{"id":102059,"date":"2006-09-14T16:41:00","date_gmt":"2006-09-14T16:41:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/new.moldova.org\/2006\/09\/14\/beware-the-ivanov-doctrine-18271-eng\/"},"modified":"2006-09-14T16:41:00","modified_gmt":"2006-09-14T16:41:00","slug":"beware-the-ivanov-doctrine-18271-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/beware-the-ivanov-doctrine-18271-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Beware the Ivanov Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

David J. Smith* <\/p>\n

“ Russia is pursuing a consistent and, where necessary, even tough policy in upholding its national interests,” writes Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in the July 13 edition of Izvestia. His Triad of National Values—sovereign democracy, strong economy and military might—is a stark, comprehensive exposition of Moscow’s increasingly bellicose foreign policy. With Russian military helicopters buzzing above Zugdidi, we had better take a close look at the Ivanov doctrine. <\/p>\n

Published as leaders of the world’s industrial democracies were winging their way to Saint Petersburg for the G-8 Summit, Ivanov’s article was also meant to discourage the distinguished guests from dwelling on matters that might embarrass Putin in his hometown. <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s warning combined with the Israel-Hizbollah clash to stifle any serious G-8 discussion of energy security. European leaders had been concerned about Russia ’s reliability as an energy supplier since Putin’s brazen January 1 gas cutoff to Ukraine . But Ivanov’s words preempt: “ Russia ’s economic potential today makes it possible to maintain world energy stability.” Then—for anyone who failed to understand—he adds that Russia is an “energy superpower.” Accordingly, the G-8 adopted an anodyne statement on energy security and that was that—until the coming winter. <\/p>\n

Whether we will sustain another Kremlin-inspired blackout or some other low blow, Ivanov is clear that Moscow will continue bullying. And bullying is usually rooted in feelings of inadequacy. Indeed, Ivanov’s article bewrays a manic depression that alternates bouts of defensiveness with thrusts of aggression and delusions of grandeur. <\/p>\n

Russia, says Ivanov, “faced a real threat of losing its independence,” but “the situation began to change cardinally in the past six years,” (during Putin’s presidency, that is). Russia is again a great power—tough—“resolutely resisting any attempts to interfere in [its] internal affairs and impose standards of life that are alien.” What is that? Who is attempting to impose anything on Russia ? Insecure leaders of marginal countries intone this sort of ranting against McDonald’s restaurants. Sadly, this comes from the man who may be Russia ’s next president. <\/p>\n

As one might expect, the defense minister’s manic depression originates close to home, in defensiveness about Russia ’s oft-criticized political system. Russia , he explains, is a “sovereign democracy…which implies the right of citizens to determine policy in their country and uphold that right against external pressure by any means, including by means of arms.” <\/p>\n

This apparently against “those of our partners in the community of democratic states…that criticize us for not being democratic enough and even for attempts to revive authoritarianism.” (Most of Russia ’s citizens have long since given up any notion of “determining policy in their country.”) <\/p>\n

With regard to the international critics, Ivanov is correct that “all democratic states have their national peculiarities.” Japan ’s democracy is unlike India ’s or England ’s. Italy ’s parliamentary system is different from America ’s presidential one, which is different from France ’s presidential system. And the French Fifth Republic is a marked departure from the French Fourth Republic , which somewhat resembled the Italian parliamentary system. No one begrudges Russia its idiosyncrasies. <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s error is to qualify democracy with an adjective—sovereign—that obscures Russia’s departure from the norms shared by all modern democracies: majority rule, minority rights, rule of law, basic civil liberties, including free exchange of ideas and guarantee of private property. Moreover, it is manic to threaten critics—domestic or foreign—with force of arms. <\/p>\n

Looking outward, on one hand, Ivanov claims, “ Russia has always tried to adhere to the principles of non-interference.” On the other hand, he declares that each world power is engaged in “a special ideological project that competes with others for the right to determine the world agenda and prospects for the development of humankind.” <\/p>\n

Presumably, Moscow ’s attention to the world agenda underpins its protracted mischief in Transdniestria<\/font>, Samachablo and Abkhazia. Its concern for humankind no doubt motivated its cutoff of Georgian energy during the dead of last winter and its embargo on Georgian wine, water and agricultural products. <\/p>\n

Most recently, two Russian military helicopters overflew Georgia ’s Zugdidi district on August 19. A few days later, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reiterated that Moscow regards its illegal distribution of passports to current residents of Abkhazia, which Russia recognizes is part of Georgia<\/font>, as a potential pretext for even greater interference in that region. “We will not leave in the lurch our citizens who live outside Russia ,” Karasin told Izvestia. <\/p>\n

By the way, Putin has not yet found time to reschedule the meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that was to have been held in July. <\/p>\n

The Kremlin is playing tough and it is plain to see why Ivanov believes that Russia needs to be so tough. In his view, there are only enemies. “In the first camp are soft opponents,” those that criticize, that “are unhappy about an independent, strong and confident Russia .” In Ivanov’s “second camp” are those that have “declared an all-out terrorist war on the whole civilized world.” Of course, this would be depressing—and from this follows the truly manic part of the Ivanov doctrine. <\/p>\n

Russia must deter its soft opponents; repel the terrorists. “Given existing geopolitical risks we put the emphasis on the qualitative perfection of the strategic deterrence forces that are capable of effectively destroying an aggressor by a retaliatory strike or a counterstrike under any circumstances. To this end, they are being armed with Topol-M ground-based missile systems and will soon start to get the Bulava-30 sea based missile systems.” <\/p>\n

Let us be clear about these weapons. The Topol-M, also known in Russia as the RS-12M, and to NATO as the SS-27, is a modern 10,500 kilometer-range ballistic missile. It carries a single 550-kiloton nuclear warhead, although the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology is reportedly fitting the Topol-M to carry three independent warheads. The Bulava-30 is a 10,000 kilometer-range submarine-launched version of the Topol-M, known to NATO as the SS-NX-30. According to Ivanov, these missiles “can pierce existing and future missile defense.” <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s assertion that “a great deal of attention in military development plans is paid to strengthening general purpose forces” fails to overcome the impression that he is over-reliant on strategic nuclear weapons. <\/p>\n

This may stem from Russia ’s January 14, 2000 National Security Blueprint that broadened the application for nuclear weapons, presumably to compensate for the weakness of Russian conventional forces. However, it also appears rooted in Ivanov’s insecurity about Russia ’s greatness in the face of “only one power center [that] seeks to dominate the planet,” a clear Cold War-style reference to the United States<\/font>. <\/p>\n

Ivanov is living in another world. His doctrine would be comical if it were not so sad and, frankly, dangerous for the world in which the rest of us live. This is unlikely to change until, to borrow Ivanov’s words, Russia<\/font> is truly democratic, independent, strong and confident. Far from being enemies, most of us wish Russia success in attaining these goals—that would be in our interest too. <\/p>\n

David J. Smith is Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, and Director of the Georgian Security Analysis Center, Tbilisi. \/\/ Izvestia<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>Beware the Ivanov Doctrine<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-102059","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"content_social_share":"Reading Time: <\/span> 4<\/span> minutes<\/span><\/span>

David J. Smith* <\/p>\n

“ Russia is pursuing a consistent and, where necessary, even tough policy in upholding its national interests,” writes Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in the July 13 edition of Izvestia. His Triad of National Values—sovereign democracy, strong economy and military might—is a stark, comprehensive exposition of Moscow’s increasingly bellicose foreign policy. With Russian military helicopters buzzing above Zugdidi, we had better take a close look at the Ivanov doctrine. <\/p>\n

Published as leaders of the world’s industrial democracies were winging their way to Saint Petersburg for the G-8 Summit, Ivanov’s article was also meant to discourage the distinguished guests from dwelling on matters that might embarrass Putin in his hometown. <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s warning combined with the Israel-Hizbollah clash to stifle any serious G-8 discussion of energy security. European leaders had been concerned about Russia ’s reliability as an energy supplier since Putin’s brazen January 1 gas cutoff to Ukraine . But Ivanov’s words preempt: “ Russia ’s economic potential today makes it possible to maintain world energy stability.” Then—for anyone who failed to understand—he adds that Russia is an “energy superpower.” Accordingly, the G-8 adopted an anodyne statement on energy security and that was that—until the coming winter. <\/p>\n

Whether we will sustain another Kremlin-inspired blackout or some other low blow, Ivanov is clear that Moscow will continue bullying. And bullying is usually rooted in feelings of inadequacy. Indeed, Ivanov’s article bewrays a manic depression that alternates bouts of defensiveness with thrusts of aggression and delusions of grandeur. <\/p>\n

Russia, says Ivanov, “faced a real threat of losing its independence,” but “the situation began to change cardinally in the past six years,” (during Putin’s presidency, that is). Russia is again a great power—tough—“resolutely resisting any attempts to interfere in [its] internal affairs and impose standards of life that are alien.” What is that? Who is attempting to impose anything on Russia ? Insecure leaders of marginal countries intone this sort of ranting against McDonald’s restaurants. Sadly, this comes from the man who may be Russia ’s next president. <\/p>\n

As one might expect, the defense minister’s manic depression originates close to home, in defensiveness about Russia ’s oft-criticized political system. Russia , he explains, is a “sovereign democracy…which implies the right of citizens to determine policy in their country and uphold that right against external pressure by any means, including by means of arms.” <\/p>\n

This apparently against “those of our partners in the community of democratic states…that criticize us for not being democratic enough and even for attempts to revive authoritarianism.” (Most of Russia ’s citizens have long since given up any notion of “determining policy in their country.”) <\/p>\n

With regard to the international critics, Ivanov is correct that “all democratic states have their national peculiarities.” Japan ’s democracy is unlike India ’s or England ’s. Italy ’s parliamentary system is different from America ’s presidential one, which is different from France ’s presidential system. And the French Fifth Republic is a marked departure from the French Fourth Republic , which somewhat resembled the Italian parliamentary system. No one begrudges Russia its idiosyncrasies. <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s error is to qualify democracy with an adjective—sovereign—that obscures Russia’s departure from the norms shared by all modern democracies: majority rule, minority rights, rule of law, basic civil liberties, including free exchange of ideas and guarantee of private property. Moreover, it is manic to threaten critics—domestic or foreign—with force of arms. <\/p>\n

Looking outward, on one hand, Ivanov claims, “ Russia has always tried to adhere to the principles of non-interference.” On the other hand, he declares that each world power is engaged in “a special ideological project that competes with others for the right to determine the world agenda and prospects for the development of humankind.” <\/p>\n

Presumably, Moscow ’s attention to the world agenda underpins its protracted mischief in Transdniestria<\/font>, Samachablo and Abkhazia. Its concern for humankind no doubt motivated its cutoff of Georgian energy during the dead of last winter and its embargo on Georgian wine, water and agricultural products. <\/p>\n

Most recently, two Russian military helicopters overflew Georgia ’s Zugdidi district on August 19. A few days later, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reiterated that Moscow regards its illegal distribution of passports to current residents of Abkhazia, which Russia recognizes is part of Georgia<\/font>, as a potential pretext for even greater interference in that region. “We will not leave in the lurch our citizens who live outside Russia ,” Karasin told Izvestia. <\/p>\n

By the way, Putin has not yet found time to reschedule the meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that was to have been held in July. <\/p>\n

The Kremlin is playing tough and it is plain to see why Ivanov believes that Russia needs to be so tough. In his view, there are only enemies. “In the first camp are soft opponents,” those that criticize, that “are unhappy about an independent, strong and confident Russia .” In Ivanov’s “second camp” are those that have “declared an all-out terrorist war on the whole civilized world.” Of course, this would be depressing—and from this follows the truly manic part of the Ivanov doctrine. <\/p>\n

Russia must deter its soft opponents; repel the terrorists. “Given existing geopolitical risks we put the emphasis on the qualitative perfection of the strategic deterrence forces that are capable of effectively destroying an aggressor by a retaliatory strike or a counterstrike under any circumstances. To this end, they are being armed with Topol-M ground-based missile systems and will soon start to get the Bulava-30 sea based missile systems.” <\/p>\n

Let us be clear about these weapons. The Topol-M, also known in Russia as the RS-12M, and to NATO as the SS-27, is a modern 10,500 kilometer-range ballistic missile. It carries a single 550-kiloton nuclear warhead, although the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology is reportedly fitting the Topol-M to carry three independent warheads. The Bulava-30 is a 10,000 kilometer-range submarine-launched version of the Topol-M, known to NATO as the SS-NX-30. According to Ivanov, these missiles “can pierce existing and future missile defense.” <\/p>\n

Ivanov’s assertion that “a great deal of attention in military development plans is paid to strengthening general purpose forces” fails to overcome the impression that he is over-reliant on strategic nuclear weapons. <\/p>\n

This may stem from Russia ’s January 14, 2000 National Security Blueprint that broadened the application for nuclear weapons, presumably to compensate for the weakness of Russian conventional forces. However, it also appears rooted in Ivanov’s insecurity about Russia ’s greatness in the face of “only one power center [that] seeks to dominate the planet,” a clear Cold War-style reference to the United States<\/font>. <\/p>\n

Ivanov is living in another world. His doctrine would be comical if it were not so sad and, frankly, dangerous for the world in which the rest of us live. This is unlikely to change until, to borrow Ivanov’s words, Russia<\/font> is truly democratic, independent, strong and confident. Far from being enemies, most of us wish Russia success in attaining these goals—that would be in our interest too. <\/p>\n

David J. Smith is Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, and Director of the Georgian Security Analysis Center, Tbilisi. \/\/ Izvestia<\/p>\n

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