{"id":108940,"date":"2007-10-05T16:03:00","date_gmt":"2007-10-05T16:03:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/new.moldova.org\/2007\/10\/05\/analisys-zubkov-told-not-to-get-too-comfy-in-pm-chair-73952-eng\/"},"modified":"2007-10-05T16:03:00","modified_gmt":"2007-10-05T16:03:00","slug":"analisys-zubkov-told-not-to-get-too-comfy-in-pm-chair-73952-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/analisys-zubkov-told-not-to-get-too-comfy-in-pm-chair-73952-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Analisys: Zubkov told not to get too comfy in PM chair"},"content":{"rendered":"Reading Time: <\/span> 5<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

When President Putin nominated Viktor Zubkov as prime minister in September, a significant part of the response to the appointment was consideration of Zubkov’s suitability as a possible presidential successor. Undue focus on elections and succession, according to Putin’s initial statement on the resignation of the Fradkov government, is what led, in part, to the change in government personnel; a continued debate over a post-Putin Russia would serve only to weaken Putin’s current status; such is the nature of "lame duck" syndrome. The shuffle of ministers should have revealed Putin’s displeasure—the ousted ministers either were too ambitious or too open in their support for a successor—or, at the very least, it should have signaled a new direction to expect from the Zubkov-led government. <\/p>\n

Initial reports suggested that a new government would be put together by Zubkov, approved by Putin and announced on September 21st. (1) As it turns out, Zubkov submitted at least two (and reportedly four) different iterations of the government line-up, only to be rejected by Putin. (2) The final composition of the government clearly was the result of significant bargaining, demonstrated most clearly by the reappearance of Anatoli Serdyukov as defense minister. It is certainly unusual for an individual who provides a "double resignation" (when the government resigned, Serdyukov’s resignation could have been assumed, but it was announced separately as an "anti-nepotism" measure) to be reappointed, unless the resignation is meant to rally support around a cause (for example, the unaccepted resignations of Gaidar and other economic reformers at key moments—usually prior to parliamentary congresses—during the Yel’tsin administration). <\/p>\n

The Zubkov draft versions of the government have not been published, but it seems clear either that certain ministers he wanted removed have remained or that some, with whom he would have preferred not to serve, have been appointed, and, in exchange, Serdyukov was allowed to retain his post, despite the noisy resignation. <\/p>\n

With so few changes to the government, it shouldn’t be too difficult to narrow down the potential conflicts. The resignations of the oft-criticized Social Policy Minister Zurabov and the perennially unpopular German Gref were not unexpected. Recently released opinion polls highlighted citizen disaffection with the two (also, Aleksei Kudrin, who, of course, was promoted in the reshuffle). (3) Gref was also the recipient of a public presidential expression of displeasure at a recent government meeting, an excerpt of which was released by the Kremlin. (4) <\/p>\n

Perhaps most notable among the changes is the re-emergence of Dmitri Kozak on the Moscow scene as the Minister for Regional Development. Kozak was the author of at least three major reform attempts during Putin’s administration: regional reform (which was partly implemented, then some of the reforms abandoned, but the goals of regional "coordination" with the federal center remain a strong focus); judicial reform (which, as with many reforms, remains unimplemented but still debated); and administrative reform (several of Kozak’s recommendations, including changes to the number of deputies in each ministry and changes to the status of both Kremlin and ministerial personnel were implemented with the announcement of the reform initiative). <\/p>\n

Zubkov’s displeasure with the civil service reforms, and by extension Kozak, may have been displayed in an interesting side note on the formation of his government. In announcing the changes to the government at its first sitting on 24 September, President Putin remarked, "At the Prime Minister’s request, two new committees were created…." (5) State committees had been one of the targets of Kozak’s reforms, which were meant to slash government and Kremlin duplication of authority and the volume of personnel (in addition to other cost saving measures). (6) <\/p>\n

It certainly is worth noting that two women were added to the cabinet: Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina was appointed Economic Development and Trade Minister. The outgoing minister, German Gref referred to his former deputy and newly-named successor as "one of the most highly-skilled experts in Russia." (7) Nabiullina most recently was head of the Center for Strategic Research and worked on implementation of President Putin’s (and Dmitri Medvedev’s) national priority projects program. Putin also named Tatiana Golikova as Health and Social Development Minister. Golikova previously worked in the Finance Ministry, eventually becoming first deputy finance minister under Aleksei Kudrin. In a shrug to nepotism concerns, Golikova, notably, is the wife of the Viktor Khristenko, Minister for Industry and Energy. (8) <\/p>\n

No sooner was the structure of the new government announced, than President Putin tossed it onto the trash heap of irrelevance with an unexpected announcement of his own. During closing remarks to the United Russia Congress, Putin noted that he was a founder of United Russia, if not a member, and went on to consider a proposal for him to head up the government as "an entirely realistic" possibility. (9) <\/p>\n

Putin coyly hedged his remarks by noting that it was entirely too early to "talk about this at the moment," but then listed two preconditions for him to assume the prime minister’s seat: 1) United Russia would need to win in the December elections. If there had been any concern about United Russia’s electoral success, Putin’s decision to stand as the leading member on the party’s list probably will assure United Russia’s victory; and 2) "[V]oters would have to elect a decent, effective and modern-thinking President with whom it would be possible to work together." (10) Perhaps Putin would have been well served to have been reminded that this new President would have to choose to nominate him as prime minister, unless constitutional changes to reassign the authority to name the government from the executive to the legislative branch are in the offing. <\/p>\n

Putin’s decision to tie himself to United Russia and to consider the prime ministerial slot was well received in the financial world, where stability in Russia generally is more highly-valued than is strengthening democratic processes. This move, however, could have significant long-term consequences that benefit both Russia’s financial future and its democratic political development. <\/p>\n

In the short term, Putin likely has assured himself continued relevance, even dominance in Russia (assuming that some segment of the apparatchiki already are working on the relevant constitutional changes), and the short term consequences of that might not prove beneficial to Russia’s population. (If Putin, Zubkov, and other "investigators" in the Kremlin and government initiate a wide-scale corruption purge as a lead up to elections, his continued leadership might not even benefit most members of his administration.) <\/p>\n

However, the long-term consequences of curtailing the broadly-defined powers of the Russian executive could prove essential to Russia’s political development, post-Putin, into a more balanced regime with strong legislative checks over executive powers. Now, if only a strong judiciary would emerge…. <\/p>\n

Source Notes:
\n(1) RIA-Novosti, 21 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(2) "The Game of Liars’ Poker Continues," 27 Sep 07; www.russia-intelligence.fr via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) 2007-#203, 27 Sep 07.
\n(3) "The People are not satisfied with the government," Vedomosti, 23 Jul 07; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(4) "Excerpts of remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin and cabinet members at their meeting," (as released by the Kremlin), 21 Aug 07; Official Kremlin International Broadcast via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(5) "Beginning of the Meeting with Cabinet Members," 24 Sep 07 via www.kremlin.ru, accessed October 1, 2007.
\n(6) "Apparat delight," by Susan J. Cavan, The ISCIP Analyst, Vol IX, No. 6, 8 April 2004.
\n(7) Interview with German Gref, Ekho Moskvy radio, 25 Sep 07; Russia and CIS Business and Financial Daily, 25 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(8) See ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Two ladies and Kozak," Kommersant, 25 Sep 07; Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis Academic, among others. See "Relatives in Power," Kommersant-Vlast, 24 Sep 07 via JRL 2007-#203, 27 Sep 07 for examples of other powerful relatives serving together in Russia’s government, Kremlin and business entities.
\n(9) "Concluding Remarks at the United Russia Party Congress," President Putin, 1 Oct 07 via www.kremlin.ru\/eng\/speeches\/2007\/10\/01\/2210_type82912type82913type84779_146510.shtml, accessed October 4, 2007.
\n(10) Ibid. <\/p>\n

By Susan J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu) \/\/ ISCIP<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading Time: <\/span> 5<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>When President Putin nominated Viktor Zubkov as prime minister in September, a significant part of the response to the appointment was consideration of Zubkov’s suitability as a possible presidential<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-108940","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"content_social_share":"Reading Time: <\/span> 5<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

When President Putin nominated Viktor Zubkov as prime minister in September, a significant part of the response to the appointment was consideration of Zubkov’s suitability as a possible presidential successor. Undue focus on elections and succession, according to Putin’s initial statement on the resignation of the Fradkov government, is what led, in part, to the change in government personnel; a continued debate over a post-Putin Russia would serve only to weaken Putin’s current status; such is the nature of "lame duck" syndrome. The shuffle of ministers should have revealed Putin’s displeasure—the ousted ministers either were too ambitious or too open in their support for a successor—or, at the very least, it should have signaled a new direction to expect from the Zubkov-led government. <\/p>\n

Initial reports suggested that a new government would be put together by Zubkov, approved by Putin and announced on September 21st. (1) As it turns out, Zubkov submitted at least two (and reportedly four) different iterations of the government line-up, only to be rejected by Putin. (2) The final composition of the government clearly was the result of significant bargaining, demonstrated most clearly by the reappearance of Anatoli Serdyukov as defense minister. It is certainly unusual for an individual who provides a "double resignation" (when the government resigned, Serdyukov’s resignation could have been assumed, but it was announced separately as an "anti-nepotism" measure) to be reappointed, unless the resignation is meant to rally support around a cause (for example, the unaccepted resignations of Gaidar and other economic reformers at key moments—usually prior to parliamentary congresses—during the Yel’tsin administration). <\/p>\n

The Zubkov draft versions of the government have not been published, but it seems clear either that certain ministers he wanted removed have remained or that some, with whom he would have preferred not to serve, have been appointed, and, in exchange, Serdyukov was allowed to retain his post, despite the noisy resignation. <\/p>\n

With so few changes to the government, it shouldn’t be too difficult to narrow down the potential conflicts. The resignations of the oft-criticized Social Policy Minister Zurabov and the perennially unpopular German Gref were not unexpected. Recently released opinion polls highlighted citizen disaffection with the two (also, Aleksei Kudrin, who, of course, was promoted in the reshuffle). (3) Gref was also the recipient of a public presidential expression of displeasure at a recent government meeting, an excerpt of which was released by the Kremlin. (4) <\/p>\n

Perhaps most notable among the changes is the re-emergence of Dmitri Kozak on the Moscow scene as the Minister for Regional Development. Kozak was the author of at least three major reform attempts during Putin’s administration: regional reform (which was partly implemented, then some of the reforms abandoned, but the goals of regional "coordination" with the federal center remain a strong focus); judicial reform (which, as with many reforms, remains unimplemented but still debated); and administrative reform (several of Kozak’s recommendations, including changes to the number of deputies in each ministry and changes to the status of both Kremlin and ministerial personnel were implemented with the announcement of the reform initiative). <\/p>\n

Zubkov’s displeasure with the civil service reforms, and by extension Kozak, may have been displayed in an interesting side note on the formation of his government. In announcing the changes to the government at its first sitting on 24 September, President Putin remarked, "At the Prime Minister’s request, two new committees were created…." (5) State committees had been one of the targets of Kozak’s reforms, which were meant to slash government and Kremlin duplication of authority and the volume of personnel (in addition to other cost saving measures). (6) <\/p>\n

It certainly is worth noting that two women were added to the cabinet: Elvira Sakhipzadovna Nabiullina was appointed Economic Development and Trade Minister. The outgoing minister, German Gref referred to his former deputy and newly-named successor as "one of the most highly-skilled experts in Russia." (7) Nabiullina most recently was head of the Center for Strategic Research and worked on implementation of President Putin’s (and Dmitri Medvedev’s) national priority projects program. Putin also named Tatiana Golikova as Health and Social Development Minister. Golikova previously worked in the Finance Ministry, eventually becoming first deputy finance minister under Aleksei Kudrin. In a shrug to nepotism concerns, Golikova, notably, is the wife of the Viktor Khristenko, Minister for Industry and Energy. (8) <\/p>\n

No sooner was the structure of the new government announced, than President Putin tossed it onto the trash heap of irrelevance with an unexpected announcement of his own. During closing remarks to the United Russia Congress, Putin noted that he was a founder of United Russia, if not a member, and went on to consider a proposal for him to head up the government as "an entirely realistic" possibility. (9) <\/p>\n

Putin coyly hedged his remarks by noting that it was entirely too early to "talk about this at the moment," but then listed two preconditions for him to assume the prime minister’s seat: 1) United Russia would need to win in the December elections. If there had been any concern about United Russia’s electoral success, Putin’s decision to stand as the leading member on the party’s list probably will assure United Russia’s victory; and 2) "[V]oters would have to elect a decent, effective and modern-thinking President with whom it would be possible to work together." (10) Perhaps Putin would have been well served to have been reminded that this new President would have to choose to nominate him as prime minister, unless constitutional changes to reassign the authority to name the government from the executive to the legislative branch are in the offing. <\/p>\n

Putin’s decision to tie himself to United Russia and to consider the prime ministerial slot was well received in the financial world, where stability in Russia generally is more highly-valued than is strengthening democratic processes. This move, however, could have significant long-term consequences that benefit both Russia’s financial future and its democratic political development. <\/p>\n

In the short term, Putin likely has assured himself continued relevance, even dominance in Russia (assuming that some segment of the apparatchiki already are working on the relevant constitutional changes), and the short term consequences of that might not prove beneficial to Russia’s population. (If Putin, Zubkov, and other "investigators" in the Kremlin and government initiate a wide-scale corruption purge as a lead up to elections, his continued leadership might not even benefit most members of his administration.) <\/p>\n

However, the long-term consequences of curtailing the broadly-defined powers of the Russian executive could prove essential to Russia’s political development, post-Putin, into a more balanced regime with strong legislative checks over executive powers. Now, if only a strong judiciary would emerge…. <\/p>\n

Source Notes:
\n(1) RIA-Novosti, 21 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(2) "The Game of Liars’ Poker Continues," 27 Sep 07; www.russia-intelligence.fr via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) 2007-#203, 27 Sep 07.
\n(3) "The People are not satisfied with the government," Vedomosti, 23 Jul 07; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(4) "Excerpts of remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin and cabinet members at their meeting," (as released by the Kremlin), 21 Aug 07; Official Kremlin International Broadcast via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(5) "Beginning of the Meeting with Cabinet Members," 24 Sep 07 via www.kremlin.ru, accessed October 1, 2007.
\n(6) "Apparat delight," by Susan J. Cavan, The ISCIP Analyst, Vol IX, No. 6, 8 April 2004.
\n(7) Interview with German Gref, Ekho Moskvy radio, 25 Sep 07; Russia and CIS Business and Financial Daily, 25 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic.
\n(8) See ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Two ladies and Kozak," Kommersant, 25 Sep 07; Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis Academic, among others. See "Relatives in Power," Kommersant-Vlast, 24 Sep 07 via JRL 2007-#203, 27 Sep 07 for examples of other powerful relatives serving together in Russia’s government, Kremlin and business entities.
\n(9) "Concluding Remarks at the United Russia Party Congress," President Putin, 1 Oct 07 via www.kremlin.ru\/eng\/speeches\/2007\/10\/01\/2210_type82912type82913type84779_146510.shtml, accessed October 4, 2007.
\n(10) Ibid. <\/p>\n

By Susan J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu) \/\/ ISCIP<\/p>\n

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