{"id":130750,"date":"2008-07-16T08:03:00","date_gmt":"2008-07-16T08:03:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/new.moldova.org\/2008\/07\/16\/analysis-republic-of-moldovas-security-policy-in-the-trap-of-the-russian-federation-geopolitical-interests-134361-eng\/"},"modified":"2008-07-16T08:03:00","modified_gmt":"2008-07-16T08:03:00","slug":"analysis-republic-of-moldovas-security-policy-in-the-trap-of-the-russian-federation-geopolitical-interests-134361-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/analysis-republic-of-moldovas-security-policy-in-the-trap-of-the-russian-federation-geopolitical-interests-134361-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Analysis: Republic of Moldova\u2019s security policy in the trap of the Russian Federation geopolitical interests"},"content":{"rendered":"Reading Time: <\/span> 7<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

Author: Vitalie Grosu, Political and Security Statewatch, Nr. 6, 2008<\/p>\n

Overview<\/strong> <\/p>\n

Only after 7 years of governing, at the end of its second mandate and in the framework of a difficult electoral campaign in 2009, the majority of the communist parliamentarians voted on 22.05.208 the Law on National Security Concept. In an ongoing process of democratization, such a document is expected to contribute to the strengthening of the democratic system. Thus, the activities of the communist authorities revealed multiple lacks of this Concept and of the national security policy. <\/p>\n

Intensified dialogue on transnistrian conflict, successive bilateral visits and the multilateral meetings of the actor involved in the conflict solving process gave a hope concerning the chances of settling this “frozen conflict”. Thus, the development of the events, proved once again the complexity of the current state of conflict solving process, as well as the lack of a continuous policy and a coherent solving project of the Republic of Moldova’s authorities, this contributing to the raise of the Moldovan society’s insecurity and instability. <\/p>\n

A security policy in the detriment of democracy?
\n<\/strong>
\nAccording to the Republic of Moldova’s Constitution and some judicial documents signed at international level, the State takes the responsibility to respect the democracy principles, human rights and liberties, as well as to grant the state of law. In spite of such strategic trends, during the years of independence, and especially after seven years of communist governance, we could point out a deplorable situation in the field of democracy, human rights and Moldovan society security. According to Freedom House’s annual reports, during the last seven years we could see a negative trend characterized by the stagnation of the Republic of Moldova’s democratic process. <\/p>\n

The recently adopted National Security Concept testifies the countries democratization stagnation, and represents a tentative to legislate and institutionalize the undemocratic communist authorities. Of all the lacks of the new National Security Concept, as showing an aggressive attitude towards NATO, promotion of a incoherent Security Policy, disrespect shown for the opportunities offered by the regional framework and international cooperation, the absence of a clear and sure link between the Security Policy and the principles of Democracy represents possibly the most serious one. The discrepancy between security policy and democratic principles has as main objective to repress the opposition in the Moldovan society and to maintain masterly the control over the political power. <\/p>\n

Thus, unlike many other judicial documents set up in accordance with the Council of Europe’s standards, but not applied in practice, the adoption of the National Security Concept was submited to abusive actions from the part of the communist authorities, which generated a new class of threats towards Moldovan society’s democracy and security. The bringing on action of criminal cases to some young people, who posted critical comments on the side of communist authorities during June 2008, proves the worsening of the relation security-democracy. One of the reasons invoked by the authorities are aberrant and have no logic, while the others are violating the fundamental rights as: the right to self conscience and the freedom of speech. This way, the communist authorities proved once again their incapacity and unwillingness to promote real democratic reforms. <\/p>\n

These abusive actions from the part of the Republic of Moldova’s authorities towards citizens and NGOs who realizing their right to self conscience and freedom of speech pleaded for unification with Romania, are part of the communist authorities hysteria in their relation with Romania. Plus, the simple fact that they followed the visit and the declarations of the President of the Commission for CIS of the Russian Federation State Duma, Al. Ostrovschi, who overdoing this duties, in his discussions with the Moldovan officials invoked the “threat of Romanization of the Republic of Moldova” gives us the right to suppose that they have as objective the manifestation of obedience towards Moscow and obtaining support concerning the transnistrian conflict. So, in spite of the declarations that state European Integration as main foreign policy vector, as well as the stipulations of the new National Security Concept regarding the adherence to the European security standards and practices it is very well pointed out the simulation by the communist authorities of the security strategy in the detriment of the democracy practiced by the Russian federation and Belarus, or in such a framework we could doubt the European integration intentions of the current communist authorities that are liable to oscillations between East and West. <\/p>\n

A new transnistrian odyssey and Russian Federation’s double standards policy
\n<\/strong>
\nThe intensification of the dialogue concerning the transnistrian conflict shown by the Helsinki meeting on June 10, 2008 regarding the restarting of the 5+2 negotiation format, bilateral visits made by the Moldovan officials in the Russian Federation and vice versa, as well as the meetings between some USA and EU representatives with the auto proclaimed transnistrian authorities created the impression of a soon conflict settlement by observing the Republic of Moldova’s national interest. The sequence of the events proves the complexity of the current negotiation round and their capacity to be unforeseeable. <\/p>\n

Thus, in spite that on June 10, 2008 in Helsinki was decided to put all the efforts in order to restart the 5+2 negotiation process by strengthening the trust measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol, in order to convince the separatist leader it was necessary a personal meeting with the Foreign Minister of Ukraine in Odessa on June 14, 2008, only four days after the Helsinki meeting. This mysterious meeting of the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Vl. Ograzco, and of the separatist leader I. Smirnov is full of significance because of the Russian Federation’s reaction as well as because of the meeting statements. So, there are identified two aspects of primordial importance. The first aspect emerges from the I. Smirnov’s declarations concerning the “Chisinau’s exclusion in the negotiations about the border demarcation between Ukraine and Transnistria”. Or, indirectly these pretensions of direct negotiations between Ukraine and Transnistria regarding border delimitation are equivalent to the recognition of the transnistrian state; all this because negotiations on issues about border delimitation can take place only between two recognized states. This fact demonstrates ones again that Transnistria regardless of the international situation is not willing to give up the independence purpose. The second aspect has a more symbolic nature and refers to the separatist leader’s statements about “the relevance and the present interest of the Iuscenco Plan”. Establishing a correlation between the present initiatives of conflict settlement and the 2005 plan, which turned out to be non functional and hasn’t been implemented is not a very good association for the EU, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova aspirations to settle the conflict and demonstrates clearly the intentions of blocking the negotiations by the Transnistrian authorities. <\/p>\n

The reaction of the Russian Federation regarding the Odessa meeting was prompt and showed the Russian geopolitical interests in the transnistrian conflict, as well as its double standards policy concerning this issue. So, during the visit on June 19-21 of the Security Council President of the Russian Federation in Chisinau, Iu. Zubacov, was asked the exclusion of any political or economic pressure on separatist authorities, these statements meaning a warning towards Moldovan authorities regarding the strategy that has to be followed during the current discussion round. Concomitantly, in spite of the statements of good intentions made in Chisinau, during Zubacov’s visit in Tiraspol, he assured the auto proclaimed authorities that they will get support from the Russian federation, stating that “Russia is not going to press Transnistria in order to force it to reunite with Republic of Moldova”, and the grant of the state medal “Security Council of the Russian Federation” by Zubakov to a transnistrian official during the same visit is a symbolic act that clearly denotes the total support accorded to the separatist regime. The fact that after Zubakov’s visit in Chisinau, president Voronin was forced to demand the EU’s representative for the Foreign Policy and Common Security that the transnistrian issue to be discussed during the EU – Russia Summit on June 25-26, 2008 is a prove of the ambiguous position of the Russian authorities and their unwillingness to settle the conflict by observing the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. Last hour events that took place in Tiraspol refer to the demission of V. Litkai, already ex minister of Foreign Affairs, who according to some Kiev sources had a pro-Ukrainian orientation and was accused of damaging the relation with Russia, confirms the consolidation policy of Russia concerning the transnistrian conflict. <\/p>\n

In the case of the communist authorities policy from Chisinau we could notice the excessive statements concerning the finality and the proximate settlement of the conflict in spite of the complex settlement framework. Such a situation makes us suppose that the current authorities are more concerned by their political image at the 2009 elections, than to promote consequent policies based on the promotion of the national interest, and in such a situation they are liable to conform to the Russian federation blackmail, generating this way insecurity and uncertainty among the Moldovan civil society. <\/p>\n

Forecasts<\/strong> <\/p>\n

The adoption of the National Security Concept without an ample discussion with the civil society, as well as serious lacks that this has concerning the correlation of security with the democratic principles will determine the raise of the political instability in the country and contribute to the worsening of the democratization issue. In the national identity crisis conditions that characterize Republic of Moldova and legislating the state involvement in the civil society field, communist authorities will continue the massive intimidation of the pro-Rumanian and pro-occidental forces, even if they declare themselves for the European integration, all this in the detriment of the democratic development of the Republic of Moldova. The lack of a clear delimitation between the state institutions and civil society within the National Security Concept proves the communists intention of undemocratic involvement in the field of the civil society regardless of sphere: ONGs, church and religion, freedom of mass-media. Such a policy is in agreement with Russian federation geopolitical interests for whom the democratization of the Moldovan society is equivalent with the lost of influence and thus a test of communist authorities’ loyalty. <\/p>\n

The current international context is favorable to the involvement of the Russian Federation “regarding transnistrian conflict settlement”, for which the settlement equals to the political reorganization of the Republic of Moldova and the institutional guaranty of control toward it, regardless of the terminology that is going to be used. Thus, the perspectives of settling the conflict are uncertain with an ascendant imperialist Russia that is opposing the NATO and EU enlargement process. It is expected that the Russian Federation will continue its effort to correlate the transnistrian conflict settlement with the activities of strengthening the CIS. The raising presence of EU and NATO in the region will determine the intensification of the cooperation with Russia and separatist authorities in order to block the EU initiatives and reserve that right for them; the case of Valeri Litkai dismissal being an example.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading Time: <\/span> 7<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>Only after 7 years of governing, at the end of its second mandate and in the framework of a difficult electoral campaign in 2009, the majority of the communist parliamentarians voted on 22.05.208 the<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-130750","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"content_social_share":"Reading Time: <\/span> 7<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

Author: Vitalie Grosu, Political and Security Statewatch, Nr. 6, 2008<\/p>\n

Overview<\/strong> <\/p>\n

Only after 7 years of governing, at the end of its second mandate and in the framework of a difficult electoral campaign in 2009, the majority of the communist parliamentarians voted on 22.05.208 the Law on National Security Concept. In an ongoing process of democratization, such a document is expected to contribute to the strengthening of the democratic system. Thus, the activities of the communist authorities revealed multiple lacks of this Concept and of the national security policy. <\/p>\n

Intensified dialogue on transnistrian conflict, successive bilateral visits and the multilateral meetings of the actor involved in the conflict solving process gave a hope concerning the chances of settling this “frozen conflict”. Thus, the development of the events, proved once again the complexity of the current state of conflict solving process, as well as the lack of a continuous policy and a coherent solving project of the Republic of Moldova’s authorities, this contributing to the raise of the Moldovan society’s insecurity and instability. <\/p>\n

A security policy in the detriment of democracy?
\n<\/strong>
\nAccording to the Republic of Moldova’s Constitution and some judicial documents signed at international level, the State takes the responsibility to respect the democracy principles, human rights and liberties, as well as to grant the state of law. In spite of such strategic trends, during the years of independence, and especially after seven years of communist governance, we could point out a deplorable situation in the field of democracy, human rights and Moldovan society security. According to Freedom House’s annual reports, during the last seven years we could see a negative trend characterized by the stagnation of the Republic of Moldova’s democratic process. <\/p>\n

The recently adopted National Security Concept testifies the countries democratization stagnation, and represents a tentative to legislate and institutionalize the undemocratic communist authorities. Of all the lacks of the new National Security Concept, as showing an aggressive attitude towards NATO, promotion of a incoherent Security Policy, disrespect shown for the opportunities offered by the regional framework and international cooperation, the absence of a clear and sure link between the Security Policy and the principles of Democracy represents possibly the most serious one. The discrepancy between security policy and democratic principles has as main objective to repress the opposition in the Moldovan society and to maintain masterly the control over the political power. <\/p>\n

Thus, unlike many other judicial documents set up in accordance with the Council of Europe’s standards, but not applied in practice, the adoption of the National Security Concept was submited to abusive actions from the part of the communist authorities, which generated a new class of threats towards Moldovan society’s democracy and security. The bringing on action of criminal cases to some young people, who posted critical comments on the side of communist authorities during June 2008, proves the worsening of the relation security-democracy. One of the reasons invoked by the authorities are aberrant and have no logic, while the others are violating the fundamental rights as: the right to self conscience and the freedom of speech. This way, the communist authorities proved once again their incapacity and unwillingness to promote real democratic reforms. <\/p>\n

These abusive actions from the part of the Republic of Moldova’s authorities towards citizens and NGOs who realizing their right to self conscience and freedom of speech pleaded for unification with Romania, are part of the communist authorities hysteria in their relation with Romania. Plus, the simple fact that they followed the visit and the declarations of the President of the Commission for CIS of the Russian Federation State Duma, Al. Ostrovschi, who overdoing this duties, in his discussions with the Moldovan officials invoked the “threat of Romanization of the Republic of Moldova” gives us the right to suppose that they have as objective the manifestation of obedience towards Moscow and obtaining support concerning the transnistrian conflict. So, in spite of the declarations that state European Integration as main foreign policy vector, as well as the stipulations of the new National Security Concept regarding the adherence to the European security standards and practices it is very well pointed out the simulation by the communist authorities of the security strategy in the detriment of the democracy practiced by the Russian federation and Belarus, or in such a framework we could doubt the European integration intentions of the current communist authorities that are liable to oscillations between East and West. <\/p>\n

A new transnistrian odyssey and Russian Federation’s double standards policy
\n<\/strong>
\nThe intensification of the dialogue concerning the transnistrian conflict shown by the Helsinki meeting on June 10, 2008 regarding the restarting of the 5+2 negotiation format, bilateral visits made by the Moldovan officials in the Russian Federation and vice versa, as well as the meetings between some USA and EU representatives with the auto proclaimed transnistrian authorities created the impression of a soon conflict settlement by observing the Republic of Moldova’s national interest. The sequence of the events proves the complexity of the current negotiation round and their capacity to be unforeseeable. <\/p>\n

Thus, in spite that on June 10, 2008 in Helsinki was decided to put all the efforts in order to restart the 5+2 negotiation process by strengthening the trust measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol, in order to convince the separatist leader it was necessary a personal meeting with the Foreign Minister of Ukraine in Odessa on June 14, 2008, only four days after the Helsinki meeting. This mysterious meeting of the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Vl. Ograzco, and of the separatist leader I. Smirnov is full of significance because of the Russian Federation’s reaction as well as because of the meeting statements. So, there are identified two aspects of primordial importance. The first aspect emerges from the I. Smirnov’s declarations concerning the “Chisinau’s exclusion in the negotiations about the border demarcation between Ukraine and Transnistria”. Or, indirectly these pretensions of direct negotiations between Ukraine and Transnistria regarding border delimitation are equivalent to the recognition of the transnistrian state; all this because negotiations on issues about border delimitation can take place only between two recognized states. This fact demonstrates ones again that Transnistria regardless of the international situation is not willing to give up the independence purpose. The second aspect has a more symbolic nature and refers to the separatist leader’s statements about “the relevance and the present interest of the Iuscenco Plan”. Establishing a correlation between the present initiatives of conflict settlement and the 2005 plan, which turned out to be non functional and hasn’t been implemented is not a very good association for the EU, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova aspirations to settle the conflict and demonstrates clearly the intentions of blocking the negotiations by the Transnistrian authorities. <\/p>\n

The reaction of the Russian Federation regarding the Odessa meeting was prompt and showed the Russian geopolitical interests in the transnistrian conflict, as well as its double standards policy concerning this issue. So, during the visit on June 19-21 of the Security Council President of the Russian Federation in Chisinau, Iu. Zubacov, was asked the exclusion of any political or economic pressure on separatist authorities, these statements meaning a warning towards Moldovan authorities regarding the strategy that has to be followed during the current discussion round. Concomitantly, in spite of the statements of good intentions made in Chisinau, during Zubacov’s visit in Tiraspol, he assured the auto proclaimed authorities that they will get support from the Russian federation, stating that “Russia is not going to press Transnistria in order to force it to reunite with Republic of Moldova”, and the grant of the state medal “Security Council of the Russian Federation” by Zubakov to a transnistrian official during the same visit is a symbolic act that clearly denotes the total support accorded to the separatist regime. The fact that after Zubakov’s visit in Chisinau, president Voronin was forced to demand the EU’s representative for the Foreign Policy and Common Security that the transnistrian issue to be discussed during the EU – Russia Summit on June 25-26, 2008 is a prove of the ambiguous position of the Russian authorities and their unwillingness to settle the conflict by observing the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. Last hour events that took place in Tiraspol refer to the demission of V. Litkai, already ex minister of Foreign Affairs, who according to some Kiev sources had a pro-Ukrainian orientation and was accused of damaging the relation with Russia, confirms the consolidation policy of Russia concerning the transnistrian conflict. <\/p>\n

In the case of the communist authorities policy from Chisinau we could notice the excessive statements concerning the finality and the proximate settlement of the conflict in spite of the complex settlement framework. Such a situation makes us suppose that the current authorities are more concerned by their political image at the 2009 elections, than to promote consequent policies based on the promotion of the national interest, and in such a situation they are liable to conform to the Russian federation blackmail, generating this way insecurity and uncertainty among the Moldovan civil society. <\/p>\n

Forecasts<\/strong> <\/p>\n

The adoption of the National Security Concept without an ample discussion with the civil society, as well as serious lacks that this has concerning the correlation of security with the democratic principles will determine the raise of the political instability in the country and contribute to the worsening of the democratization issue. In the national identity crisis conditions that characterize Republic of Moldova and legislating the state involvement in the civil society field, communist authorities will continue the massive intimidation of the pro-Rumanian and pro-occidental forces, even if they declare themselves for the European integration, all this in the detriment of the democratic development of the Republic of Moldova. The lack of a clear delimitation between the state institutions and civil society within the National Security Concept proves the communists intention of undemocratic involvement in the field of the civil society regardless of sphere: ONGs, church and religion, freedom of mass-media. Such a policy is in agreement with Russian federation geopolitical interests for whom the democratization of the Moldovan society is equivalent with the lost of influence and thus a test of communist authorities’ loyalty. <\/p>\n

The current international context is favorable to the involvement of the Russian Federation “regarding transnistrian conflict settlement”, for which the settlement equals to the political reorganization of the Republic of Moldova and the institutional guaranty of control toward it, regardless of the terminology that is going to be used. Thus, the perspectives of settling the conflict are uncertain with an ascendant imperialist Russia that is opposing the NATO and EU enlargement process. It is expected that the Russian Federation will continue its effort to correlate the transnistrian conflict settlement with the activities of strengthening the CIS. The raising presence of EU and NATO in the region will determine the intensification of the cooperation with Russia and separatist authorities in order to block the EU initiatives and reserve that right for them; the case of Valeri Litkai dismissal being an example.<\/p>\n

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