{"id":446555,"date":"2019-01-29T12:47:27","date_gmt":"2019-01-29T12:47:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/?p=446555"},"modified":"2019-01-29T15:36:03","modified_gmt":"2019-01-29T15:36:03","slug":"kremlin-regime-really-want-upcoming-moldovan-elections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/kremlin-regime-really-want-upcoming-moldovan-elections\/","title":{"rendered":"What does the Kremlin regime really want from the upcoming Moldovan elections?"},"content":{"rendered":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

I was at an international event\u00a0and was asked by a participant whether Putin still has influence in the Republic of Moldova. The lady was an elderly Russian who has lived in several countries in exile in the European Union and was forced to leave after a long fighting experience for the Russian (including electoral) rights in her native country.<\/p>\n

I did not know what to answer at first, because I saw a myriad of ways in which the Kremlin (which is often something other than Russia) exercises its influence in the Republic of Moldova.<\/p>\n\n

The Russian vice is weakening<\/h3>\n

Naturally, I started off with the army in the Transnistrian conflict, which Yeltsin’s Kremlin had promised to bring home in 1999, but which Putin’s Kremlin had forgotten there. The remnants of this 14th Army have always offered pseudo-authorities in the strip a feared whip for legitimate authorities in Chisinau (or whatever they may be), who have never hurried to solve the problem. And there are no changes, as the OSCE responds to the interests of the East, NATO does not get involved because the Moldovans are afraid of the alliance, and the 5 + 2 negotiation format is long overdue.<\/p>\n

I kept going on talking about the economic and energy dependence on the Kremlin, which could shut down the gas tap at any time or reject exports coming from the Republic of Moldova. There is hope that we will finally be able to connect<\/a> to the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau pipeline. While export leverage can be less and less used, as only 15.5% go to the CIS states compared with 70% of the EU, Russia has gone far beyond Romania<\/a> (8% versus 29%). We do not need the same amount of investments<\/a> from the Russians as in the old days, as their investments have reached the 6th place, being exceeded by 5 European states. Workplaces and remittances of Moldovans working in Russia are another chapter in which the Kremlin is losing ground year after year, the first being reoriented to the EU<\/a> after the Russians’ harassment, but also after the overall decline in Russian living standards. In 2018, money sent home by Moldovans in the EU accounted for 40% of the total, while those in Russia only 28%.<\/p>\n\n

Tanks, propaganda and corrupt politicians<\/h3>\n

All data from above should make us more optimistic if we live in a democracy where things are in tune with the general interest of the population. But Moldova is not a democracy anymore, and the Moldovan population is not (only) formed of independent and well-informed citizens. The (geo) political orientation of our fellow citizens makes us remain pessimistic. Although the natural aspirations for a better life of Moldovans translate into the weakening of the Russian vignette, the Kremlin remaining only with their traditional tank and the new gas tap, too many of us continue to look at the Moldova Socialist Party\/Democratic Party supporters, the subordinates from Chisinau of the Kremlin, with hope and confidence, as if they knew to do nothing but steal and lie in an organized way. In addition, the perception of the Moldovans<\/a> is that Russia remains our most important economic partner, as it was before the Association Agreement, embargo, and other events that radically changed our dependence in recent years.<\/p>\n

Part of the explanation of this attitude has its place in propaganda and in the fake news<\/a> in the laboratories of Russian manufacturers of information garbage. Being Russian-speaking and having a Soviet past (and present), many Moldovans fall victim to these messages harmful to democracy, cohesion and the well-being of modern society. Moreover, the Kremlin knows this and speculates this vulnerability to the fullest, working hard to plant hatred and mistrust in everything that does not fit in the old Soviet templates, including their partners in Chisinau, people close to the President Dodon’s Moldovan Socialist Party, who control TV\/Radio channels such as RTR, NTV, CTC, Accent TV, THT Bravo, Ren-TV<\/em> and many others. Although only two of these are in the top 6 at the audience<\/a>, the other ones are very influential among the population looking for entertainment and simple explanations for complicated issues.<\/p>\n

These TV channels, duplicated by the Sputnik.md<\/em>, vedomosti.md<\/em> or kp.md<\/em><\/a> sites, present the so-called socialists as partners of the Kremlin lords<\/strong>, while they are only fewer children their achievements, which mimic authority, power,\u00a0and control in a mournful manifestation of people truly incapable of something better. We are talking about a female party leader who has enriched her relatives and colleagues from the money saved by citizens<\/a>\u00a0(Zinaida Greceanii); about a candidate who was enriched “only by the district counselor salary” in the Kroll report<\/a>\u00a0(Piotr Puscari); about another one who is beating his fellow citizens because he can not be taken into account altogether; or one who swears that he lives only from the financial gifts he received during his birthday<\/a>\u00a0(Veaceslav Lupov). Thus, he’s also an important actor in the Kroll report (this time, only a Shor Party member).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The threat of installing anti-European authoritarianism is real<\/h3>\n

In November, one of the recent credible polls showed us that in any configuration, the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Parliament will be a pro-Kremlin, anti-European and an anti-Moldovan\u00a0one (which might turn into a large Transnistria). From the President Dodon’s Socialist Party to the Democratic Party of Moldova, the Moldovan Communist Party – parties with a high chance of forming a post-election coalition – all proved to be adepts of authoritarianism, doubling with a sort of local Soviet patriotism. Only oligarch Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) has been self-titled, since leading a discretionary republic, as a so-called “pro-European” party, and in the summer became a “pro-Moldova”. At that time, the relationship of subordination between Plahotniuc and Dodon began to grow more and more<\/strong>. It became clear that the President of the Republic of Moldova is in the ingrained situation of being pulled by two rails: one from the Armeneasca 44 street in Chisinau and another from the Piata Rosie 1 street.<\/p>\n

The threat of the establishment of a Trans-Partisan group of greedy admirers of Putin is real. And if it succeeds, nothing will stop further deepening the crisis in which the Republic of Moldova lies, plundering the resources of the state, destroying families and ruining the lives of those whom they will banish, as did the Putin regime that chased the lady I answered the question to.<\/p>\n

Therefore, our participation in the February 24th elections is vital for the Moldovan society, for the relatives, friends and people we hold.<\/p>\n

Opinion by\u00a0Tudor Cojocariu<\/a><\/h4>\n
Translated by Arina Livadari<\/h5>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>I was at an international event\u00a0and was asked by a participant whether Putin still has influence in the Republic of Moldova. The lady was an elderly Russian who has lived in several countries in exile in the European Union and was forced to leave after a long fighting experience for the Russian (including electoral) rights […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":446556,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,12,3,4],"tags":[115,30,192,100,60,35,191,27,112,193,190,31],"class_list":["post-446555","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-diaspora-en","category-opinion","category-politics","category-society","tag-corruption","tag-dodon","tag-eastern","tag-elections","tag-europe","tag-important","tag-kremlin","tag-moldova","tag-plahotniuc","tag-poitics","tag-putin","tag-transnistria"],"content_social_share":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

I was at an international event\u00a0and was asked by a participant whether Putin still has influence in the Republic of Moldova. The lady was an elderly Russian who has lived in several countries in exile in the European Union and was forced to leave after a long fighting experience for the Russian (including electoral) rights in her native country.<\/p>\n

I did not know what to answer at first, because I saw a myriad of ways in which the Kremlin (which is often something other than Russia) exercises its influence in the Republic of Moldova.<\/p>\n\n

The Russian vice is weakening<\/h3>\n

Naturally, I started off with the army in the Transnistrian conflict, which Yeltsin’s Kremlin had promised to bring home in 1999, but which Putin’s Kremlin had forgotten there. The remnants of this 14th Army have always offered pseudo-authorities in the strip a feared whip for legitimate authorities in Chisinau (or whatever they may be), who have never hurried to solve the problem. And there are no changes, as the OSCE responds to the interests of the East, NATO does not get involved because the Moldovans are afraid of the alliance, and the 5 + 2 negotiation format is long overdue.<\/p>\n

I kept going on talking about the economic and energy dependence on the Kremlin, which could shut down the gas tap at any time or reject exports coming from the Republic of Moldova. There is hope that we will finally be able to connect<\/a> to the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau pipeline. While export leverage can be less and less used, as only 15.5% go to the CIS states compared with 70% of the EU, Russia has gone far beyond Romania<\/a> (8% versus 29%). We do not need the same amount of investments<\/a> from the Russians as in the old days, as their investments have reached the 6th place, being exceeded by 5 European states. Workplaces and remittances of Moldovans working in Russia are another chapter in which the Kremlin is losing ground year after year, the first being reoriented to the EU<\/a> after the Russians’ harassment, but also after the overall decline in Russian living standards. In 2018, money sent home by Moldovans in the EU accounted for 40% of the total, while those in Russia only 28%.<\/p>\n\n

Tanks, propaganda and corrupt politicians<\/h3>\n

All data from above should make us more optimistic if we live in a democracy where things are in tune with the general interest of the population. But Moldova is not a democracy anymore, and the Moldovan population is not (only) formed of independent and well-informed citizens. The (geo) political orientation of our fellow citizens makes us remain pessimistic. Although the natural aspirations for a better life of Moldovans translate into the weakening of the Russian vignette, the Kremlin remaining only with their traditional tank and the new gas tap, too many of us continue to look at the Moldova Socialist Party\/Democratic Party supporters, the subordinates from Chisinau of the Kremlin, with hope and confidence, as if they knew to do nothing but steal and lie in an organized way. In addition, the perception of the Moldovans<\/a> is that Russia remains our most important economic partner, as it was before the Association Agreement, embargo, and other events that radically changed our dependence in recent years.<\/p>\n

Part of the explanation of this attitude has its place in propaganda and in the fake news<\/a> in the laboratories of Russian manufacturers of information garbage. Being Russian-speaking and having a Soviet past (and present), many Moldovans fall victim to these messages harmful to democracy, cohesion and the well-being of modern society. Moreover, the Kremlin knows this and speculates this vulnerability to the fullest, working hard to plant hatred and mistrust in everything that does not fit in the old Soviet templates, including their partners in Chisinau, people close to the President Dodon’s Moldovan Socialist Party, who control TV\/Radio channels such as RTR, NTV, CTC, Accent TV, THT Bravo, Ren-TV<\/em> and many others. Although only two of these are in the top 6 at the audience<\/a>, the other ones are very influential among the population looking for entertainment and simple explanations for complicated issues.<\/p>\n

These TV channels, duplicated by the Sputnik.md<\/em>, vedomosti.md<\/em> or kp.md<\/em><\/a> sites, present the so-called socialists as partners of the Kremlin lords<\/strong>, while they are only fewer children their achievements, which mimic authority, power,\u00a0and control in a mournful manifestation of people truly incapable of something better. We are talking about a female party leader who has enriched her relatives and colleagues from the money saved by citizens<\/a>\u00a0(Zinaida Greceanii); about a candidate who was enriched “only by the district counselor salary” in the Kroll report<\/a>\u00a0(Piotr Puscari); about another one who is beating his fellow citizens because he can not be taken into account altogether; or one who swears that he lives only from the financial gifts he received during his birthday<\/a>\u00a0(Veaceslav Lupov). Thus, he’s also an important actor in the Kroll report (this time, only a Shor Party member).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

The threat of installing anti-European authoritarianism is real<\/h3>\n

In November, one of the recent credible polls showed us that in any configuration, the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Parliament will be a pro-Kremlin, anti-European and an anti-Moldovan\u00a0one (which might turn into a large Transnistria). From the President Dodon’s Socialist Party to the Democratic Party of Moldova, the Moldovan Communist Party – parties with a high chance of forming a post-election coalition – all proved to be adepts of authoritarianism, doubling with a sort of local Soviet patriotism. Only oligarch Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) has been self-titled, since leading a discretionary republic, as a so-called “pro-European” party, and in the summer became a “pro-Moldova”. At that time, the relationship of subordination between Plahotniuc and Dodon began to grow more and more<\/strong>. It became clear that the President of the Republic of Moldova is in the ingrained situation of being pulled by two rails: one from the Armeneasca 44 street in Chisinau and another from the Piata Rosie 1 street.<\/p>\n

The threat of the establishment of a Trans-Partisan group of greedy admirers of Putin is real. And if it succeeds, nothing will stop further deepening the crisis in which the Republic of Moldova lies, plundering the resources of the state, destroying families and ruining the lives of those whom they will banish, as did the Putin regime that chased the lady I answered the question to.<\/p>\n

Therefore, our participation in the February 24th elections is vital for the Moldovan society, for the relatives, friends and people we hold.<\/p>\n

Opinion by\u00a0Tudor Cojocariu<\/a><\/h4>\n
Translated by Arina Livadari<\/h5>\n
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