Vladimir Putin has certainly been busy setting out his manifesto for the presidential election due on 4 March, with a series of extensive articles placed in the Russian media, relayed instantly in impeccable English translations to international readerships.

European readers of his texts will pay particular attention to what he has to say about our continent in his article of 27 February: ‘Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe and European civilization. Our citizens think of themselves as Europeans. We are by no means indifferent to developments in united Europe. …. I propose again that we work toward creating a harmonious community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which will, in the future, evolve into a free trade zone and even more advanced forms of economic integration’. (For full texts of this and other articles in the series see http://premier.gov.ru/eng/)

When Putin says that Russians think of themselves as Europeans, most Europeans for their part are happy about this. In the two decades since the end of the Soviet Union, West Europeans and Russians have begun to get to know each other. Older generations from the former Soviet bloc will not forget and may never forgive the tragic and traumatic experience of the Soviet occupation in their own lifetimes. Yet the overwhelming European attitude, from foreign ministries to the population as a whole, is to hope for European-Russian relations to become more and more normal as between all other nations of the continent: and ‘normal’ means to be open, friendly, appreciative of the same human and cultural values, of common standards of human rights and legal order, and above all to be devoid of mutual threat perceptions. For their part foreign policy people are looking for convergence of positions on matters contributing to an enlightened or at least soundly functioning world order, with particular concern for how the newly expanded collection of major world powers can work together.

In this regard Putin’s texts, while mostly familiar stuff, raises a number of sharp issues which question the overall coherence and feasibility of his objectives. We select here three of them, his ideas for an economic community from Lisbon to Vladivostok, his plans for increased military spending, and Russia’s position over Syria.

The idea of a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok may sound utopian and futuristic, but there are increasingly practical arguments warranting that the EU respond with interest. The status quo is a messy collection of competing and partly overlapping projects. The EU seeks to conclude deep and comprehensive free trade areas with Eastern Partner states, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Russia has recently formed a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. It also pushes Ukraine to join this, which however would be incompatible with free trade with the EU unless the customs union also entered into a free trade agreement with the EU. Russia also seeks to expand and deepen the Eurasian Economic Area with all former Soviet states that are willing. Neither the EU nor Russia contemplate free trade with China, but Russia can see in free trade with the EU a mechanism for economic modernization, and the EU is interested in economic alliances to face the competition from the hyper-competitive China. The formula to square this circle would be for the EU to add a free trade agreement with Russia, or presumably with the customs union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, to its expanding set of free trade agreements in Eastern Europe. Since Russia has now joined the WTO the way is open for this. Russia has in the past viewed free trade with the EU as a deal that would only be to the EU’s advantage. If Putin’s view on this has changed, let the matter be taken up at the next EU-Russia summit. If the idea of EU-Russia free trade were to be taken up, the door would be natural to think about a further step, namely to multilateralise a Greater European free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok; and to this the EU would want to consider adding, or doing first, Lisbon to Cairo, thus a Greater Euro-Med free trade area. These are ideas of huge potential significance.

Back now to Putin, later on in his writings he complains how Russian economic interests are treated in the rest of the world. ‘So far Russian economic actors have been getting a raw deal abroad. We are trying to attract foreign capital to the Russian economy. … But our investors are not welcome abroad and are often pointedly brushed aside’. It is true that the West at large is wary of big investment stakes in Russia or by Russian interests. But has Putin adequately reflected on the reasons for this? His remarks are all about alleged anti-Russian sentiment and conspiracies in the world. The rest of the world is wary about Russia for a chain of reasons: Russia has a habit of mixing geo-political power with commerce, including for example trade sanctions against East European states to mark mere political displeasure. Russia is a hazardous business environment for its uncertain rule of law. And then these economic concerns compound with broader matters of political trust on matters of strategic security. And this leads into other features of Putin’s current writings.

As regards hard security matters Putin says in his 20 February article on defense that Russia is threatened by (unnamed) enemies. ‘We continue to see new areas of instability and deliberately managed chaos. There also are purposeful attempts to provoke such conflicts even within the direct proximity of Russia’s and its allies’ borders’.

In response there has to be a huge expansion of military spending: ‘In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines, about 20 multi-purpose submarines, over 50 surface warships, around 100 military spacecraft, over 600 modern aircraft including fifth generation fighter jets, more than 1,000 helicopters, 28 regimental kits of S-400 air defence systems, 38 battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems, 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M missile systems, over 2,300 modern tanks, about 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems and vehicles, and more than 17,000 military vehicles’.

Wow! But who threatens Russia in this way? Obviously not Europe which cuts back on its already modest military spending. Hardly China with whom it has settled previous border disputes and shares the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. And is not President Obama withdrawing his military from Afghanistan, Iraq and reducing West European bases? Russia may have soft security threats coming from its south in the shape of terrorism, drugs and criminality, but this is hardly a matter for intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines. There is of course the threat of Iran’s nuclear proliferation, to which the US and NATO plans for anti-missile defenses in Europe are addressed. Russia argues that these anti-Iranian defenses might be engineered in a way that undermined its own strategic missile capabilities. But this relies on the strange logic of nuclear deterrence: these defenses might possibly be engineered in a way also to reduce Russia’s capability to obliterate Western Europe and the United States. Have we not got beyond this? Moreover former finance minister Kudrin says that Russia cannot afford this military spending bonanza. Or maybe with the new high oil price Russia can at least temporarily fund this, but is it what the economy and society needs? Putin’s new arms build-up seems to be ascribed to some kind of politically convenient neo-cold war mythology, or incredibly expensive political posturing at election time, disconnected from the real politics of the world at large.

Now for Syria. Russia and China vetoed a resolution of the UN Security Council on 4 February, which was otherwise a consensus text proposed by a large group of Arab and Western states. The text excluded external military intervention. A similar text was put to the UN General Assembly on 16 February, revealing more completely who are the friends of Syria, and who are the supporters of a world order based on modern humanitarian norms as well as traditional security norms: 137 states voted for, 12 against, and 17 abstained. Of the 12 votes against, five are international pariah states: Belarus, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Iran and Syria itself. Two of these are nuclear weapon proliferators and all are brutally repressive authoritarian regimes. Another five is a group from Latin America led by Hugo Chavez: Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, whose leaders live off anti-capitalist and anti-American polemic despite their disastrous economic records.

Then there were the two big no votes: Russian and China. Of the two Russia has been in the lead on Syria, given the importance of its military (naval base, arms supplies) and political commitments there. China has far less direct interests. Its joining Russia at the UNSC vote seem driven by the two parties’ commitment to some kind of diplomatic mutual support pact: you help me here, and I’ll help you elsewhere.

The 137 votes in favour of the Resolution saw a solid packing of Arab League states except Algeria and Lebanon, all European states except Russia and Belarus, all other OECD states, and a considerable number of African, Asian and Latin American states, including Brazil, India and South Africa from the BRICs, and all G20 states except Russia and China. The BRIC alliance was divided down the middle, between the democrats (Brazil, India and South Africa) and the non-democrats (Russia and China). The democratic BRICs joined with the liberal democratic club of advanced nations.

Thus it was that the non-democratic BRICs joined up with the bizarre collection of international pariah and dissident states: one is reminded of Groucho Marx’s line, ‘who would want to join a club I am member of?’ Should not the foreign policy planners of Russia and China be thinking more about the positions they are taking that lead them into this exclusive and utterly disreputable company? How can it be that Russia and China aspire to major roles in global affairs while keeping such alliances?

Or put otherwise, what does it mean for the possible evolution of the new world order when two UN Security Council veto-carrying powers find themselves only in such company in the UN General Assembly? The answer from the current Syrian crisis is clear enough. The UN system is bypassed and ad hoc coalitions are formed in its place. A first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis on 24 February 2012, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the Arab League, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia and China were the noted absentees. The UN structures are thus bypassed, and a huge international coalition of the willing is assembled in ad hoc meetings elsewhere. Putin for his part ‘warns our Western colleagues against the temptation to resort to this simple, previously used tactic: if the UN Security Council approves of a given action, fine: if not, we will establish a coalition of states concerned and strike anyway’. Sadly, this is precisely what Russian policy is leading to, not ‘strike anyway’ since the Friends of Syria exclude military action, but Russia is undermining the functionality of the UN by adopting spoiler positions. Over Libya Russia and China abstained, and for a moment it seemed there was a partial convergence of positions with the advanced democracies and Arab League.

Both Russia and China advance normative principles, above all non-interference and absolute respect for the sovereignty of recognized states. These are hugely important principles, time-honoured since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. But the international system and realities of globalization have moved on from this ‘pure’ order if ever it existed. The development of international humanitarian law, the creation of the International Criminal Court, and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, all amount to intrusions of international norms, law and institutions into the politics of the world’s sovereign states, quite apart from the long-established intrusion of the international financial institutions into matters of economic sovereignty. However over Syria it is clear from the texts that the Western powers will not intervene militarily. But Russia and China, in blocking the UN resolution, go to the other extreme, signaling encouragement to the Assad regime to carry on with their deadly bombardments.

Russia, Europe’s big and eternal neighbor, thus finds itself in a bizarre situation. It wishes to be accepted as a normal civilized modern state, and to hang on to its post-World War rank as great power. But it seems convinced that it can achieve the latter only by using its privileged position in the UN Security Council as blocker or spoiler, thereby undermining the crucial matter of trust with the world’s advanced democracies. This both damages the country’s branding in ways that are desirable for its economic modernization, and pushes international diplomacy away from the forum where it has privileged status. Will the next President of Russia, after the forthcoming election, reflect on these truly strategic questions with a more open mind?