Politics
Transnistria or Moldavian Transnistrian Republic: Just facts
Reading Time: 7 minutesFactual information about Moldovas separatist region of Transnistria
Facts about Transnistria*
Internationally unrecognized entity proclaimed in Tiraspol on 2 September 1990, initially styled the Moldavian Transnistrian Soviet Socialist Republic. Currently known as the Moldavian Transnistrian Republic, or MTR, (Russian name: Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika or Pridnestrovie), this breakaway entity, referred to in many sources as Transnistria or Transdniestr, consists of a narrow strip of land (180 km by 32 km) nestled between the East bank of the Nistru River (Russian: Dniester/Dniestr/Dnestr River) and the border of Moldova with the Ukraine on a small part of what used to be, between 1924 and 1940, the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The separatist authorities in Tiraspol exert their rule over five Soviet-style districts—Camenca, Dubăsari, Grigoriopol, Râbniţa, and Slobozia—comprising a total population of 555,500 (2004 est.). Except for nine villages bordering the east bank of the river (Malovata Nouă, Cocieri, Coşniţa, Doroţcaia, Pârâta, Pohrebea, Roghi, Vasilevca, and Corjova), the area controlled by the MTR includes all of Moldova’s land on the east bank of the Nistru. On the river’s west bank, the self-proclaimed MTR controls the city of Tighina.
The MTR, which declared itself a “customs control zone,” uses the ruble (dubbed “Suvorov”) as the local currency, preserves the Soviet-era state symbols, and maintains a strategic importance due to the deployment of Russian troops there and the industries and power plants concentrated on its soil throughout the years that preceded the disbanding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). About 30 percent of Moldova’s industries and over 90 percent of its energy production are located on territory controlled by the Tiraspol authorities, whose policies have made evident that the conflict with the government in Chişinău is not essentially about ethnic and linguistic issues, but mostly about political orientation and geopolitics.
The Tiraspol leadership is leftist, antireform, and conservative. Furthermore, it has no intention of negotiating seriously with Moldova to alter a status quo that is in its favor. Most of the key figures in the Tiraspol administration are Russian and/or Ukrainian citizens and is widely believed that they were sent to Moldova by the Kremlin to organize a secessionist movement to prevent Moldova’s independence moves. Igor Smirnov, a former military plant manager in Tiraspol who came to Moldova in November 1987, is MTR’s president since 1991. His government controls the mass media, oppress civil society organizations and opposition political formations, while his sons run the republic’s main businesses through the notorious Sherif Company.
MTR has been populated by the same ethnic groups as the rest of Moldova, although local Russians and Ukrainians, taken together, outnumber ethnic Moldovans. Such a situation developed as a result of Russification and due to influx of migrants from other parts of the USSR as working force for military plants and other heavy industries. According to data from the recent census organized by Tiraspol authorities in 2004, Ukrainian ethnics make up 28.8 percent (a slight increase from 28 percent in 1989), Russians—38.3 percent (up from 24 percent, 1989), and Moldovans 31.9 percent (down from 40 percent, 1989), thus the share increase of the Russian ethnics was made on the expense of Moldovans who were forced to flee the region due to discrimination policies. Romanian-speaking Moldovans have only 88 schools where the language of education is Romanian, out of which only eight are allowed to use the Latin alphabet.
Tiraspol broke away from Chişinău in protest over the 1989 laws regarding the return to the Latin script, the establishment of Moldavian rather than Russian as the official language of the country, and the change of the republic’s Soviet-style flag to a new one, almost identical with Romania’s tricolor. A series of small-scale clashes occurred in late 1991 and early 1992, culminating with a short but violent armed conflict in which Russia’s 14th Army sided with the government proclaimed in Tiraspol.
In the wake of a cease-fire agreement signed at Limanskoe on 7 July 1992 between Russia and the Republic of Moldova, the two parties of the conflict (signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur), under the mediating authority of the commander of Russia’s 14th Army, Alexandr Lebed, negotiations have been going on between Moldova’s authorities and the self-appointed Tiraspol authorities (that, meantime, became the party of the conflict) in a series of attempts to settle the conflict by reaching an agreement on granting expanded autonomy to the Nistru east-bank districts, as Moldova’s “Transnistrian Self-Administered Territories.” The arrangement would provide the region with the right to exert jurisdiction over taxation, police forces, budget decisions, and other issues. However, the Tiraspol leadership has constantly turned down Chişinău’s offers to grant the east-bank districts such a status, sticking to its claim to statehood.
With its diminutive form, this last bastion of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe is generally regarded as evocative of the former USSR in a nutshell. In 1997, the MTR applied for membership in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, later on, for full-scale integration into the CIS political and military structures. That same year, the Tiraspol Supreme Soviet chairman declared that the Transnistrian republic will demand that Moldova accepts full integration into the CIS and that it joins the Russian Federation-Belarus union, viewed as a possible future model for the MTR’s status vis-a-vis the Republic of Moldova. A nonbinding referendum on joining the Russia-Belarus union was held between April and June 1998, with over 66 percent of the ballots supporting the union. However, like the province of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea (isolated from Russia by independent Lithuania and Poland), the east-bank separatist region, has no common borders with either Belarus or the Russian Federation.
A key factor in the stalemate is the continuing presence of Russia’s military base in Tiraspol, where Moscow keeps its only permanent deployment of armed forces outside Russia’s borders in Europe. The Tiraspol enclave is considered to be a strategic stronghold in the proximity of the volatile Balkans region and a turntable in arms trafficking between this internationally unrecognized entity and other volatile regions, including Kosovo and the Caucasus. In 2004, in the Ilaşcu and others versus Russia and Moldova, a case examined by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it has been concluded that the Russian 14th Army and other elements of the Russian government had contributed to the creation and continued existence of the Moldavian Transnistrian Republic.
Another important factor in preserving the status quo of the MTR is the Ukrainian factor—the illicit trade that occurs over the Ukrainian border with MTR allows the separatist state to survive, and has been profitable to some business groups in Ukraine.
Latest developments
The federalization of Moldova, which is a controversial political blueprint initially advocated by the Russian Federation and separatist leaders in Tiraspol, has called for the reorganization of the Republic of Moldova into a federation in which the self-proclaimed Moldavian Transnistrian Republic (MTR) would have a separate legislature, government, anthem and state symbols, while at the same time forming a loose political unit with the Republic of Moldova. Russia’s interest in federalizing Moldova is seen by analysts as Moscow’s template for use in other former Soviet republics, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. A Moscow agreement signed by experts of the two sides of the trans-Nistrian conflict on 9 October 1997 was interpreted as providing for a “de facto” federalization of Moldova, a view contradicted by the central authorities in Chişinău, according to whom the Moscow agreement would ensure that the Chişinău government will have “sole competence over Moldovan citizenship, foreign policy, customs and frontiers.”
In July 2002, Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) officially submitted to Moldova and the Tiraspol regime a project to federalize Moldova under joint mediation and guarantees by all three parties. In February 2003, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin issued a draft plan calling for a new constitution to be formed, transforming Moldova into a federation or confederation. These proposals were incorporated into Russia’s so-called Kozak Memorandum, a federalization plan whereby Moldova becomes a loose confederation of two sovereign and independent states, similar to that of Serbia and Montenegro. President Voronin had been on the verge of signing with Russian President Vladimir Putin the Russia-prepared federalization document in November 2003 until Moldovan public opposition, culminating in obstreperous protests on the streets of Chişinău, erupted against the plan. The mass demonstrations, in addition to warnings from the United States and European Union diplomats, pressured Voronin into rejecting Moscow’s federalization proposal. The implementation of such a federalization plan would have granted Tiraspol international recognition, and deployment of the Russian military base in Moldova for a period of 20 years, thus, keeping Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence. Following Voronin’s backflip on the federalization plan, Moldova-Russian relations noticeably worsened, leading Moldova’s communist government to appeal for international support from the west to press Russia to evacuate its troops from Moldova and to solve the trans-Nistrian conflict.
At the end of 2004, the Moldovan civil society offered an alternative plan to the federalization of Moldova—the 3-D strategy: demilitarization, decriminalization, and democratization (of MTR)—a document that has reached a national consensus in Moldova and was promoted by the Moldova Foundation in the United States (Washington, D.C., November 2004) and Western Europe (Brussels, February 2005). The strategy proposed to strengthen the existing five-party conflict settlement format of “3 plus 2” (Russia, Ukraine, and OSCE plus Moldova and the MTR) by transforming it into a new one: “3 plus 1 plus 3” (Russia, Ukraine, Romania plus Moldova, plus OSCE, US and EU), thus, excluding the MTR and involving the West. The strategy also offered to set up a collective settlement international agreement, a supervisory authority, and an international civil provisional administration, which would implement the action plan and post-conflict rehabilitation strategies. There was no special status envisioned for the trans-Nistrian region as a whole, but for the urban agglomeration of Tiraspol only.
The principles laid down in the 3-D strategy were used by the Moldovan parliament in three resolutions related to the trans-Nistrian conflict adopted on 10 June 2005: the declaration on Ukraine’s initiative regarding the settlement of the trans-Nistrian conflict (new approach to settle the conflict through democratization); the appeal on criteria of democratization of the trans-Nistrian region (to conduct free and democratic elections meeting international standards, political pluralism and freedom of expression); and the appeal on principles and conditions for demilitarization of the trans-Nistrian region (withdrawal of the Russian troops, disarmament and demobilization of trans-Nistrian military units). Moldova’s Law on the basic provisions of the special legal status of the localities from the left bank of Nistru River, passed on 22 July 2005, is also in line with principles outlined in the civil society’s 3-D strategy. Starting October 2005, the European Union and the United States joined Moldova, MTR, Russia, Ukraine, and OSCE in the new “5+2 format” of the trans-Nistrian settlement process.
In December 2005, the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Ukraine-Moldova border was launched, aiming at suppressing the traffic in arms, drugs, and human beings, as well as the regular commercial contraband of which MTR is consider to be both a source and a transit route.
*Source: The Historical Dictionary of Moldova, (496pp). Authors: Dr. Andrei Brezianu and Vlad Spânu. Scarecrow Press, Maryland, USA & London. 2007. And its 2010 edition “The A to Z of Moldova“.
Video links:
- Transnistria Trafficking Arms On Europe’s Doorstep (Documentary; 52 minutes; Dec. 2005; By France’s Canal +)
- Transnistria – Europe’s Black Hole (Documentary; 33 minutes; Dec. 2006; By United Kingdom’s Journeyman Pictures)
Related document: Key elements of the 3D Strategy for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict
Featured
FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.
International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.
Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.
Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.
Is it Moldova?
First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.
At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”
What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.
“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.
Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.
Is it a victory?
In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.
Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.
“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”
Is it only about football?
FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.
The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.
Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.
Photo: unknown
Politics
Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita meets high-ranking EU officials in Brussels

Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Natalia Gavrilita, together with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu, pay an official visit to Brussels, between September 27-28, being invited by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles.
Today, Prime Minister had a meeting with Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The Moldovan PM thanked the senior European official for the support of the institution in strengthening democratic processes, reforming the judiciary and state institutions, economic recovery and job creation, as well as increasing citizens’ welfare. Natalia Gavrilita expressed her confidence that the current visit laid the foundations for boosting relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, so that, in the next period, it would be possible to advance high-level dialogues on security, justice and energy. Officials also exchanged views on priorities for the Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in December.
“The EU is open to continue to support the Republic of Moldova and the ambitious reform agenda it proposes. Moldova is an important and priority partner for us,” said Charles Michel.
Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also met with Paolo Gentiloni, European Commissioner for Economy, expressing her gratitude for the support received through the OMNIBUS macro-financial assistance program. The two officials discussed the need to advance the recovery of money from bank fraud, to strengthen sustainable mechanisms for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in Moldova, and to standardize the customs and taxes as one of the main conditions for deepening cooperation with the EU in this field.
Additionally, Prime Minister spoke about the importance of the Eastern Partnership and the Deep Free Trade Agreement, noting that the Government’s policies are aimed at developing an economic model aligned with the European economic model, focused on digitalization, energy efficiency and the green economy.
A common press release of the Moldovan Prime Minister with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell Fontelles, took place today, where the agenda of Moldova’s reforms and the main priorities to focus on in the coming months were presented: judiciary reform; fighting COVID-19 pandemic; promoting economic recovery and conditions for growth and job creation; strengthening state institutions and resilience of the country.
“I am here to relaunch the dialogue between my country and the European Union. Our partnership is strong, but I believe there is room for even deeper cooperation and stronger political, economic and sectoral ties. I am convinced that this partnership is the key to the prosperity of our country and I hope that we will continue to strengthen cooperation.”
The Moldovan delegation met Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice. Tomorrow, there are scheduled common meetings with Oliver Varhelyi, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Adina Valean, European Commissioner for Transport and Kadri Simson, European Commissioner for Energy.
Prime Minister will also attend a public event, along with Katarina Mathernova, Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
Photo: gov.md
Politics
Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria

The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, pays an official visit to New York, USA, between September 21-22. There, she participates in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a press release of the President’s Office, the official will deliver a speech at the tribune of the United Nations.
In this context, the Promo-LEX Association suggested the president to request the appointment of a special rapporteur in order to monitor the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. According to Promo-LEX, the responsibility for human rights violations in the Transnistrian region arises as a result of the Russian Federation’s military, economic and political control over the Tiraspol regime.
“We consider it imperative to insist on the observance of the international commitments assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces and ammunition from the territory of the country,” the representatives of Promo-LEX stated. They consider the speech before the UN an opportunity “to demand the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Russian Federation with reference to this territory which is in its full control.”
“It is important to remember about the numerous cases of murder, torture, ill-treatment, forced enlistment in illegal military structures, the application of pseudo-justice in the Transnistrian region, all carried out under the tacit agreement of the Russian Federation. These findings stem from dozens of rulings and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that Russia is responsible for human rights violations in the region.”
The association representatives expressed their hope that the president of the country would give priority to issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region and would call on relevant international actors to contribute to guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms throughout Moldova.
They asked Maia Sandu to insist on the observance of the obligation to evacuate the ammunition and the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to publicly support the need for the Russian Federation to implement the ECtHR rulings on human rights violations in the Transnistrian region, and to request the appointment of an UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
**
The Promo-LEX Association concluded that 14 out of 25 actions planned within the National Action Plan for the years 2018–2022 concerning respecting human rights in Transnistria were not carried out by the responsible authorities.
The association expressed its concern and mentioned that there are a large number of delays in the planned results. “There is a lack of communication and coordination between the designated institutions, which do not yet have a common vision of interaction for the implementation of the plan.”
Promo-LEX requested the Government of the Republic of Moldova to re-assess the reported activities and to take urgent measures, “which would exclude superficial implementation of future activities and increase the level of accountability of the authorities.”
Photo: peacekeeping.un.org