Author: Sergiu Panainte, Political and Security Statewatch, Nr. 6, 2008
Overview

The recent history of independent Moldova depicts a period of prolonged transition and impossibility to create a viable, democratic and prosperous state. There are many factors which determined such a pitiful and poor performance of state institutions among which systemic, historic, geographic, politi¬cal, economic and socio-cultural.

Through the lenses of a social constructivist ap¬proach Moldova failed to find its identity undergo¬ing a constant and deep crisis. Coupled with other objective factors it got Moldova right where it is now – the poorest country in Europe with weak democratic institutions. Since identities are a con¬structed concept heavily relying on socio-cultural components backed by political considerations the question to ask is where Moldova stands now and where does it want to get.

The events taking place during the last month clearly demonstrate that Moldovan foreign poli¬cy suffers from the same identity crisis unable to define clear pathways and strategies for promoting national interests of the state and its citizens on the international arena. The recurrent issue since inde¬pendence was and still is: East or West? That is why to accommodate this identity crisis Moldova keeps betting on its exceptional role of bonding East and West and placing its loyalties in a sinusoidal way both to Moscow and Brussels.

Strategic Partnership or Strategic Obedience?

The relationships with Russia have been assig¬ned a strategic importance to Moldova. The party in power has polished this relationship through permanent contacts with Russian high officials and constant attention to the moods of the “big brother”. Nobody denies the strategic importance Moscow represents for Moldova, but most of the times it is overestimated and slowly degenerated into a strategic obedience.

The participation of President Voronin in the informal Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Summit in Sankt-Petersburg to meet the new Russian president was an “opportunity” to reinsure Chisinau’s good faith to the new administration. The outcome of the meeting with Medvedev cannot be fully assessed as it has become a practice for the public to find about important decisions long after they had been already taken. Obviously, Presi¬dent Voronin’s biggest concern is Transnistrian resolution process and the package of solutions Moldova submitted to Moscow to be endorsed since 2005. Given the fact this package provides for reintegration of the country according to the law about the eastern rayons of Moldova from July 2005 granting extensive autonomy to Transnistria, Moscow refuses to support it as it is “too good” for Moldova. Now it was the time to try this package with Medvedev and to push it through until the parliamentary elections from 2009. The concessions made by Moldova have been discussed previously and include the permanent neutrality, recognition of Russian investments in Transnistria, etc.

However, the policy promoted by Putin will be carried out further on by Medvedev in the short and medium term, which means that Russia wants to preserve the status quo existing at the moment with regard to Transnistrian resolution process. It is a wise move since it can get Voronin into more concessions as the electoral campaign will approa¬ch. On the other hand Voronin does not want a resolution that would mean loosing control over the foreign policy, security policy, etc when Trans¬nistria rejoins the county under Russian terms. Therefore, one can expect some surprising develo¬pments as the electoral campaign will come close to and on the other hand it will constitute a test for Voronin to see how far he can get in his electoral ambitions of getting Russian support. The stakes are too well known and the possibilities too obvio¬us since they have been voiced by different Russian officials like Ostrovskii or Zubakov – a “Kozak 2” Memorandum establishing a federative Moldova or Voronin’s package preserving a unitary Moldova with an autonomous Transnistria.

On the economic side of Moldovan-Russian relati¬ons the parity is more uneven. The recent meeting of two prime-ministers, Greceanii and Putin in Moscow, touched upon this issue. Gas prices for Moldova was the burning matter, also Moldovan export of wines, Russian investments into Moldo¬van economy, etc. Greceanii shared her optimism and satisfaction with the talks as did Putin. Howe¬ver, as the prices for gas increased anyway, this op¬timism of Moldovan side can hardly be explained. Moreover, at the CIS Summit Voronin agreed to a deepened economic cooperation within CIS where economic relations are better to keep on a bilateral basis.

As a matter of fact one can notice a slight change in Voronin’s behavior towards Russia. If two years ago he started a huge campaign of rebuilding Rus¬sian trust by fully submitting to Russian interests, now he tries to defend a position which should preserve and maintain a strategic relationship with Moscow and in the same time to reach the goals be¬neficial for Moldova, among which the resolution of Transnistrian conflict is the priority number one. Voronin’s entourage has turned back to European rhetoric to create an alternative to Russian offensive in Moldova. Yet, this oscillation between East and West can only bring temporary results, but endan¬gers future European perspectives if this is the path Moldova wants to embrace.

A new Agreement in Sight: Moldovan Ambitions vs. EU Neighborhood Policy

At the last EU-Moldova Cooperation Committee meeting in Brussels the EU officials announced a reflection period which will precede the new con¬tractual agreement with Moldova after the Partner¬ship and Cooperation Agreement expired. Howe¬ver, while acknowledging progress in Moldova’s implementation of the Action Plan, EU stressed the need for further reforms as a precondition for the new agreement. The areas which need special at¬tention remained the same: independence of justice, freedom of press, fighting corruption and creating a benefic environment for foreign investments.

In Moldova the news about this reflection period was presented as the readiness of EU to bring the relations with Moldova to a higher level. Well, this is not quite so. This process will take some time as the 27 members of EU have to come to a common agreement to what the framework of relations with Moldova should entail. Once there is a unified position over the issue with a prior report from the Commission to assess the development Moldo¬va reached, the Commission will be empowered with the mandate to carry out the negotiations for signing the new document. Since Ukraine is already in negotiations with EU over a new agree¬ment, it is likely Moldova will follow the same path and the same content will be offered to it as well. Obviously, this is conditioned by the requirements mentioned above, plus Moldova has to ensure free and fair parliamentary elections, de facto the most important test to assess the country’s attachment to democratic values. One can predict that only after these elections the negotiations over the new agree¬ment will be commenced.

Nevertheless, Moldovan authorities are very optimistic about the future of their relations with EU. At the last meeting of the National Commis¬sion for European integration, president Voronin delivered a very ambitious, yet surprisingly very articulated and pragmatic speech over Moldova’s chances and opportunities with regard to the new agreement. Voronin stated that Moldova should be ambitious in its endeavors and to ask for an Asso¬ciation Agreement with EU which will stipulate a future quality of a member, but without setting any timeframes for it now. This should give a serious boost to the reformation process in Moldova, added the president. Further on Voronin stated that the new agreement has to take into serious considerati¬on the liberalization of visa regime with EU and to exclude all restrictions and barriers to a free trade regime.

All in all, this is the most coherent, realistic and ambitious speech Voronin delivered about Euro¬pean integration. However, neither Moldova, nor the EU is ready to proceed with such demands. The problem with Moldova is that its overall democra¬tic record does not qualify it for such deep relations with the EU yet. In more specific terms, what con¬cerns the free trade regime, Moldova is not ready to face the tough competition on the Common Market and to exclude all taxes and duties which form a huge portion of state budget. Furthermore, a free visa regime would mean to introduce a visa regime with CIS countries in order to be able to control the flow of migrants coming to Moldova. Is Moldova ready to give up this and to have a visa regime with Russia, its strategic partner? – Hardly believable.

On the other hand the EU is not prepared to go so far as to grant an Association Agreement to Moldova. European Neighborhood Policy clearly states no membership perspectives for Eastern neighbors, at least for the foreseeable future and EU wants to keep it so. With regard to visa regime, the EU already signed a Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2007 which will not be soon replaced by a visa free regime. Moldova still poses threats in matters of illegal migration and its borders are not secure enough to live up to European standards. That is specifically one of the reasons EUBAM is deployed at the border with Ukraine. As a result no matter how strong an Association Agreement is desired by Chisinau, this is not a viable enterprise at the moment, though an even distant perspective of EU integration would really sponsor improvements in carrying out the reforms in all problematic areas.

Nonetheless, the new agreement has to offer bigger possibilities for cooperation with EU than the PCA did. In this respect, the recent Eastern Partnership initiative launched by Polish and Swedish gover¬nments could upgrade the actual framework of ENP. Although it does not stipulate a membership perspective, it does exceed the limits of the Action Plan. It offers possibilities for deepened economic relations and gradual liberalization of visa regime. This is what actually Voronin asked for.

It is encouraging though, that the EU is conscious of the fact that the new agreement should meet also Moldova’s needs and desires, tempered by EU possibilities and set of indicators to measure compliance with its norms and values. Now Mol¬dovan government has to do its part of the job and to continue with the reforms, to respect freedom of media, human rights to fight corruption and create a sound business climate.

The Impossible Dream of Moldovan Foreign Poli¬cy: Reconciling EU Membership with Leap of Faith to Russia

The East-West dilemma in Moldovan foreign poli¬cy is already a recurrent concept. Due to the impos¬sibility to define clear priorities in the first years of independence and to break up with the old menta¬lity, Moldova has been trapped in an interminable transition and identity crisis of understanding who it is. Hence, the solution which became ubiquitous afterwards was the idea to reconcile Moldovan dependence on East with the willingness to join the West. In the media jargon this has been termed as being in two boats at the same time or milking two cows at once.

The truth is that this “dream” of having both “worlds” with their striking discrepancies cannot last indefinitely. Moldova reached a moment when a choice has to be made. Nevertheless, the choice is not of being with one and denying the other, it is more of belonging to one while understanding the other. Such a possibility has been advocated long before where Moldova would do its best to join the EU and to serve as a bridge for understanding Russia and doing business with it.

However, a big impediment hampering such an evolution is the Transnistrian problem where it is believed that the key to the solution lies in Moscow, adding to it energetic dependence of Moldova. These cards are played constantly by Russia to keep control over Moldova, plus a generous display of affection manifested by the party in power for “the big brother”.

On the other hand there is EU with its rising influ¬ence in the area, but who chose a careful approach to issues related to enlargement. Nevertheless, the support it offers for the resolution of Transnistrian conflict cannot be denied, it just that the methods are different from those used by Russia.

Now what Moldova does? It plays between EU and Russia, unfortunately in a predictive and silly way most of the times. At the beginning of the month Voronin signs a document for deepening economic cooperation within CIS; at the end of the month he addresses the government with the need to deepen the economic ties with the EU and sign an Associa¬tion Agreement. This is just an example, not menti¬on many others. In such a way Moldova discredits itself both in relation to the EU and Russia.

One thing has to be clear – it is impossible to recon¬cile EU with Russia and CIS. These are two diffe¬rent structures excluding themselves by definition. This play of Moldovan foreign policy either with Brussels or Moscow does not bring any long term results. It is detrimental to national interests and damages country’s image and credibility. That is why Moldova has to be aware in the first place of its own identity. Not the “primitive moldovenism” identity the Communists are trying to build, but the true European identity which will allow Moldovan people to embrace a European future.

Prognosis

Last month events triggered a lot of talking over the future perspectives of Moldova. This relates both to resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and Euro¬pean integration. While president Voronin still ke¬eps hopes of reaching a solution before the elections from 2009 which will correspond to the package of measures submitted by Chisinau to Russia, the re¬solution process gets a more international dimension. The mediators and observers to the negotiations have met in Helsinki to discuss the possibility for resuming the talks in the “5+2” format next month and to proceed with the trust building measures initiated by president Voronin. Such an internatio¬nalization of the resolution process is beneficial for Moldova as Russian ambitions follow a trajectory that would ensure continuous control over a reinte¬grated Moldova under the Russian terms.

On the Western vector Moldova is hopeful of signing a new contractual agreement with EU following the EU-Moldova Cooperation Commit¬tee meeting in Brussels. President Voronin asked the government to continue with reforms as to be able to request an Association Agreement with EU. While it is hardly possible that EU would go with such request, the new agreement should upgrade EU-Moldova relations.

Next month has to witness the visit of Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Chisinau. Since the relations with the Western neighbor undergo a period of distress the visit has to set the things right and to establish a dialogue for cooperation.

Also President Yushchenko is expected with a visit next month to assess the level of Moldovan-Ukrainian relations and the possibilities for their improvement. There are divergent issues related to the demarcation of border, especially on the Trans¬nistrian sector uncontrolled by the authorities from Chisinau. Also discussing the resolution process in Transnistria has to be an issue on the agenda.