean a much more balanced system,” he explained.

“Consolidating the system formed and led by the puppets of Plahotniuc and Platon is stupid. For the Party of Action and Solidarity that would be a political suicide. Is there a risk of political subordination of decisions taken by prosecutors and judges? Of course! And that must be the red line. The only safeguard against these abuses is the self-control of the new government and the strict monitoring of civil society and external partners, but  also of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. If Plahotniuc’s control over judiciary gets replaced by the PAS’s control – everything has been in vain.”

The expert believes that the current Prosecutor General, Alexandru Stoianoglo, must resign because he has been elected through a vicious procedure intentionally organised by socialists. Another important reason is his inactivity concerning important investigations, the lack of progress when it comes to sanctioning or holding people accountable for major abuses, as it is the case of Veaceslav Platon or Ilan Shor, who left the country without any impediments. This was one of the arguments of the current government as well, in addition to the intention to bring the law into line with the Constitution in order to establish a mechanism for evaluating the activity of the Prosecutor General.

What changes will the current amendments undergo through the second reading, and whether the PG resigns or is dismissed – those are the next big questions.

Photo: parlament.md

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