{"id":260655,"date":"2010-02-02T00:58:41","date_gmt":"2010-02-02T00:58:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/new.moldova.org\/2010\/02\/02\/imfs-2009-snapshot-of-moldovas-economy-205820-eng\/"},"modified":"2010-02-02T00:58:41","modified_gmt":"2010-02-02T00:58:41","slug":"imfs-2009-snapshot-of-moldovas-economy-205820-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/imfs-2009-snapshot-of-moldovas-economy-205820-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"IMF's 2009 snapshot of Moldova's economy"},"content":{"rendered":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff report on the Republic of Moldova published on February 1, 2010, gives a snapshot of this former Soviet republic’s economy. The report is based on discussions held by IMF staff with the officials of the Republic of Moldova on economic developments and policies that ended on October 28, 2009. The report was issued in connection with the International Monetary Fund’s approval on January 29 of a three-year combined financial assistance to Moldova in the amount of US$574.4 million to support the country’s economic program aimed at restoring fiscal and external sustainability, preserving financial stability, reducing poverty, and raising growth.<\/em><\/p>\n

Moldova experienced strong growth over 2006–08, accompanied by signs of overheating.<\/strong> Growth averaged 5 percent, boosted by remittances and foreign investment. Buoyant domestic demand, however, pushed the current account deficit to 17 percent of GDP and generated inflation pressures. These pressures, together with large inflows, resulted in substantial appreciation of Moldova’s real effective exchange rate (REER). Monetary policy kept real interest rates low despite double-digit inflation (Figure 1). Although fiscal policy maintained a small headline budget deficit under the IMF PRGF-supported program, it grew increasingly procyclical, with the estimated structural balance deteriorating from a small surplus in 2005 to a deficit of over 4 percent of GDP by 2008.<\/p>\n

The economy remained overregulated and hampered by relative price distortions.<\/strong> High barriers to entry and low competition in telecommunications, trade, and food processing kept domestic prices significantly above international prices of many consumer products. In contrast, utility tariffs generally remained well below cost-recovery levels, leading to substantial arrears and underinvestment.<\/p>\n

The global economic crisis led to a sharp weakening of the economy.<\/strong> In the first half of 2009, falling demand in trading partners led to a severe downturn in exports and remittances. While GDP dropped by nearly 8 percent over the same period, domestic demand declined even faster, and the current account deficit contracted to about 11 percent of period GDP. At the same time, the balance of payments moved from a surplus to a large deficit as FDI and other capital inflows fell dramatically. Deflation pressures emerged, with the 12- month inflation at -0.7 percent in November (Figure 1).<\/p>\n

Two rounds of parliamentary elections marked a rise in political instability in 2009.<\/strong> The April elections were followed by strong protests against alleged irregularities and boycott of the parliament by the opposition parties. A repeat election held in July led to the formation of a new four-party coalition government with a narrow majority. However, political uncertainty persists as parliament failed to elect a President of the republic.<\/p>\n

The crisis and pre-election spending hikes resulted in a large increase in the fiscal deficit.<\/strong> Over January-September 2009, budget revenue dropped by about 10 percent in real terms relative to 2008 as absorption-related tax receipts declined. At the same time, current fiscal expenditure increased by over 13 percent (also in real terms), driven by large increases in wages and pensions in the run-up to the April elections. The fiscal deficit increased from 1 percent of GDP in 2008 to 6¼ percent of GDP in January-September 2009, financed mainly by a drawdown of balances in budget accounts and heavy domestic borrowing. The budget began to experience financing shortfalls, and arrears started to accumulate. Policy slippages derailed the PRGF-supported program, which expired in May 2009 without completion of the last two reviews.<\/p>\n

The authorities used most of their SDR allocation for budget financing in late 2009.<\/strong> The Ministry of Finance assumed an obligation of SDR 114.3 million to the members of the SDR department (out of a total allocation of SDR 117.7 million). Given the severe external financing shortages and the difficulties in adjusting inherited expenditure commitments in the short run, this operation reduced reliance on expensive short-term domestic financing and cleared accumulated expenditure arrears. The NBM’s gross international reserves were not affected as the foreign exchange equivalent of the SDRs was sold to the central bank.<\/p>\n

Monetary policy has been tight despite falling inflation. <\/strong>Resisting sustained depreciation pressures, the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) sold about a third of its international reserves in early 2009, sharply tightening liquidity despite rapidly falling inflation. Nevertheless, the REER depreciated notably in January—April 2009, and again in December (10 percent), offsetting in large part the appreciation seen in previous years. Since May, the NBM partially replenished its reserves, cut its base rate by 6 percentage points and lowered reserve requirements in half. Nonetheless, commercial banks’ lending rates remain very high in real terms, contributing—together with the depressed economy—to a sharp drop in demand for credit (Figure 1). The supply of credit has also tightened, as banks channel the released liquidity into T-bills or keep it deposited with the NBM.<\/p>\n

While the financial system appears stable, the recession is affecting credit quality, and one bank has been closed. <\/strong>The decline in credit and bank capital increases brought the capital adequacy ratio of the system to 32.7 percent in November 2009, well above the required minimum of 12 percent. Foreign banks have been maintaining exposure to their Moldovan subsidiaries, which account for 26 percent of banking system assets. Stress tests conducted by the NBM confirm that most banks’ portfolios are robust to various risks. However, the nonperforming loan ratio reached 16.6 percent in November 2009, and provisioning remains low. Moreover, one medium-size bank (Investprivatbank, IPB) became insolvent in June as a result of high portfolio concentration in recession-hit sectors and risk management irregularities. At the same time, low bank interconnectedness limits the systemic threat from individual bank failures. Moreover, the NBM has stepped up its supervision and regulation.<\/p>\n

Difficulties in maintaining cost-recovery tariffs for district heating continue, creating a budget risk.<\/strong> The municipality of Chisinau has kept the district heating tariff at its 2007 level despite the significant cost increase since then. As a result, the heating company has been running large losses and accumulating arrears to its suppliers, exceeding 3 percent of GDP by late 2009. Nonpayment to the gas supply company risks a repeat of the 2008 cut-off in gas supplies to heat producers. The tension between the below-cost tariff and the need to ensure adequate payments to suppliers creates a risk for the consolidated budget, as it may be called upon for financing.<\/p>\n

Debt is sustainable at present, but vulnerabilities are rising.<\/strong> The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) indicates that Moldova’s risk of debt distress is low given presently envisaged borrowing, mainly from IFIs. However, alternative scenarios suggest that rapid accumulation of nonconcessional debt—faster than US$125 million per year—can increase the risk of debt distress, warranting caution. Moreover, high private external debt for a developing country (44 percent of GDP) also signals heightened vulnerabilities.
\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>The IMF staff report on the Republic of Moldova published on February 1, 2010, gives a snap-shot of this poor countrys economy. The report is based on discussions with the officials of the Republic of Moldova on economic developments and policies that ended on October 28, 2009.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-260655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-economy"],"content_social_share":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff report on the Republic of Moldova published on February 1, 2010, gives a snapshot of this former Soviet republic’s economy. The report is based on discussions held by IMF staff with the officials of the Republic of Moldova on economic developments and policies that ended on October 28, 2009. The report was issued in connection with the International Monetary Fund’s approval on January 29 of a three-year combined financial assistance to Moldova in the amount of US$574.4 million to support the country’s economic program aimed at restoring fiscal and external sustainability, preserving financial stability, reducing poverty, and raising growth.<\/em><\/p>\n

Moldova experienced strong growth over 2006–08, accompanied by signs of overheating.<\/strong> Growth averaged 5 percent, boosted by remittances and foreign investment. Buoyant domestic demand, however, pushed the current account deficit to 17 percent of GDP and generated inflation pressures. These pressures, together with large inflows, resulted in substantial appreciation of Moldova’s real effective exchange rate (REER). Monetary policy kept real interest rates low despite double-digit inflation (Figure 1). Although fiscal policy maintained a small headline budget deficit under the IMF PRGF-supported program, it grew increasingly procyclical, with the estimated structural balance deteriorating from a small surplus in 2005 to a deficit of over 4 percent of GDP by 2008.<\/p>\n

The economy remained overregulated and hampered by relative price distortions.<\/strong> High barriers to entry and low competition in telecommunications, trade, and food processing kept domestic prices significantly above international prices of many consumer products. In contrast, utility tariffs generally remained well below cost-recovery levels, leading to substantial arrears and underinvestment.<\/p>\n

The global economic crisis led to a sharp weakening of the economy.<\/strong> In the first half of 2009, falling demand in trading partners led to a severe downturn in exports and remittances. While GDP dropped by nearly 8 percent over the same period, domestic demand declined even faster, and the current account deficit contracted to about 11 percent of period GDP. At the same time, the balance of payments moved from a surplus to a large deficit as FDI and other capital inflows fell dramatically. Deflation pressures emerged, with the 12- month inflation at -0.7 percent in November (Figure 1).<\/p>\n

Two rounds of parliamentary elections marked a rise in political instability in 2009.<\/strong> The April elections were followed by strong protests against alleged irregularities and boycott of the parliament by the opposition parties. A repeat election held in July led to the formation of a new four-party coalition government with a narrow majority. However, political uncertainty persists as parliament failed to elect a President of the republic.<\/p>\n

The crisis and pre-election spending hikes resulted in a large increase in the fiscal deficit.<\/strong> Over January-September 2009, budget revenue dropped by about 10 percent in real terms relative to 2008 as absorption-related tax receipts declined. At the same time, current fiscal expenditure increased by over 13 percent (also in real terms), driven by large increases in wages and pensions in the run-up to the April elections. The fiscal deficit increased from 1 percent of GDP in 2008 to 6¼ percent of GDP in January-September 2009, financed mainly by a drawdown of balances in budget accounts and heavy domestic borrowing. The budget began to experience financing shortfalls, and arrears started to accumulate. Policy slippages derailed the PRGF-supported program, which expired in May 2009 without completion of the last two reviews.<\/p>\n

The authorities used most of their SDR allocation for budget financing in late 2009.<\/strong> The Ministry of Finance assumed an obligation of SDR 114.3 million to the members of the SDR department (out of a total allocation of SDR 117.7 million). Given the severe external financing shortages and the difficulties in adjusting inherited expenditure commitments in the short run, this operation reduced reliance on expensive short-term domestic financing and cleared accumulated expenditure arrears. The NBM’s gross international reserves were not affected as the foreign exchange equivalent of the SDRs was sold to the central bank.<\/p>\n

Monetary policy has been tight despite falling inflation. <\/strong>Resisting sustained depreciation pressures, the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) sold about a third of its international reserves in early 2009, sharply tightening liquidity despite rapidly falling inflation. Nevertheless, the REER depreciated notably in January—April 2009, and again in December (10 percent), offsetting in large part the appreciation seen in previous years. Since May, the NBM partially replenished its reserves, cut its base rate by 6 percentage points and lowered reserve requirements in half. Nonetheless, commercial banks’ lending rates remain very high in real terms, contributing—together with the depressed economy—to a sharp drop in demand for credit (Figure 1). The supply of credit has also tightened, as banks channel the released liquidity into T-bills or keep it deposited with the NBM.<\/p>\n

While the financial system appears stable, the recession is affecting credit quality, and one bank has been closed. <\/strong>The decline in credit and bank capital increases brought the capital adequacy ratio of the system to 32.7 percent in November 2009, well above the required minimum of 12 percent. Foreign banks have been maintaining exposure to their Moldovan subsidiaries, which account for 26 percent of banking system assets. Stress tests conducted by the NBM confirm that most banks’ portfolios are robust to various risks. However, the nonperforming loan ratio reached 16.6 percent in November 2009, and provisioning remains low. Moreover, one medium-size bank (Investprivatbank, IPB) became insolvent in June as a result of high portfolio concentration in recession-hit sectors and risk management irregularities. At the same time, low bank interconnectedness limits the systemic threat from individual bank failures. Moreover, the NBM has stepped up its supervision and regulation.<\/p>\n

Difficulties in maintaining cost-recovery tariffs for district heating continue, creating a budget risk.<\/strong> The municipality of Chisinau has kept the district heating tariff at its 2007 level despite the significant cost increase since then. As a result, the heating company has been running large losses and accumulating arrears to its suppliers, exceeding 3 percent of GDP by late 2009. Nonpayment to the gas supply company risks a repeat of the 2008 cut-off in gas supplies to heat producers. The tension between the below-cost tariff and the need to ensure adequate payments to suppliers creates a risk for the consolidated budget, as it may be called upon for financing.<\/p>\n

Debt is sustainable at present, but vulnerabilities are rising.<\/strong> The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) indicates that Moldova’s risk of debt distress is low given presently envisaged borrowing, mainly from IFIs. However, alternative scenarios suggest that rapid accumulation of nonconcessional debt—faster than US$125 million per year—can increase the risk of debt distress, warranting caution. Moreover, high private external debt for a developing country (44 percent of GDP) also signals heightened vulnerabilities.
\n <\/p>\n

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