Politics
Ukraine’s Options Limited as Russia’s Time Runs Out
Reading Time: 5 minutesRussia has only a limited window of time in which it can hope to achieve its maximum hopes in Ukraine, and Ukraine has only a limited number of options to develop its relations with the Russian Federation in order to ensure its survival as an independent state, according to two leading Kyiv specialists on international relations.
By Paul Goble
Russia has only a limited window of time in which it can hope to achieve its maximum hopes in Ukraine, and Ukraine has only a limited number of options to develop its relations with the Russian Federation in order to ensure its survival as an independent state, according to two leading Kyiv specialists on international relations.
In the current issue of “Zerkalo nedeli,” Academician Vladimir Gorbulin, director of the Kyiv Institute of Problems of National Security, and Aleksandr Litvinenko, his advisor, provide a detailed 4,100-word discussion of the security trap in which both the Russian Federation and Ukraine find themselves (www.zn.ua/1000/1600/67194/).
Russia’s domestic problems, including demographic decline, ethnic and religious challenges, and regional separatism ethnic and non-ethnic, have been compounded by its return to authoritarianism and the impact of the global economic crisis, the two say, forcing Moscow to “concentrate on the resolution of questions it can’t put off of a primarily regional nature.”
“Key among [Russia’s] foreign policy tasks must be considered the repression of Ukraine,” Gorbulin and Litvinenko write, noting that by means of “the subordination of Ukraine or at least its southeaster part, the Kremlin [could] essentially improve the situation in the Russian Federation.”
Such an achievement would “reduce [Russia’s] demographic problems, guarantee reliable transit of energy carriers to Europe, significantly increase its economic potential in machine tools (including military) and in agriculture, make impossible for the US to use [this area as a base] and neutralize the potential of an ideological threat to its authoritarian regime.”
Those considerations, they continue, demonstrate that “the aggressive policy of the Kremlin relative to Ukraine is the result not of the actions of Kyiv but of the requirements of Russia as the current leadership of [that] state understands them.” And that means a change of course in Ukraine’s policies “will not lead to a significant correction in Russian policy.”
At the same time, Gorbulin and Litvinenko argue, “in the Kremlin, they recognize that the historical ‘window of opportunity’ relative to Ukraine for Moscow is quite short and may close already sometime after 2015 at which time there will be created a new generation of Ukrainian elites” and when the West may have changed its approach to Moscow and Kyiv.
All these considerations mean, the two Ukrainian security analysts argue, that a Russian “’attack on Kyiv’ will develop in the nearest future and will be decisive and pitiless.”
Gorbulin and Litvinenko then examine more specifically Russian policy toward Ukraine and Ukraine’s possible response. With respect to the former, they make six points. First, they say, Moscow has repeatedly made clear that it recognizes the borders of Ukraine but demands that Ukraine defer to Moscow on issues like possible membership in NATO.
Second, they argue, “the contemporary Russian state both legally and ideologically and in institutional terms is a direct heir of the USSR,” a reality that involves in the first instance “institutional memory” regarding “the mechanisms for the development and adoption of decisions,” in the first instance those involving “strategic” questions.
Because of that continuity, they continue, it is very likely that the Kremlin has not developed “a precise, clearly formulated program of actions relative to Ukraine” but rather is being guided by decisions on “the main tasks, directions and [available] arsenal of instruments to be used.”
Third, the two analysts argue, this lack of a specific plan does not mean that Moscow has not decided on its long-term “strategic vision” for relations with Ukraine. In fact, it has done so at the December 25, 2008, meeting of the Russian Security Council and State Council of the Russian Federation.
That vision, subsequently made public by Konstantin Zatulin in May 2009 takes the form of “an ultimatum: the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine is ensured by its transition to ‘special relations’ with the Russian Federation and in fact to a Russian protectorate over a weak Ukraine.”
Fourth, on the basis of “almost 20 years of relations with independent Ukraine,” the Kremlin has become “convinced” of the effectiveness of using “so-called pro-Russian elites” to advance its cause in Ukraine and of the way in which a Russian protectorate will ultimately lead to “the territorial division of Ukraine into three parts,” part of which will be absorbed by Russia.
And fifth, the Russian political elite is divided into “hawks” and “doves” as to how best and how quickly to achieve these goals, with some arguing that more pressure sooner is best and others arguing for less pressure and a longer term approach as the best means of gaining an upper hand for Moscow. In recent months, because of economic problems, the hawks are on top.
Moscow is using Crimea as its “basic polygon” for developing relations with Ukraine and Russian security services for promoting its goals, the two say. But if these services are unable to achieve Moscow’s goals and if the January 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine do not give the result Russia wants, “one cannot completely exclude the application of direct force.”
Given this Russian policy, one that places “the very survival of the Ukrainian state in its current borders” at risk, Kyiv must immediately adopt a number of “complex measures,” Gorbulin and Litvinenko argue, some of which involve its domestic arrangements and others a new approach to its foreign partners.
“Above all,” they argue, “the protection of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens of Ukraine must become the essence of state policy not only at the level of loud declarations but in reality.” Kyiv must “immediately establish political stability on the basis of elite and social consensus regarding a European path of development.”
Among the things that will require is a new constitution that will define Ukraine either as a presidential or a parliamentary republic rather than combining the two, the reduction of corruption in the state bureaucracy, the reform of the armed services, the development of an effective intelligence and counterintelligence service, and better propaganda of Ukraine’s goals.
In foreign affairs, the two analysts suggest, Ukraine must continue its “strategic course” toward membership in NATO and the European Community, but this drive “must take on significantly more tactical flexibility,” allowing Ukraine to “accentuate” positive aspects of its ties with Russia as well.
Such ties cannot be developed in isolation. Instead, Ukraine must use “the possibilities offered by international organizations” like the CIS, OSCE, UN, and Council of Europe and must be willing to think out of the box by considering such things as declaring the Black Sea a demilitarized zone.
In its relations with the United States, Kyiv should shift “the accent from the public and the official to the working level, above all in the sphere of security,” and in ties with the EU, it should move from declarations to practical work, however limited that may appear to be at any particular moment.
And Ukraine should, Gorbulin and Litvinenko argue, “increase its dialogue with China, [again] in the sphere of security by making use of the fact that China became the first state guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity which it confirmed these guarantees in 2006.”
Such policies, the two say, “can gradually if not lower tensions between Ukraine and Russia then at least limit their risk of conflict and also minimize the potential harm for the national interests of Ukraine.” Perhaps more to the point, such actions will help those in Russia who want to organize their country “on the principles of freedom.”
A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Natalia Gavrilita, together with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu, pay an official visit to Brussels, between September 27-28, being invited by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles.
Today, Prime Minister had a meeting with Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The Moldovan PM thanked the senior European official for the support of the institution in strengthening democratic processes, reforming the judiciary and state institutions, economic recovery and job creation, as well as increasing citizens’ welfare. Natalia Gavrilita expressed her confidence that the current visit laid the foundations for boosting relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, so that, in the next period, it would be possible to advance high-level dialogues on security, justice and energy. Officials also exchanged views on priorities for the Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in December.
“The EU is open to continue to support the Republic of Moldova and the ambitious reform agenda it proposes. Moldova is an important and priority partner for us,” said Charles Michel.
Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also met with Paolo Gentiloni, European Commissioner for Economy, expressing her gratitude for the support received through the OMNIBUS macro-financial assistance program. The two officials discussed the need to advance the recovery of money from bank fraud, to strengthen sustainable mechanisms for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in Moldova, and to standardize the customs and taxes as one of the main conditions for deepening cooperation with the EU in this field.
Additionally, Prime Minister spoke about the importance of the Eastern Partnership and the Deep Free Trade Agreement, noting that the Government’s policies are aimed at developing an economic model aligned with the European economic model, focused on digitalization, energy efficiency and the green economy.
A common press release of the Moldovan Prime Minister with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell Fontelles, took place today, where the agenda of Moldova’s reforms and the main priorities to focus on in the coming months were presented: judiciary reform; fighting COVID-19 pandemic; promoting economic recovery and conditions for growth and job creation; strengthening state institutions and resilience of the country.
“I am here to relaunch the dialogue between my country and the European Union. Our partnership is strong, but I believe there is room for even deeper cooperation and stronger political, economic and sectoral ties. I am convinced that this partnership is the key to the prosperity of our country and I hope that we will continue to strengthen cooperation.”
The Moldovan delegation met Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice. Tomorrow, there are scheduled common meetings with Oliver Varhelyi, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Adina Valean, European Commissioner for Transport and Kadri Simson, European Commissioner for Energy.
Prime Minister will also attend a public event, along with Katarina Mathernova, Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
Photo: gov.md
Politics
Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria
The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, pays an official visit to New York, USA, between September 21-22. There, she participates in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a press release of the President’s Office, the official will deliver a speech at the tribune of the United Nations.
In this context, the Promo-LEX Association suggested the president to request the appointment of a special rapporteur in order to monitor the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. According to Promo-LEX, the responsibility for human rights violations in the Transnistrian region arises as a result of the Russian Federation’s military, economic and political control over the Tiraspol regime.
“We consider it imperative to insist on the observance of the international commitments assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces and ammunition from the territory of the country,” the representatives of Promo-LEX stated. They consider the speech before the UN an opportunity “to demand the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Russian Federation with reference to this territory which is in its full control.”
“It is important to remember about the numerous cases of murder, torture, ill-treatment, forced enlistment in illegal military structures, the application of pseudo-justice in the Transnistrian region, all carried out under the tacit agreement of the Russian Federation. These findings stem from dozens of rulings and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that Russia is responsible for human rights violations in the region.”
The association representatives expressed their hope that the president of the country would give priority to issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region and would call on relevant international actors to contribute to guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms throughout Moldova.
They asked Maia Sandu to insist on the observance of the obligation to evacuate the ammunition and the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to publicly support the need for the Russian Federation to implement the ECtHR rulings on human rights violations in the Transnistrian region, and to request the appointment of an UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
**
The Promo-LEX Association concluded that 14 out of 25 actions planned within the National Action Plan for the years 2018–2022 concerning respecting human rights in Transnistria were not carried out by the responsible authorities.
The association expressed its concern and mentioned that there are a large number of delays in the planned results. “There is a lack of communication and coordination between the designated institutions, which do not yet have a common vision of interaction for the implementation of the plan.”
Promo-LEX requested the Government of the Republic of Moldova to re-assess the reported activities and to take urgent measures, “which would exclude superficial implementation of future activities and increase the level of accountability of the authorities.”
Photo: peacekeeping.un.org
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